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Résumé
Bien que la littérature sur le problème d’emplacement soit vaste, la plupart des pu-
blications considèrent des modèles simples, dans lesquels une autorité centrale assigne les
utilisateurs aux installations les plus proches. Des caractéristiques plus réalistes, telles que le
comportement des usagers, la compétition et la congestion, sont souvent négligées, peut-être
en raison de leur nature hautement non-linéaire «compliquée». Quelques articles ont incor-
poré ces traits, mais uniquement de facon séparée, et seulement des approches heuristiques
ont été proposées comme méthodes de résolution.
Le problème d’emplacement d’installations consiste à localiser un ensemble d’installa-
tions de manière optimale afin de répondre à une demande donnée. Dans un environnement
congestioné où les usagers ont le choix, les installations sont généralement modélisées sous
la forme de files d’attente. Les utilisateurs sélectionnent les installations à fréquenter en
fonction de leur utilité perçue, qui est généralement écrite comme une combinaison linéaire
de la distance de déplacement, du temps d’attente dans les installations, etc. En résulte
un modèle dit "à deux niveaux" appartenant à la classe des programmes mathématiques à
contraintes d’équilibre (MPEC en anglais), où l’équilibre peut être exprimé sous la forme
d’une inéquation variationnelle.
Notre travail est axé sur le problème d’emplacement d’installations où les usagers ont le
choix (CC–FLP en anglais) et nous fournissons un certain nombre de contributions impor-
tantes. Du point de vue de la modélisation, nous proposons différents modèles qui capturent
les principales caractéristiques du CC–FLP. Pour ces programmes non-linéaires, discrets, et
NP-difficiles, nous avons conçu des algorithmes exactes et d’approximation, ainsi que des
heuristiques sur-mesure. Notre travail couvre trois articles. Dans le premier article, nous
considérons différents modèles qui intègrent l’abandon aux centres de services, en raison des
places limitées dans la file d’attente, tandis que le comportement des utilisateurs peut être
iii
déterministe ou stochastique. Dans ce dernier cas, le comportement des usagers correspond
au principe d’équilibre de Wardrop, tandis que dans le premier cas, les clients se distri-
buent entre les établissements selon un modèle de choix d’utilité aléatoire Logit. Au-delà de
l’analyse des propriétés théoriques du modèle, nous concevons une heuristique menée par
les usagers et un algorithme d’approximation linéaire pour lequel nous prouvons une borne
d’erreur de l’approximation, dans le cas d’une file d’attente M/M/1.
Le second article est consacré à la conception d’un nouvel algorithme de ‘Branch and
Bound’ (B&B) pour résoudre une sous-classe plus générale des MPEC. L’algorithme est
implémenté et évalué sur un CC–FLP. L’idée est de traiter virtuellement chaque nœud de
l’arbre B& B comme un problème d’optimisation distinct, afin de tirer parti de la puissance
des solveurs MILP et de leur prétraitement fort au niveau de la racine. Notre approche
algorithmique est basée sur une combinaison de programmation linéaire à nombres entiers
et mixtes (MILP en anglais), de techniques de linéarisation et de la resolution itérative de
sous-problèmes convexes, et nécessite une gestion d’arbre sophistiquée.
Dans le troisième article, nous incorporons les prix dans le CC–FLP. Le prix est une
variable de décision continue, tout comme la localisation et le niveaux et de service, et les
utilisateurs l’intègrent dans leur utilité. Les concepts de tarification du réseaux et de CC–
FLP étant fusionnés en un seul modèle, le problème devient extrêmement difficile, également
en raison de la présence de variables de localisation et de niveau de service, ainsi que de délais
d’attente bidimensionnels. Pour ce programme à deux niveaux non-convexe, nous avons conçu
un algorithme basé sur des approximations linéaires emprunté à la fois à la littérature sur la
localisation et à la tarification du réseau.
Mots clés : probleme d’emplacement d’installations, programmation à deux ni-
veaux, programmation à nombres entiers et mixtes, équilibre, ﬁle d’attente, non
convexe, optimisation globale, tariﬁcation.
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Abstract
While the location literature is vast, most papers consider simpler models, in which a
central authority assigns users to the closest facilities. More realistic traits, such as user
behaviour, competition, and congestion are often overlooked, perhaps due to their ‘compli-
cating’ highly non-linear nature. A few papers did incorporate them, but separately, and
only heuristic approaches have been proposed as solution methods.
The facility location problem consists in optimally locating a set of facilities in order
to satisfy a given demand. In a congested user-choice environment, facilities are typically
modeled as queues, and users select the facilities to patronize based on their perceived
utility, which is, in general, written as linear combination of travel distance, waiting time at
facilities, etc. The resulting bilevel model belongs to the class of mathematical programs with
equilibrium constraints (MPECs), where the equilibrium can be expressed as a variational
inequality.
Our work is focused on the competitive congested user-choice facility location problem
(CC–FLP), and we provide a number of strong contributions. From the modeling point
of view, we propose various models that capture the key features of CC–FLP. For these
NP-hard discrete nonlinear programs we designed exact and approximated algorithms, as
well as tailored heuristics. Our work spans three papers. In the first article we consider
different models that incorporate balking at facilities, due to limited places in the queue,
while user behaviour can be either deterministic or stochastic. In the latter case, user
behaviour fits Wardrop’s equilibrium principle, while in the former case, customers distribute
among facilities according to a Logit random utility choice model. Beyond the analysis of the
model’s theoretical properties, we design a user-driven heuristic and a linear approximation
algorithm, for which we prove a bound on the approximation error, for the M/M/1 queue.
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The second paper is dedicated to the design of a novel exact branch-and-bound (B&B)
algorithm for solving a more general subclass of MPECs, which is implemented and evalu-
ated on a CC–FLP. The idea is to virtually treat each node of the B&B tree as a separate
optimization problem, in oder to leverage the strength of the MILP solvers and their strong
preprocessing at the root node. Our algorithmic approach is based on a combination of
Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP), linearization techniques and the iterative solu-
tion of convex subproblems, and requires a sophisticated tree management.
In the third paper we incorporate mill pricing into the CC–FLP. Price is a continuous
decision variable, along with the location and service levels, and user incorporate it into their
utility. Since concepts from network pricing and CC–FLP are merged into a single model,
the problem becomes extremely challenging, also due to the presence of facility location and
service level decision variables, as well as bivariate queueing delays. For this non-convex
bilevel program we devise an algorithm based on linear approximations, that borrows from
both location and network pricing literature.
Keywords: location, bilevel programming, mixed integer programming, equilib-
rium, queueing, nonconvex, global optimization, pricing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
People have faced the facility location problem since the early days of human civilization,
when they decided where to build their households, their villages, etc. A more formal for-
mulation of the location problem was perhaps first introduced by the mathematician Pierre
de Fermat (1601 – 1665). In his work entitled ‘Methodus ad disquirendam maximam et
minima’ he proposed the following puzzle: ‘Given three points in a plane, find a fourth
point such that the sum of its distances to the three given points is as small as possible.’
[Eiselt and Marianov, 2011]. The earliest known (geometrical) solution belongs to Fer-
mat’s pupil, Evangelista Torricelli (1598 – 1647). Although he found it around 1640, it
was published much later, in 1919 in ‘Opere di Evangelista Torricelli’. This puzzle would
later constitute the foundation of an entire class of problems, called the Facility Location
Problem (FLP).
In Operations Research the class of Facility Location Problems (FLP) can be stated as:
locate one or more facilities within a set of possible sites [Dantrakul et al., 2014], under
different assumptions, with the goal to serve a set of demand points. The candidate sites
can be represented either by a discrete set of points, or by continuous space. In the former
case we have a discrete location problem whilst in the latter we have a continuous location
problem [Dantrakul et al., 2014]. From a mathematical point of view, FLP is a combi-
natorial optimization problem that has numerous practical applications such as location of
service centers (health clinics, communication centers, banks, etc.), warehouses, production
facilities, plants and shops.
FLP has been extensively studied in the literature. The existent formulations cover a
plethora of models, from basic to more elaborate models. However, most papers are making
simplifying assumptions. In this thesis we focus on more realistic models, that incorporate
competition among several existing firms, congestion and user behaviour.
1.1. FLP: Basic ingredients
Although an FLP can be modelled in many ways, some components are common to all
models. The set of locations, the customers, and the facilities represent the basic ingredi-
ents for even the simplest formulation [Azarmand and Neishabouri, 2009]. While the
location subproblem corresponds to deciding the sites where the facilities are to be opened,
the allocation represents the assignment of the customers to their respective facilities. Of
course, they are part of a larger problem, in which other parameters are to be decided, for
instance the capacity of the facilities, the number of servers in each facility, etc.
Customers are assigned to facilities either by a central authority, or they have the choice
themselves. Typically, when the allocation is centralized, the objective function minimizes
the total weighted sum of distances, waiting time etc. When the model takes into account
users’ preferences, a discrete choice model is used, where a random term enters the users’
utility function. In the FLP case, the discrete options are associated to the set of open
facilities to patronize. Every client must choose one and only one location from the set.
The main elements of the mathematical model are:
— the agents (users, competitors, etc.);
— the interactions between the agents;
— the optimization objectives, goals, etc.
In the case of Facility Location Problem several issues are being raised. From what point
of view are we looking at the problem (users, competitors, etc.)? How many facilities are
there to be placed in the network? Do facilities have a limited capacity? Are we considering
a deterministic or a probabilistic model? Do users have a choice or is there a central coor-
dination? Are there other competitors already in the market? If yes, how do they interact
with the entering firm? Do they engage in a sequential or simultaneous game, or do they
remain unresponsive to the actions of the newly entered? The answers to all these questions
written in a mathematical form, dictate the main characteristics of the model.
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The aspects of the problem that can be incorporated are supposedly unlimited, due to
a great variety of real-life situations that can be modelled. Nevertheless, we can identify a
few features that tend to appear very often in the literature.
— Capacity. We define the capacity of a facility as the quantity of product or service
offered, etc. When this quantity is limited the problem is capacitated, as opposed
to the uncapacitated case where the capacity is ‘unlimited’. The capacity can be
represented by the number of servers, the service rate, the number of places available
in the waiting line, etc.
— Nature of objective function. Depending on the agent that is optimizing, and
on the real-life context the objective function can have a social interpretation (for
instance improve a public service), or it could represent a profit, a total cost, etc.
— Nature of choice. We can identify two types of problems depending on who is the
decision maker. If the facilities to be patronized are chosen by the users we talk about
a user choice environment. On the other hand, the choice can be made by a central
authority, in which case we have a centralized decision.
— Randomness. The model could contain stochastic elements, for instance, the popu-
lation from a demand node will choose a facility to patronize with a certain probability
that depends on numerous factors: distance, price, congestion, etc. In contrast, in
simpler models, user choice is deterministic, and the facilities to patronize are always
the closest, the ones offering the lowest price, etc.
— Congestion. When modelling a real-life situation it is natural to consider that some
sort of congestion will occur at the facilities, due to limited resources. Either the
quantity of the product is restricted, or users have to wait in a queue in order to get
served. Sometimes congestion takes place on the edges of the network due to heavy
traffic. This aspect is captured in models by explicitly incorporating users behaviour
in queueing equations, captured queueing delay costs, etc.
— Competition. Competitors play an important role, as the way they interact with
each other can change the nature of the problem. In some formulations they remain
unresponsive, whilst in others they can engage into a Stackelberg or Nash game.
The simplest location problem is the uncapacitated FLP, which involves locating
an undetermined number of facilities on a network, in order to satisfy the demand
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for a certain commodity, while minimizing the total cost (fixed setup costs + travel
time) [Averbakh et al., 2007, Boﬀey et al., 2007]. Setup and travel time costs are
represented as a function of the number of open facilities as well as their respective
locations. While the capacity is considered ‘unlimited’ or ‘infinite’, in practice it means that
is sufficiently large to satisfy any possible demand [Boﬀey et al., 2007]. For a given set of
parameters
di: demand originating from user node i ∈ I,
tij: travel time from user node i ∈ I to site j ∈ J ,
and decision variables
xij: fraction of individuals originating from node i ∈ I that choose facility j ∈ J ;
yj: takes the value of 1 if a facility is located at site j, 0 otherwise.
its formulation is:
UFLP: min
x,y
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
ditijxij +
∑
j∈J
fjyj (1.1.1)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
xij = 1, ∀i ∈ I (1.1.2)
∑
i∈I
xij ≤ yj, ∀j ∈ J (1.1.3)
∑
j∈J
yj = p, (1.1.4)
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J (1.1.5)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J. (1.1.6)
The objective (1.1.1) is to minimize the total travel time plus the fixed costs associated
with locating all facilities. Constraint (1.1.2) guarantees that the demand of any user is met
by one or more facilities. Demands can be satisfied (partially or entirely) only by sites where
facilities are open (constraint (1.1.3)). Equations (1.1.4) and (1.1.6) are the non-negativity
and binary constraints, respectively.
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1.2. Congested Facility Location
The Congested Facility Location Problem (CFLP) is a modification of FLP, where con-
gestion is also taken into consideration. We are interested in the CFLP, since it is a more
accurate representation of real-life situations.
Congestion occurs naturally in a context of limited resources and capacitated facilities.
If too many customers arrive at the same time at a service center, they will have to wait in
line in order to be served. Also, if too many cars travel on the same street, traffic congestion
becomes inevitable, hence increasing the travel time/costs.
Congestion can either arise at facilities (thus at nodes, in the case of network represen-
tation) or on the links between nodes, or on both. Thus, in a network we can distinguish
three types of congestion:
— Node congestion (waiting in line to be served, etc.);
— Link congestion (traffic congestion on roads, etc.);
— Network congestion (both node and link congestion).
Depending on the context of the problem, in most cases congestion on links corresponds
to traffic in the network, which is generated only partially by the users taken into account
in the FLP. For instance, if we were to decide a location for a hospital in a city, the amount
of people travelling to the hospital is insignificant compared to the total traffic in the city.
Therefore, it is generally considered that congestion on the links is not influenced by users
constituting the demand, and it is modelled by predefined constant travel costs. Hence, the
underlying network becomes irrelevant, and the problems can be modelled as a bipartite
graph. The sets of nodes represent the demand nodes and the facility nodes, respectively. In
all our three article we consider node congestion, i.e., facilities are modelled as M/M/s/K
queues, or variants thereof. Then, the delay functions are derived from queueing theory (e.g.,
waiting time, probability of balking, etc.).
An important aspect when modelling congestion regards the allocation problem. The
question to be asked is who is the decision maker? Do users decide which facilities to patron-
ize or is there a central authority in charge of the decision? If the decision maker is a central
authority, does it protect the users’ interest? If yes, typically the the congestion and/or travel
costs are minimized [Desrochers et al., 1995, Marianov, 2003, Castillo et al., 2009,
Marianov and Serra, 2011, Vidyarthi and Jayaswal, 2014, Fischetti et al., 2016].
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If users decide, what are the parameters of their decision? What is their purpose and what
makes them prefer a specific facility to another one? A widely used assumption is that users
select facilities based solely on proximity [Marianov, 2003, Berman and Drezner, 2006,
Abouee-Mehrizi et al., 2011, Marić et al., 2012, Camacho-Vallejo et al., 2014].
More complex models, incorporate congestion at facilities, modelled as waiting queues.
Based on these aspects we can identify two environments:
— A user-choice environment, typically modelled by lower-level problem containing equi-
librium constraints or a Logit function of utility.
— A centralized authority environment can be modelled by both single and bilevel for-
mulations.
1.2.1. User-choice environment
When clients choose the facilities to patronize, we talk about a user-choice environment.
The assumption here is that clients are selfish and they minimize their individual disutility,
which is typically expressed as a linear combination of different parameters (e.g., distance,
congestion, price, etc.). We distinguish here two types of behaviour, namely deterministic
and stochastic.
The most common rule when describing the patronizing behaviour is the deterministic
one, which we have considered in all our three articles. The disutilities that we have used
are, respectively
ui,j =


ti,j + αwj + βpK,j (1
st article)
ti,j + αwj (2
nd article)
ti,j + αwj + βpj (3
rd article),
(1.2.1)
where wj represents the waiting time at facilities, pK,j the probability of balking, and pj the
price. Each customer will choose the facility that she finds most attractive. In this case,
customers are assigned to facilities according to Wardrop’s equilibrium principle. According
to it, the disutility of unchosen paths (facilities) is higher than the disutility of the chosen
ones. Let γi denote the minimum disutility for users originating from node i. Then, the
optimal solution x∗ is characterized by the complementarity system
ui,j(x
∗) = γi, if x
∗
i,j > 0
ui,j(x
∗) ≥ γi, if x∗i,j = 0,
(1.2.2)
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and the users’ problem is written as
0 ≤ xi,j ⊥ uij − γi ≥ 0, i ∈ I; j ∈ J. (1.2.3)
Alternatively, we can use vector-matrix notation and write Eq. (1.2.3) as a variational
inequality problem. We group xi,j and ui,j into column vectors x, u ∈ R|I|·|J |, and given
upper-level variables y and µ, the variational inequality V I (u(x), X) is to find x∗ ∈ X(y, µ),
such that
〈u(x∗), x∗ − x〉 ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ X, (1.2.4)
where X =
{
x : yj ≥ xi,j ≥ 0;
∑
j∈J = di
}
. Then, a solution of the variational inequality
will correspond to an equilibrium solution.
If u is a gradient, we define the function U : R −→ R|I|·|J |, such that ∇U(x) = u(x). If U
is twice continuously differentiable and convex, V I (u(x), X) can be written as the following
convex optimization problem [Beckmann et al., 1956]
LL1: min
x
U(x) (1.2.5)
s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di ∀i ∈ I (1.2.6)
xij ≥ 0. ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗ (1.2.7)
Some papers consider the choice as probabilistic, and they use a random utility model.
In our first article we also consider probabilistic behaviours. In this framework, the utility
of facility j for a customer issued from demand node i is given by
u˜ij = −uij + εij
where εij are independent Gumbel variates with common scale parameter θ and variance
π2/(6θ2). In this multinomial logit framework (see [McFadden, 1974]), the demand gen-
erated at node i that patronize an open facility j is given by the expression
xij = di
e−θui,j∑
l∈J∗
e−θui,l
, (1.2.8)
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where J∗ represents the set of open facilities. For small values of θ, users are spread more
or less evenly between facilities while, when θ is large, the assignment approaches that of
a Wardrop equilibrium. Similar to its deterministic counterpart, the solution of Eq. (1.2.8)
can be obtained by solving the program (see [Fisk, 1980]).
LL2: min
x, λ, ρ, w, p
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij ln xij
]
+ U(x)
s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗ .
Due to the presence of the equilibrium constraints, the problem belongs to a larger
class of problems, named MPEC (mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints).
The original problem can be reformulated as NP-hard bilevel program, where at the upper
level we have the firm’s optimization problem (e.g., maximizing the market share or profit,
minimizing the costs, etc.). and at the lower level we have users’ problem (LL1) or (LL2).
1.3. Competitive Facility Location
The Competitive Facility Location Problem (ComFLP) can be defined as an FLP that in-
volves several rival firms, already present in, or joining the market in the future. Competitors
strive to capture maximum market share, or to maximize their profit. On the other hand,
users choose the facility to patronize based on certain parameters: facility attractiveness,
price of the commodity, distance from the customer to the facility, etc.
ComFLP involve a number of interacting agents that interact with one another and is a
part of Game Theory, which is a branch of mathematics that studies the strategic human
behaviour in a competitive situation. The participants involved in the game (i.e. decision-
makers) are the players. Each player is faced with one or more alternatives or strategies.
The outcome of the game depends on the decisions of all players, but uncertainty elements
can also be present in the game.
Economists have developed a number of models based on different types of behaviour.
When only two players compete in the market over a homogeneous product, we have a
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duopoly. Three quintessential examples of duopoly models are Cournot-Nash, Bertrand and
Stackelberg.
(1) Cournot-Nash
If the quantity competition is simultaneous, we have a Cournot-Nash duopoly. The
selling price is represented by a decreasing function of the total demand, called the
inverse demand function, that we note p(x). Let c1(x1) and c2(x2) be the production
costs of the two firms, respectively. Then, the profit function of firm i is:
fi(x1, x2) = xip(x2 + x2)− ci(xi).
If the objective of every firm is to maximize their profit, then the quantities are given
by the Nash equilibrium.
(2) Bertrand
Bertrand’s model is similar to Cournot-Nash, but the players compete in price, rather
than in quantities, and it assumes that clients want to buy from the lowest priced
firm. If the firms charge the same price, the demand is split evenly between the two.
Then, at equilibrium, prices will equal the marginal cost.
(3) Stackelberg
Let us consider the same duopoly scenario, but the companies are moving sequentially
rather than simultaneously. Firm 1 chooses the quantity to produce. Next, firm 2
takes note of the quantity produced by firm 1, and produces its quantity accordingly.
We call firm 1 the leader and firm 2 the follower. The price is set once both quantities
are decided.
In order to have a Stackelberg equilibrium, some assumptions are being made. First,
the follower observes the leader’s action, and the leader must know it ‘ex ante’ .
Second, the follower must commit to a future Stackelberg action, and the leader must
be aware of it, as well. In practice firms engage into a Stackelberg game only if one
has the possibility to move first.
The main difference between a Cournot-Nash or Bertrand, and a Stackelberg model is
that in the case of the former two model, no player is at disadvantage due to the simultaneity
of the game. In a Stackelberg game, one player must move first, which could be an advantage
or disadvantage.
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Acording to [Plastria, 2001], when modelling a ComFLP, several aspects are taken into
account: competition type, features of the market and decision variables.
The simplest type of competition is the static one, in which competitors already present in
the market are unresponsive to the actions of the newly entered firm, thus their characteristics
remain fixed. When the competitors react to the actions of the firm emerging into the
market (competition with foresight [Plastria, 2001]), we have a sequential model. The
firms engage in a Stackelberg game, in which the newcomer plays the role of the leader and
the follower is played by the existing firms. A full overview on the sequential models is
provided by [Eiselt and Laporte, 1997].
Interactions between competitors can also be described by a dynamic model, where later
players have some knowledge about earlier actions. The challenge of such a model is to find
the equilibrium solution, if one exists.
The Competitive Facility Location Problem was first introduced by Hotelling
in 1929, when he studied the competition between two firms under inelastic de-
mand [Hotelling, 1929]. In his work he considered a very simple scenario: a demand
population is uniformly distributed along a line segment, and two firms locate their service
points at distances a and b from the two segment ends (A and B), respectively. Customers
choose one of the firms based on the sum of commodity price and transportation costs, in
an attempt to minimize their total costs. The objective of each firm is to maximize their
profit. The decision variables of ComFLP are common to the generic FLP: the number of
facilities to locate, as well as their locations, their properties (capacity, service rate, etc.),
the objective of the firms, etc. Later, Labbé and Hakimi [Labbé and Hakimi, 1991],
described a two-stage location–allocation game in which two firms are engaging in a
Nash game. The two firms are striving to maximize their profit. First, they decide on
location of their facilities, and at the second stage on the quantities to produce. A more
recent contribution is proposed by [Ljubić and Moreno, 2018] who address a market
share-maximization competitive FLP, where captured customer demand is represented
by a multinomial logit model. The authors solve this problem using two branch-and-cut
techniques, namely outer approximation cuts and submodular cuts.
More elaborate developments of ComFLP have been proposed in the literature. They
involve queueing at facilities, and interactions between agents. Most of them are based on
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Stackelberg games, and we can identify two main trends, when it comes to who are the
players. In one, the game is played between two firms, and they can react to each others’
actions, while clients are also taken into account, although their behaviour is modelled by
making simplifying assumptions (e.g. the gravity-based rule) [Küçükaydin et al., 2011,
Saidani et al., 2012, Beresnev, 2013].
Another possibility is that one player is represented by the newly entered firm, and the
second one by the users. One or more competitors are also present in the game, but they
remain unresponsive to the other firm action [Marianov et al., 2008].
To the best of our knowledge, [Marianov et al., 2008], are the first to study the CC–
FLP. They consider a problem where a new firm is making location decisions in a market
where competitors are already operating, but they remain unresponsive to the actions of
the newly arrived. The objective of the entering firm is to maximize market share. Users
patronize a facility with a probability given by a Logit function of distance and waiting
time. Congestion is captured as waiting time in facilities. As the new firm attracts clients,
its facilities become more and more congested and the waiting time at its facilities increases,
which can deter some customers. An equilibrium is reached when no client has incentive to
deviate from her path. Facilities are considered as M/M/s/K queues, which means arrivals
and service are Poisson processes with the mean rate λ and µ, respectively. There are s
servers available, and the queue length is limited to K customers.
1.4. Pricing
Pricing is a key component in market competition. On the one hand, lowering the prices
might attract more customers, but their presence creates congestion, which, finally, might
deter customers. On the other hand, a higher price might attract less customers, but the
firm could still increase its profit.
Three types of pricing strategies are typically considered in the literature
( [Hanjoul et al., 1990]):
— mill pricing: prices can vary between facilities;
— uniform pricing: all facilities charge the same price;
— discriminative pricing: customers patronizing the same facility can be charged differ-
ent prices.
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While the location pricing literature is extensive, most papers study hierarchi-
cal models in which the locations are decided first, then the price competition is
defined by the Bertrand model [Pérez et al., 2004, Panin et al., 2014]. Several au-
thors [Hwang and Mai, 1990, Cheung and Wang, 1995, Aboolian et al., 2008]
argue that this strategy is suboptimal. A joint decision is more suited for practical
applications and can provide valuable insight into whether or not is profitable for a firm to
enter a new market.
Some papers consider simultaneous decisions on location, price and capacity, but they
omit competition [Dobson and Stavrulaki, 2007, Abouee-Mehrizi et al., 2011,
Tong, 2011, Hajipour et al., 2016, Tavakkoli-Moghaddam et al., 2017].
[Pahlavani and Saidi-Mehrabad, 2011] include competition, but they consider lo-
cation as fixed.
Other papers consider congestion and competition and pricing, but locations are fixed
[Sattinger, 2002, Chen and Wan, 2003]. A full review of the literature concerning com-
petition in queueing systems is provided in [Hassin, 2016].
1.5. Contribution
The aim of this thesis is twofold. From a modelling standpoint we extend and improve
the existing models by incorporating location, service levels and pricing decisions into a
competitive, congested user-choice market. Users select facilities based not only on proximity,
but on more realistic traits, such as congestion, price, probability of service denial, etc. In
our three papers we analyze various CC–FLP models that fit the MPEC framework, which
have not been previously investigated.
Another significant novelty of our work is from an algorithmic point of view. The
bilevel literature is very rich, but the variants of CC–FLP that we consider are extremely
challenging, due to their combinatorial, highly non-linear, non-differentiable, and nonconvex
nature, even when location variables are fixed.
The lower level is non-linear, the upper-level is non-convex, and the KKT optimality
conditions of the lower-level can not be reformulated into an MILP. Since the performance of
the exact and quasi-exact bilevel algorithms typically rests on these conditions, they cannot
be successfully applied.
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Metaheuristics could be used in our case (Tabu search, genetic algorithms, etc.), but they
are not ideal, for several reasons. First, the solution space would increase tremendously when
modelling the upper-level non-binary variables, like service level and price. Additionally they
only yield local optimums, which is not desirable, as we are interested in global (or close to
global) optimal solutions. For these difficult problems, we propose exact and approximated
algorithms, as well as tailored heuristics.
What distinguishes our papers from one another is
i) The presence of different elements in the models. In the first paper we consider con-
tinuous service levels, finite queues, and both stochastic and deterministic patronizing
behaviour. In the second article service level is fixed and the number of servers is the
decision variable. The third article incorporates pricing, and the service levels are
continuous.
ii) The algorithms employed are significantly different. In the first article we propose
a piece-wise linear approximation (matheuristic) and a tailored heuristic. While the
second article is dedicated to a Branch-and-Bound exact method, the third paper
proposes an approximated method inspired from the toll pricing network methods.
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Chapter 2
Competitive facility location with selfish users and queues
In the first article we consider the problem faced by a service firm locating new facilities
in a competitive market. A customer traveling from node i to facility j incurs a fixed travel
time tij. Arriving at facility j, she observes the queue and joins it, provided there are no
more than K − 1 customers in the system. If there are no vacancies, she is denied access,
and leaves the system as a lost customer.
The objective of the emerging firm is to maximize the total throughput rate at its
facilities, rather than the arrival rate, which was previously considered in the litera-
ture [Marianov et al., 2008]. We demonstrate why, when balking is present, the through-
put rate is preferable to the arrival rate, and how the maximization of the latter can lead
to paradoxical and unrealistic situations. The firm decides on location (binary) and a con-
tinuous service rate, has a limited budget that can be spent on building facilities or service
rates.
For the sake of computational tractability, and for ‘cleaner analytical re-
sults’ [Berman and Krass, 2015], we use single-server queues in this paper. But
our model is flexible and can accommodate a number of situations, that include or not
balking. Other types of queues can be considered (e.g., M/M/s/K or M/M/s) provided
that the number of server s is fixed, and the decision variable is the service rate µ.
In a random utility model, clients patronize the facility that minimizes their individual
disutility, expressed as a linear combination of travel time, queueing, and probability of
service denial. Then, the utility of facility j for a customer originating from demand node i
is
u˜ij = −uij + εij = −(tij + αwj + βpKj) + εij,
where εij are independent Gumbel variates with common scale parameter θ and variance
π2/(6 · θ2).
In this multinomial Logit framework, flows between demand nodes i and open facilities
j are determined according to the formula (see [McFadden, 1974])
xij = di
e−θ (tij + αwj + βpKj)∑
l∈J∗
e−θ (til + αwl + βpKl)
, (2.0.1)
where J∗ represents the set of open facilities. For large values of θ, the assignment approaches
that of a Wardrop equilibrium.
Eq. (2.0.1) can be reformulated as a convex optimization problem. Then, the original
program is a non-linear bilevel problem (and an MPEC), involving a leader and a follower
(users). Beyond the analysis of the theoretical properties of our model, we propose two
resolution techniques.
The first technique is based on the bilevel reformulation. We write a piecewise linear
approximation of the lower-level nonlinear terms and constraints, followed by the optimality
conditions of the obtained program. Then, the resulting bilinear terms, and the upper-level
objective function are linearized in order to reduce the model to an MILP, which we solve
using an off-the-shelf software, such as CPLEX. The algorithm is a matheuristic for which
no formal bound on the error is guaranteed, in the presence of balking. In its absence, this
approach is asymptotically exact.
The second approach is a heuristic method based on a surrogate single-level problem that
automatically yields user-optimized flows.
Author contributions
— The general research ideas were proposed by my supervisor, Patrice Marcotte.
— The research (including proofs, code, experiments, etc.) was carried out by me.
— The article was written by me, and it was revised and corrected by Patrice Marcotte.
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Competitive facility location with selfish users
and queues
Teodora Dan, Patrice Marcotte
ABSTRACT
In a competitive environment, we consider the problem faced by a service firm that makes
decisions with respect to both the location and service levels of its facilities, taking into
account that users patronize the facility that maximizes their individual utility, expressed as
the sum of travel time, queueing delay, and a random term. This situation can be modelled
as a bilevel program that involves discrete and continuous variables, as well as linear and
nonlinear (convex and nonconvex) functions. We design for its solution an algorithm based
on piecewise linear approximation, as well as a matheuristic that exploits the very structure
of the problem.
Keywords: location, bilevel programming, equilibrium, queueing, nonconvex
2.1. Introduction
2.1.1. Contribution of this paper
While the literature concerning discrete facility location is vast, few studies have focused
on user choice, where the latter frequently involves congestion, either along the paths leading
to a facility, or at the facility itself. The aim of this paper is to analyze a model that captures
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the key features of congestion within a user choice environment, yielding a bilevel program
where the leader firm’s objective function integrates the stochastic equilibrium resulting from
the choice of locations and the associated service levels. Beyond the analysis of the model’s
theoretical properties, the paper is devoted to the design and analysis of efficient algorithms,
whose nature is either based on approximations or heuristic.
Our model is closely related to that of [Marianov et al., 2008], who propose a location
model where queueing (and balking) is explicitly taken into account, while users are assigned
to facilities according to a logit discrete choice model, yielding a mathematical program
involving user-equilibrium constraints. Their model is well suited to a variety of applications,
such as location of shops, restaurants, walk-in clinics, etc., where user flows are not in direct
control of the optimizer, but are dictated by utility maximization principles. One aim of
this paper is to extend and improve their model, both from the modelling and algorithmic
standpoints. Our main contributions are the following:
— The introduction of service rate as endogenous variables, as well as the correct mod-
elling of the balking process, by integrating within a user’s utility the probability of
service denial.
— The consideration of competing facilities.
— The explicit treatment of the deterministic (Wardrop) case, which corresponds to a
zero-variance logit model.
— The reformulation of the model as a standard bilevel model, thus allowing an approx-
imate reformulation as a mixed integer linear program MILP.
— The design of a heuristic algorithm and its validation against the MILP solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1.2 is devoted to the
literature review, and Section 2.2 to a description of the model, together with a study of
its theoretical properties. Section 2.3 is dedicated to algorithms: a linear approximation
algorithm in Subsection 2.3.1, and a user-driven heuristic in Subsection 2.3.2. Numerical
experiments, discussion of our results, as well as an illustrative case are detailed in Section 2.4.
Extensions of the current framework are mentioned in the concluding Section 2.5.
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2.1.2. Literature review
Location problems have been widely studied, due to their simple structure and numerous
real-life applications. Most literature is concerned with versions of the problem where users
are simply assigned to shortest paths, and thus sidesteps the nonlinearities associated with
the important issue of user behaviour, including congestion. In our model, customers select
their own path and whenever congestion occurs, customers leaving from the same origin may
travel along different paths or patronize different facilities. This user behavior principle fits
the framework of a Wardrop equilibrium in the deterministic case, and of stochastic user
equilibrium when a random utility model of delay is assumed. The overall bilevel model
belongs to the class of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), where
the equilibrium can be expressed as a variational inequality. It can be reformulated as an
NP-hard discrete nonlinear bilevel program which, it goes without saying, poses formidable
challenges from the computational point of view.
Competitive location models were introduced by [Hotelling, 1929]. In his seminal pa-
per, the author addresses the simple situation where two firms engage in spatial competition,
with the purpose of maximizing individual profit through the location of a point along a seg-
ment located at respective distances a and b from the endpoints. It is assumed that demand
is uniformly distributed along the line segment, and customers patronize the closest facil-
ity. This work represents the cornerstone for a plethora of articles concerned with the topic
of competitive facility location. The environment considered therein was generalized to a
network by [Hakimi, 1983], who studied variants of the weighted p-median problem in-
volving competition. [Labbé and Hakimi, 1991] address a two-stage location-allocation
game, where location is decided at the first stage while, at the second stage, two firms
engage in a Cournot game with respect to quantities. An interesting development is con-
sidered by [Küçükaydin et al., 2011], where one firm decides the sites and attractiveness
for new facilities in order to maximize its profit. In this Stackelberg (leader-follower) set-
ting, the competitor responds to the leader’s action and adjusts its attractiveness level to
maximize its profit, while user behavior is characterized by Huff’s gravity law. In the work
of [Beresnev, 2013], two competing firms strive to maximize profit as well, but user prefer-
ences are provided by a linear order relation. The model is then solved by branch-and-bound
techniques. [Drezner et al., 2015] address a leader-follower competitive coverage model,
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where the attractiveness of a facility is related to an attraction radius, and customers are
spread evenly among facilities that fall within this radius. The leader can open new facili-
ties or adjust the attractiveness of existing ones, while the competitor responds accordingly.
Both firms compete for market share within budget limits.
Besides competition, congestion occurs naturally in an environment with limited re-
sources. It can arise either at facilities, or along the road. Although basic models are
content to incorporate congestion in the form of maximum capacity, more elaborate models
capture congestion through functional forms derived or not from queueing theory. Within
this framework we note the work of [Desrochers et al., 1995] who consider an extension of
a deterministic facility location problem, where individual delays (travel time) increase with
traffic. The model is centralized, namely, users are assigned as to minimize the sum of open-
ing cost, waiting delays, and travel times experienced by the users. Although the authors
mention a user-choice version of their model that fits the bilevel programming paradigm,
they do not suggest solution algorithms for its solution. A related formulation, where service
rates are endogenous, is considered by [Castillo et al., 2009]. Users are assigned to facili-
ties as to minimize the sum of the number of waiting customers and the total opening and
service costs. Within the framework of centralized systems, [Marianov, 2003] formulates a
model for locating facilities subject to congestion , and where demand is elastic with respect
to travel time and queue length. In this framework, customers are assigned to centers in
order to maximize total demand. Location of congested facilities when demand is elastic has
also been investigated by [Berman and Drezner, 2006]. Similar to [Marianov, 2003],
the objective of the model is to maximize total demand, subject to constraints on the waiting
time at facilities. Heuristic procedures are proposed for its solution.
Another work worth mentioning is that of [Zhang et al., 2010a] who propose a method-
ology for addressing a congested facility network design problem, with the aim of improving
healthcare accessibility, i.e., maximize the participation rate. The environment is user-
choice, with users patronizing the facility that minimizes the sum of waiting and travel
times, while demand is elastic with respect to total expected time experienced by clients.
The authors illustrate the performance of a metaheuristic procedure on data issued from a
network of mammography centers in Montreal, Canada. Congestion has also been considered
by [Abouee-Mehrizi et al., 2011] in the context of simultaneous decisions of locations,
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service rates and prices of facilities located at vertices of a network. They assumed that de-
mand is elastic with respect to price, and clients spread among facilities based on proximity
only, according to a multinomial logit random utility model. Congestion, which arises at
facilities, is characterized by queueing equations. For a more elaborate review of congestion
models in the context of facility location, the reader is referred to [Boﬀey et al., 2007].
Although congestion and competition have been previously combined, few papers have
tackled both within a user-choice environment. Actually, most papers that incorporate
congestion do not account for competition. On the other hand, when competition is present,
users select facilities based on congestion-free traits such as distance or attractiveness. To
the best of our knowledge, the only paper to address congestion in a competitive user-choice
environment is that of [Marianov et al., 2008]. A taxonomy of the models most relevant
to our research is provided in the e-companion to this article.
2.2. The model
2.2.1. Preliminaries
Let us consider the problem faced by a firm (a service center, for instance) that makes
location and service level decisions, with the aim of maximizing the number of customers
to attract with respect to its competitors, under a budget constraint. A salient feature of
the model is that user behavior is explicitly taken into account. Precisely, users patronize
the facility that maximizes their individual utility, i.e., minimizes their disutility. The latter
is estimated as the sum of travel time to the facility, queueing at the facility, plus the
actual probability of balking (facilities are modelled as finite-length queues). In this bilevel
setting we assume a weak form of competition where competitors do not react to the leader’s
decisions, i.e., their locations and service levels are fixed.
Since our model is closely related to that of [Marianov et al., 2008], we provide a
detailed description of the latter. In that work, the authors consider an oligopoly scenario
in which firm A locates p new facilities in a market where competitors already operate. The
‘game’ takes place over a bipartite graph V = I × J , where a vertex v may correspond to
either a location (v ∈ J) or a demand node (v ∈ I), the latter endowed with demand dv. We
denote by J1 ⊆ J the set of candidate locations for firm A, and by Jc the set of locations of its
competitors. A customer leaving vertex i ∈ I for facility j ∈ J incurs a fixed travel time tij.
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At facility j, this customer enters an M/M/s/K queue that involves s servers with identical
mean service time µ, and an associated waiting time wj. Whenever the queue reaches length
K − s (which corresponds to K customers in the system), any arriving customer is denied
access and leaves the system as a lost customer. The disutility uij of a customer is defined
as a convex combination of travel time tij and queueing delay wj, and ignores the actual
constant service time, i.e.,
uij = αtij + (1− α)wj, (2.2.1)
for some scalar α between 0 and 1.
The arrival and service processes are governed by Poisson (memoryless) processes. If
the arrival rate at facility j is λj, the probability that n customers are in the queue (or are
served) is
pnj =


(ρnj /n!)p0j if n ≤ s,
(ρnj /(s!s
n− s))p0j if s < n ≤ K,
0 if n > K,
(2.2.2)
where ρj = λj/µ is the intensity of the queueing process and
p0j =
[
1 +
s∑
n=1
ρnj
n!
+
ρsj
s!
K∑
n=s+1
(ρj
s
)n− s]−1
. (2.2.3)
The demand side is cast within the framework of a random utility model, where flows
between vertices i and j are determined according to the logit formula
xij =
yje
−θuij∑
k∈J1
yke
−θuik +
∑
k∈Jc
e−θuik
, (2.2.4)
where yj is a binary variable set to 1 if a facility is open at vertex j ∈ J1, and to 0 otherwise.
Competitors’ facilities are already open, hence the absence of the factor yk in the second
summation in the denominator of Eq. (2.2.4). Parameter θ is set to π/(σ
√
6), where σ is the
standard deviation of the Gumbel random variable yielding the probabilities (or proportions)
xij. If one denotes by λj the arrival rate at node j, and by λj the throughput rate, the model
of [Marianov et al., 2008] takes the form of the mathematical program
max
x,y,λ,w,L,λ¯,p,ρ
∑
j∈J1
λj
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s.t. λj =
∑
i∈I
dixij, ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ Jc
xij =
yje
−θuij∑
k∈J1
yke
−θuik +
∑
k∈Jc
e−θuik
, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ Jc (2.2.5)
uij = αtij + (1− α)wj, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J
wj = Lj/λj, ∀j ∈ J
Lj =
K∑
n=s
(n− s)pnj, ∀j ∈ J
λj = λj(1− pKj), ∀j ∈ J
xij ≤ yj, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J1∑
j∈J
xij = 1, ∀i ∈ I
∑
j∈J1
yj = P,
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J
λj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J
ρj = λj/µj, ∀j ∈ J
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J1
constraints (2.2.2) and (2.2.3).
Once the binary location variables yj are set, the remaining quantities are determined through
the solution of a nonlinear fixed point problem, where the probabilities xij of choosing a
facility j depend on waiting times, which are themselves functions of the demand rate vector
λ, while demand rates depend on the probabilities xij. This yields a mathematical program
with an embedded fixed point problem described in Eq. (2.2.5). The authors show that this
equation admits a unique solution, and propose a variant of Newton-Raphson algorithm for
its determination. The model is then addressed by a two-phase meta-heuristic procedure that
combines GRASP (Greedy Randomized Adaptive Search Procedure) and Tabu Search. In
the initial phase, facility locations are selected and a nonlinear assignment problem is solved.
In the second phase, Tabu Search is used to improve upon the initial location decisions.
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A key feature of the model is the possible occurrence of balking, due to a fixed buffer
of size K − s. Besides its practical importance, balking allows the arrival rate at a facility
to actually exceed the service rate, without the queues growing unbounded. However, this
has two important consequences. First, note that the objective is to maximize the number
of clients
∑
j∈J1
λj showing up at the facilities and not the number of clients
∑
j∈J1
λ¯j that
actually access service. It follows that a solution with a low rate of served clients might be
preferred to one with a high rate, if both its arrival and rejection rates are very high. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In this example, facilities can be set up at three sites
(A, B and D) coinciding with two demand vertices. The competitor’s facility is located at
C. Demand d1 is 200 at vertex 1 and d2 = 10 at vertex 2, while distances between vertices
are shown next to the edges of the network. On the supply side, the common service rate at
all facilities is equal to 100. Facilities are modelled as M/M/1/99 queues. For simplicity, we
assume θ = ∞, the limiting case of the random utility model. Accordingly, at equilibrium,
clients issued from a common origin will experience identical delays (travel time plus queueing
delay), thus achieveing a Wardrop equilibrium.
B 1 A 2
D
C
50
50
50
10
50
Figure 2.1. Paradox when maximizing λ instead of λ¯.
Assuming that the leader’s budget only allows two facilities to be opened, the options
are to open sites A and B, or sites A and D (B–D is equivalent to A–D). In the first case,
demand d1 is assigned to sites A and B, while d2 patronize the competitor’s facility. Basic
arithmetic shows that the total arrival rate at the leader’s facilities is λ = λ1+λ2 = 200, and
that the number being serviced is λ¯ = λ¯A + λ¯B = 198. If facilities are opened at sites A and
D, d1 is assigned to site A, and d2 to site D, with no client assigned to the competitor. The
total arrival rate at the leader’s facilities is λ = λA+λB = 210 and the amount of customers
26
receiving service is λ¯ = λ¯A+λ¯B = 101. In either case, the maximum λ corresponds to a much
smaller value of λ¯. Moreover, the solution that attracts more customers is less profitable, as
roughly half of the clients will balk, due to no vacancies in the queue, and thus experience
low delays at the facility.
A second issue is related to the definition of customer utility, which embeds travel and
queueing delays, but ignores balking. Returning to the example of Figure 2.1, when sites A
and D are open, demand d1 originating in 1 patronizes site A, notwithstanding a probability
of balking close to 50%. This situation is not realistic, given that facilities located at sites C
and D are relatively close and have low waiting times and probability of rejection. Since the
queueing delay is directly related to the buffer capacity K − 1, facilities with small buffers
(or none at all!) will turn down most arriving customers, in contrast with facilities equipped
with large buffer zones. This leads to the paradoxical situation where customers will favour
facilities for which the probability of balking is high, since it will minimize the overall time
spent in the system! This effect is exacerbated by the maximization of the arrival rate (rather
than the throughput rate) and will only disappear if buffers have infinite capacities.
2.2.2. A new model
We now focus on a variant of the model of [Marianov et al., 2008] that differs in three
significant ways: the objective is the throughput rate (rather than the arrival rate), service
rates are decision variables, and users integrate within their utility function the probability
of balking. Due to its generality, the model is flexible and can accommodate a number of
situations that will be mentioned in Section 2.5. Its main elements are the following.
— The objective is to maximize the throughput rate. This is relevant to applications
that arise in health care management (see [Zhang et al., 2010b]). In the context
where revenue per customer served is constant, this is equivalent to maximizing the
overall profit.
— Denial of service, i.e., balking, may be the result of either physical constraints or user
behaviour.
— Customer utility is expressed as a linear combination of travel and wait-
ing time, which is a standard assumption in the choice behaviour literature
(see [Berman and Krass, 2015]).
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— For the sake of computational tractability, facilities are modelled as single-server queue
whose service rates are endogenous to the model. This is a standard approach in
the location science literature, and can be preferable to the multi-server approach.
In [Berman and Krass, 2015], the authors argue that this representation ‘leads
to cleaner analytical results’ and can be more realistic in some practical situations.
For instance, a medical clinic requires different types of personnel (doctors, nurses,
machines, etc.) and it might be easier for the planner to reason in terms of people
served per hour rather than to model each server separately.
— The leader has a limited budget that can be spent on building facilities or improving
service rates. All the techniques developed in the paper would also apply to a model
where setup costs enter the objective.
We now specify the notation specific to the model. The budget is set to B, the fixed
cost of locating a new facility f to cf , while the cost of improving the service rate of an
M/M/1/K queue (K − 1 available places in the queue, and 1 place at the server) by one
unit is cµ. A customer observes the queue upon arrival, and leaves if there are more than
K − 1 customers already waiting.
In this context, the probability pnj of having n customers in the queue (or being served)
at facility j is given by
pnj =


ρnj
1− ρj
1− ρK + 1j
, n ≤ K, ρj 6= 1
1
K + 1
, n ≤ K, ρj = 1
0, n > K,
(2.2.6)
where ρj = λj/µj is the intensity of the process. Eq. (2.2.6) is another way of rewriting
Eq. (2.2.2) and for a fixed n, pnj is continuous in variable ρj. At facility j, the expected
number Lj of customers in the system is
Lj =
K∑
n=0
npnj. (2.2.7)
The effective arrival rate, i.e., the number of customers that access the service, is denoted
by λ, i.e.,
λj = λj(1− pKj), ∀j ∈ J. (2.2.8)
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The average waiting time wj in the system (including service time) is a function of the service
and arrival rates. According to Little’s formula, we have that
wj =
Lj
λj
, ∀j ∈ J. (2.2.9)
Basic algebra yields the expression of the waiting time at open facilities:
wj(λj, µj) =


1
µj

K + K
ρKj − 1
− 1
ρj − 1

 , ρj 6= 1
K + 1
2µj
, ρj = 1.
(2.2.10)
Note that wj, according to this definition, is a continuous function with respect to ρ, λ and
µ, even as ρj = λj/µj = 1.
Stochastic assignment
In a random utility model, clients patronize the facility that minimizes their individual
disutility, expressed as a linear combination of travel time, queueing, and probability of
accessing service. In this framework, the utility of facility j for a customer issued from
demand node i is given by
u˜ij = −uij + εij
= −(tij + αwj + βpKj) + εij,
where εij are independent Gumbel variates with common scale parameter θ and variance
π2/(6 · θ2). It is fair to assume that as long as travel time is not too large, a customer
will patronize a facility in which she is more likely to access service, as opposed to a highly
congested one. In other words, in the customers’ eyes, a facility located at a distance less
than β and with a very low probability of balking is preferable to a near-by facility. In this
context, the parameter β can be interpreted as the price of service accessibility. In practice,
parameters α, β and θ could be estimated using customer surveys. The task of determining
real-values for these parameters is outside the scope of this paper.
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In this multinomial logit framework (see [McFadden, 1974]), the demand generated at
node i that patronize an open facility j is given by the expression
xij = di
e−θ (tij + αwj + βpKj)∑
l∈J∗
e−θ (til + αwl + βpKl)
, (2.2.11)
where J∗ represents the set of open facilities. For small values of θ, users are spread more
or less evenly between facilities while, when θ is large, the assignment approaches that of
a Wardrop equilibrium (see [Fisk, 1980]). According to our assumptions, the problem can
be formulated as the equilibrium-constrained nonlinear mixed integer program involving a
leader and a follower (users):
(P) LEADER: max
y, µ, λ, λ¯,
x, w, p, ρ
∑
j∈J1
λj (2.2.12)
∑
j∈J1
cfyj +
∑
j∈J1
cµµj ≤ B, (2.2.13)
µj ≤Myj, ∀j ∈ J1 (2.2.14)
λj = λj(1− pKj), ∀j ∈ J (2.2.15)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, µj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J1 (2.2.16)
USERS: xij = di
yj · e−θ (tij + αwj + βpKj)∑
l∈J∗ e
−θ (til + αwl + βpKl) , ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J (2.2.17)
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J (2.2.18)
ρjµj = λj, ∀j ∈ J (2.2.19)
constraints (2.2.6) and (2.2.10). (2.2.20)
The decision variables are the vectors µ and y, while the user assignment x is the solution
of a fixed point problem. In Eq. (2.2.14), M is a sufficiently large constant that can be set
to M = (B − cf )/cµ.
Problem (P) has a stochastic basis and the limiting case θ = ∞ yields a deterministic
version of (P) where customers are assigned to facilities according to Wardrop’s equilibrium
principle. If ci(µ) denotes the minimum disutility (travel + waiting time and probability of
balking) for users originating from node i, the optimal solution x∗ is then characterized by
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the complementarity system
tij + αwj(x
∗, µ) + βpKj(x
∗, µ)

 = ci(µ), if x
∗
ij > 0
≥ ci(µ), if x∗ij = 0,
(2.2.21)
and the deterministic version of (P) takes the form
(P*)
LEADER: max
y, µ, λλ¯,
x, w, p, ρ
∑
j∈J1
λj (2.2.22)
s.t. constraints (2.2.13) –(2.2.16) (2.2.23)
USERS: tij + αwj(x
∗, µ) + βpKj(x
∗, µ)− ci(µ) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J (2.2.24)
xij (tij + αwj(x
∗, µ) + βpKj(x
∗, µ)− ci(µ)) = 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J (2.2.25)
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J (2.2.26)
constraints (2.2.18), (2.2.19) (2.2.6) and (2.2.10). (2.2.27)
In (P), the solution of the lower level equilibrium problem can be obtained by solving a
convex optimization problem akin to [Fisk, 1980]. In our framework, this program takes
the form
(P2)
min
x, λ, ρ, w, p
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij ln xij + xijtij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
wj(q, µj) dq + β
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
pKj(q, µj) dq
(2.2.28)
s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I (2.2.29)
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗ (2.2.30)
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J∗ (2.2.31)
ρjµj = λj, ∀j ∈ J (2.2.32)
constraints (2.2.6) and (2.2.10). (2.2.33)
Indeed, it is easy to check that, if θ is finite, xij cannot be zero at the solution, which implies
that inequality (2.2.30) can be left out. If we let ai, and cj be the Lagrange multipliers
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associated with Equations (2.2.29) and (2.2.31), respectively, the first-order necessary and
sufficient optimality conditions are given by
∂L
∂xij
= 0 ⇒ 1
θ
(ln xij + 1 ) + tij − ai + cj = 0 (2.2.34)
∂L
∂λj
= 0 ⇒ αwj(λj, µj) + βpKj(λj, µj)− cj = 0. (2.2.35)
It follows that cj = αwj(λj, µj) + βpKj(λj, µj), and Equation (2.2.34) yields
xij =
e−θuij
e−θai + 1
.
By substituting xij into (2.2.29) we obtain
xij = di
e−θuij∑
l∈J∗
e−θuil
.
Now, replacing the fixed point problem by its optimization counterpart, the original
model can be formulated as a bilevel program. At the upper level, the firm maximizes total
market capture, subject to a budget constraint while, at the lower level, the follower solves
Problem (P2). The main advantage of this reformulation is that we can adapt for its solution
methods and algorithms from convex bilevel programming.
2.2.3. Properties of the model
This subsection is devoted to the properties and features of our model. First, let us con-
sider the integrals of the waiting time and probability of balking, Wj(λj, µj) and PKj(λj, µj)
respectively, that enter the lower level’s objective function. Note that wj and pKj are con-
tinuous functions (as previously defined). We have
Wj(λj, µj) =
∫ λj
0
wj(q, µj) dq =


∫ λj
0
1
µj

K +
K(
q
µj
)K
− 1
− 1q
µj
− 1

 dq, if q 6= µj
∫ λj
0
K + 1
2µj
dq, if q = µj.
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PKj(λj, µj) =
∫ λj
0
pKj(q, µj) dq =


∫ λj
0
(
q
µj
)K
−
(
q
µj
)K + 1
1−
(
q
µj
)K + 1 dq, if q 6= µj
∫ λj
0
1
K + 1
dq, if q = µj.
Let lwj =
1
µj
∫ λj
0
−1
q
µj
− 1
dq, and lpj =
∫ λj
0
(
q
µj
)K
1−
(
q
µj
)K + 1 dq. Then
lwj =


− ln
(
q
µj
− 1
)
, if q > µj
− ln
(
1−
(
q
µj
))
, if q < µj
and lpj =


− ln
((
q
µj
)K + 1
− 1
)
µj
K + 1
, if q > µj
− ln
(
1−
(
q
µj
)K + 1)
µj
K + 1
, if q < µj,
(2.2.36)
which yields the following expression for the integral of the waiting time:
Wj(λj, µj) =


K
λj
µj
+ lwj +
K
µj
∫ λj
0
1(
q
µj
)K
− 1
dq, if q 6= µj
(K + 1)λj
2µj
, if λj = µj
(2.2.37)
and for the integral of the balking probability:
PKj(λj, µj) =


λj + lpj +
∫ λj
0
1(
q
µj
)K + 1
− 1
dq, if q 6= µj
λj
(K + 1)
, if λj = µj.
(2.2.38)
Note that the general integral
∫
1
qK − 1
dq = −qF 21 (1, 1/K; 1+1/K; qK), where F 21 stands
for the hypergeometric function, and does not have a closed-form expression for general K,
although it can be evaluated for any fixed value of K. We have that∫ λj
0
wj(q, µj) dq = Wj(λj, µj)−Wj(0, µj).
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Since Wj(0, µj) is constant at the lower level, it can be removed from the objective function.
Applying a similar operation to PKj, the lower level objective takes the form
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij ln xij + xijtij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J∗
Wj(λj, µj) + β
∑
j∈J∗
PKj(λj, µj). (2.2.39)
Proposition 1. The waiting time wj is increasing in λj.
Proposition 2. The probability of balking pKj is increasing in λj.
From the convexity of the function xij ln xij, and Propositions 1 and 2 it follows that:
Proposition 3. The lower level objective function (2.2.39) is convex in x, hence Prob-
lem (P2) is convex.
Proposition 4. When K = ∞, i.e., balking does not occur (in this case, the model admits
a solution only if the total service rate exceeds the total demand rate), W is convex jointly
in λ and µ⇒ the lower level objective function is convex jointly in x, λ and µ.
Although the integral of the waiting time and probability of balking are convex in xij
and λj, they are not jointly convex in λj and µj (see Figure 2.2).
Proposition 5. Wj(λj, µj), the integral of the waiting time, is pseudoconvex.
The proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 4 and 5 are provided in the e-companion to this paper.
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2.3. Algorithms
This section is concerned with the design of two algorithms for addressing the bilevel
location problem. The first approach is based on a piecewise-linear approximation of non-
linear (and nonconvex) functions, in order to obtain a linear bilevel problem that can
be further reduced to a MILP. It is related to the MILP approximations proposed by
[Gilbert et al., 2015] for a bilevel toll problem involving logit user assignment. When-
ever the approximation is fine-grained, we expect its solution to be close to optimal. In the
absence of balking, this algorithm is asymptotically exact, as proven by Theorem 9. When
balking occurs, the algorithm is a matheuristic for which no formal bound on the error is
guaranteed.
In contrast, the second ‘matheuristic’ algorithm solves a surrogate single-level
problem that automatically yields user-optimized flows. It is akin to the approach
of [Marcotte, 1986] for addressing a bilevel network design problem.
2.3.1. A linear approximation method
By linearizing the upper level nonlinear terms λ¯j and the lower-level objective of the
bilevel program, it is possible to reformulate (P) as a mixed integer linear bilevel program,
which can be further reduced to a MILP. This is achieved through the following five opera-
tions:
(1) Approximate the lower-level objective function by a piecewise linear approximation.
(2) Write the KKT optimality conditions of the lower-level linear program to obtain a
single-level mathematical program involving complementarity constraints (MPEC).
(3) Formulate the MPEC as an MILP, through the introduction of binary variables and
‘big-M’ constants.
(4) Solve the resulting MILP for optimum values of µ and y.
(5) Solve the original nonlinear lower-level problem to recover the true values of the
assignment vector x associated with µ and y.
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We now provide a detailed description of the linear approximation used at the first step
of the algorithm. We let
d˜ = max
i ∈ I{di}, µ¯ = (B − cf )/cµ, and µ˜ = max
{
µ¯, max
j ∈ Jc
{µj}
}
,
and sample the interval (0, d˜] using N points xn, n = 1, .., N such that xi < xj for all i < j,
and consider the linearization
fn(x) = x(ln xn + 1)− xn = anfx+ bnf . (2.3.1)
Similarly, let λ˜ =
∑
i∈I
di be the maximum arrival rate. We sample the interval (0, λ˜] using
R points λr, r = 1, . . . , R such that λi < λj for i < j. We also generate P samples of
µ over (0, µ˜] over the same interval. Let λr and µp be the samples hence obtained. We
linearize Wj(λj, µj) and PKj(λj, µj) using tangent planes at points (λ
r, µp) for r = 1, . . . , R,
p = 1, . . . , P such that λr 6= µp. Based on the gradients
∇Wj(λj, µj) = (wj(λj, µj),−wj(λj, µj)ρj) (2.3.2)
∇PKj(λj, µj) =
(
pkj(λj, µj),
1
µj
PKj(λj, µj)− pkj(λj, µj)ρj
)
, (2.3.3)
we write the first-order Taylor approximations of Wj(λj, µj) and PKj(λj, µj), respectively:
grp(λ, µ) = Wj(λ
r, µp) +∇Wj(λr, µp)

 λ− λr
µ− µp

 = arpg λ+ brpg µ+ crpg ,
hrp(λ, µ) = PKj(λ
r, µp) +∇PKj(λr, µp)

 λ− λr
µ− µp

 = arph λ+ brph µ+ crph .
Next, we convexify WjandPKj. More precisely, we construct convex piecewise linear approx-
imations of these functions by setting them to the maximum of their linear approximations
Wj(λj, µj) ≈ max
r ∈ R, p ∈ P {g
rp(λj, µj)} (2.3.4)
PKj(λj, µj) ≈ max
r ∈ R, p ∈ P {h
rp(λj, µj)} (2.3.5)
We approximate x ln x along with Wj and PKj, using f
n(xij) as defined in Eq. (2.3.1).
xij ln xij ≈ max
n ∈ N {f
n(xij)} (2.3.6)
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Upon the introduction of auxiliary variables v, u and z, the linear approximation of (P2)
takes the form
(P2-lin)
min
x, λ, v, u, z
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
vij + tijxij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J∗
uj + β
∑
j∈J∗
zj (2.3.7)
s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I (2.3.8)
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J∗ (2.3.9)
vij − anfxij ≥ bnf , ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀n ∈ N (2.3.10)
uj − arpg λj − brpg µj ≥ crpg , ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P (2.3.11)
zj − arph λj − brph µj ≥ crph , ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P (2.3.12)
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗. (2.3.13)
Note that (P2-lin) is an entirely linear formulation, and thus the variables xij could
assume the value 0, although this cannot occur in the initial formulation (P2), due to the
presence of the logarithmic barrier term ln xij. Obviously, this causes no problem.
To achieve a MILP formulation, we first perform a linear approximation of the nonlinear
constraint (2.2.15) using the triangle technique described in [D’Ambrosio et al., 2010].
This yields the equalities
R−1∑
r=1
P−1∑
p=1
(
ljrp + ljrp
)
= 1, ∀j ∈ J1 (2.3.14)
sjrp ≤ ljrp + ljrp + ljrp−1 + ljr−1p−1 + ljr−1p−1 + ljr−1p, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P (2.3.15)
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sjrp = 1, ∀j ∈ J1 (2.3.16)
λj =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sjrpλ
r, ∀j ∈ J1 (2.3.17)
µj =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sjrpµ
p, ∀j ∈ J1 (2.3.18)
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ej =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sjrp (λ
r(1− pKj(λr, µp))) , ∀j ∈ J1. (2.3.19)
Next, we write the optimality conditions of (P2-lin). Let γi, δj, ν
n
ij, π
rp
j and η
rp
j denote
the dual variables associated with constraints (2.3.8), (2.3.9), (2.3.10), (2.3.11) and (2.3.12),
respectively. We replace constraints (2.2.17), (2.2.18), (2.2.6) and (2.2.10) in (P) with the
optimality conditions of (P2-lin), which yields a nonlinear program involving complementar-
ity constraints. The standard method of dealing with this nonlinearity is to linearize these
constraints through the introduction of binary variables and ‘big-M’ constants. Alterna-
tively, one can substitute to the complementarity constraints the equality of the lower level
primal and dual objectives. The latter involves bilinear terms that can be further linearized.
Technical details, together with the corresponding MILP formulation, can be found in the e-
companion. The MILP can be solved by an off-the-shelf software such as CPLEX. For given
location variables y and service rates µ, a feasible assignment matrix x is then recovered by
solving a convex assignment program that involves a simple structure. The corresponding
running time (less than one second) is negligible for networks having up to 25 nodes. Note
that, due to approximation errors in the MILP, the recovered solution may differ significantly
from the MILP solution.
Bound on the linearization error for the M/M/1/∞ case
If facilities are modelled as M/M/1/∞ (infinite capacity) queues, the waiting time at a
facility j is wj(λj, µj) = 1/(µj − λj), and its indefinite integral Wj(λj, µj) = − log(µj − λj),
which is convex. We make the following assumptions:
i. The total service rate in the network can satisfy the entire demand.
ii. At all open facilities, µj ≥ ψ + λj for some positive number ψ.
The latter condition ensures that waiting time at facilities is finite. In practice, ψ can
be as as small as desired, and we have that wj ≤ 1/ψ = wMAX . Let tMIN and tMAX
represent the minimum and maximum travel time in the network, respectively. Furthermore,
wMIN = 1/µMAX, diam(t)= tMAX − tMIN and diam(w)= wMAX − wMIN. Let µMAX be the
maximum service rate possible in the network, either allowed by the budget at leader’s
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facilities, or at competitor’s facilities. Under our assumptions, we have that
xij =
e−θ (tij + αwj)∑
k∈J∗
e−θ (ti,k + αwk)
≥ e
−θ (tMAX + αwMAX)∑
k∈J∗
e−θ (tMIN + αwMIN)
=
e−θ (diam(t)+ α diam(w))
|J∗|
def
= rmin,
(2.3.20)
Now, let g(µ, x) be the lower-level objective function, i.e.,
g(µ, x) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij log xij + tijxij
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g1(µ, x)
+α
∑
j∈J∗
Wj(µj, x)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g2(µ, x)
. (2.3.21)
The lower-level problem can be written as:
(P∞) min
x
g(µ, x) = g1(µ, x) + αg2(µ, x) (2.3.22)
s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di ∀i ∈ I (2.3.23)
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J∗, (2.3.24)
whose compact constraint set is denoted D. Next, we let
G(µ, x) = ∇xg(µ, x) = ∇xg1(µ, x) + α∇xg2(µ, x) = G1(µ, x) + αG2(µx).
The proofs of the following results are provided in the e-companion to this paper.
Proposition 6. G1 is strongly monotone of modulus θ · dMAX with respect to x.
Proposition 7. G2 is monotone in x.
It follows directly that
Proposition 8. G is strongly monotone in x, with modulus θ · dMAX.
Théorème 9. The approximation error of the upper-level objective function is O(1/N1 +
1/N2), where N1 and N2 are the number of samples for the linearization of g1 and g2, re-
spectively.
We now illustrate Theorem 9 for the instance based on the network illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.3. It involves two demand nodes, which are potential locations as well. Demand rates
in nodes 1 and 2 are set to 5.5 and 15.0, respectively. The fixed cost of opening a facility
is set to 5 and the unit service cost to 1, for a total budget of 25. The competition owns a
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facility with service rate 25.1. On the demand side, parameters α and θ are set to 10 and
0.2, respectively.
1 2C
10
7 1
Figure 2.3. A three-node network.
For each set of open locations, the problem can be approximately solved by sampling a
very large number of values of the parameter µ. This yields a quasi-optimal solution with
objective 10.197, where both facilities are open, with respective service rates 5.325 and 9.675.
The linear approximation algorithm was then run for different sample sizes.
The optimum of the approximation MILP, as well as the true objective values corre-
sponding to the MILP solutions, are displayed in Figure 2.4, where we observe that
— The approximated objective mostly overestimates the true objective.
— The true objective obtained by solving for the actual equilibrium with respect to
the service levels quickly reaches a near-optimal solution, and actually does so for a
sample size as small as 4.
— The true (recovered) objective does not increase in a monotone fashion, but stabilizes
fairly quickly close to the optimum.
2.3.2. A surrogate-based heuristic
In this section we present a parameterized heuristic based on replacing the original
model by a single-level model involving a surrogate objective, whose optimal solution au-
tomatically satisfies the fixed point constraint. This strategy is akin to that proposed
by [Marcotte, 1986] for addressing a bilevel network design problem involving user-
optimized flow patterns.
The rationale behind this strategy is that both the leader and the users have a shared
interest in minimizing delays. We therefore expect that, if the lower level is given full control,
the resulting design should favor access to the leader’s facilities, and therefore yield a high
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Figure 2.4. Evolution of the linear approximation MILP objective value with respect
to sample size. We use the same number of samples on x, and λ. The ‘approximated’
line corresponds to the optimal objective of the approximate MILP. The ‘true’ line is the
true(recovered) objective value corresponding to the MILP solution.
throughput. Incorporating the budget constraint to ensure feasibility, we obtain the single-
level mixed nonlinear program
(PH) min
x, y, µ, λ,
w, p, ρ
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij ln xij + xijtij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
wj(q, µj) dq + β
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
pKj(q, µj) dq
(2.3.25)
s.t.
∑
j∈J
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I (2.3.26)
∑
j∈J1
yjcf +
∑
j∈J1
cµµj ≤ B, (2.3.27)
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J (2.3.28)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J (2.3.29)
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J (2.3.30)
ρj = λj/µj, ∀j ∈ J (2.3.31)
constraints (2.2.10) and (2.2.6), (2.3.32)
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whose x-solution is a logit flow assignment with respect to the design variables y and µ.
For θ = ∞, the limiting case (PH*) is a mathematical program involving user-equilibrium
(Wardropian with respect to queueing delays) flows, and is expressed as
(PH*) min
x, y, µ, λ,
w, p, ρ
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
xijtij + α
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
wj(q, µj) dq + β
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
pKj(q, µj) dq
s.t. constraints (2.3.26) –(2.3.32).
Properties of the surrogate model
The surrogate model always yields feasible solutions for the original model. Although its
objective is nonconvex, some of its properties make it computationally tractable, as will be
confirmed in Section 2.4. The proofs of the following results are provided in the e-companion.
Proposition 10. If K =∞ and there are no fixed costs, the surrogate model is convex.
Proposition 11. At the optimum of (PH*), if K = ∞, queue waiting times are equal for
all leader’s facilities.
We close this section with an example that shows that, in the worst case, the difference
between the heuristic optimum and the true optimum can be arbitrarily large. Let us consider
the network shown in Figure 2.5, with site C belonging to the competitor, and sites A and
B being potential opening nodes for the leader, with null fixed cost. We consider an infinite
queue and α = 1. Let n > 1, and D1 > 1 and nD1 be the demand at nodes 1 and 2,
respectively. The total service rate available to the leader is µ¯ = (2n + 4)D1. The service
rate at the competitor’s facility is set to µC = 2nD1.
The heuristic solves the convex program (PHY*) (see the electronic companion, proof
of Proposition 11), and at optimality, waiting times at facilities A and B must be equal.
The KKT optimality conditions are sufficient, and any solution of the following system of
equations is optimal.
(t1,A + wA − γ1) · x1,A = 0 (t1,A + wA − γ1) ≥ 0 wA = 1/(µA − x1,A − x1,A)
(t1,B + wB − γ1) · x1,B = 0 (t1,B + wB − γ1) ≥ 0 wB = 1/(µB − x1,B − x1,B)
(t1,C + wC − γ1) · x1,C = 0 (t1,C + wC − γ1) ≥ 0 wC = 1/(µC − x1,C − x1,C)
(t2,A + wA − γ2) · x2,A = 0 (t2,A + wA − γ2) ≥ 0 (wA − wB)(µ¯− µA − µB) = 0
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Figure 2.5. An instance where the gap between the heuristic and optimal value of the
objective function can be arbitrarily large.
(t2,B + wB − γ2) · x2,B = 0 (t2,B + wB − γ2) ≥ 0
(t2,C + wC − γ2) · x2,C = 0 (t2,C + wC − γ2) ≥ 0
One solution of the above system is µA = µB = (n + 2)D1; x1,A = D1; x1,B = x1,C = 0;
x2,A = 0; x2,B = D1; x2,C = (n − 1)D1; wA = wB = wC = 1(n+1)D1 . In other words, users
originating from 1 patronize solely facility A, while users issued from 2 choose facilities B
and C. Then the objective value associated to this optimal solution is 2D1.
On the other hand, in the original program wA need not be equal to wB. Then one
feasible solution is µA = 2D1 and µB = (2n + 2)D1, and x, γ solve the following set of
equations, issued from the KKT optimality conditions of the second level.
(t1,A + 1/(2D1 − x1,A − x1,A)− γ1) · x1,A = 0; (t1,A + 1/(2D1 − x1,A − x1,A)− γ1) ≥ 0;
(t1,B + 1/((2n+ 2)D1 − x1,B − x1,B)− γ1) · x1,B = 0; (t1,B + 1/((2n+ 2)D1 − x1,B − x1,B)− γ1) ≥ 0;
(t1,C + 1/(2nD1 − x1,C − x1,C)− γ1) · x1,C = 0; (t1,C + 1/(2nD1 − x1,C − x1,C)− γ1) ≥ 0;
(t2,A + 1/(2D1 − x1,A − x1,A)− γ2) · x2,A = 0; (t2,A + 1/(2D1 − x1,A − x1,A)− γ2) · x2,A = 0;
(t2,B + 1/((2n+ 2)D1 − x1,B − x1,B)− γ2) · x2,B = 0; (t2,B + 1/((2n+ 2)D1 − x1,B − x1,B)− γ2) ≥ 0;
(t2,C + 1/(2nD1 − x1,C − x1,C)− γ2) · x2,C = 0; (t2,C + 1/(2nD1 − x1,C − x1,C)− γ2) ≥ 0.
We can easily check that the following solution solves the above system of equations:
µA = 2D1; µB = (2n + 2)D1; x1,A = D1; x1,B = x1,C = 0; x2,A = 0; x2,B = D1; x2,C =
(n−1)D1; wA = wB = wC = 1(n+1)D1 . The objective value associated to this feasible solution
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is D1(n + 4)/2. The ratio between the better option and the one found by the heuristic is
(n+ 4)/4, which can be arbitrarily large.
A parameterized surrogate heuristic
One drawback of the heuristic solution presented in the previous section is that, for
K = ∞ and θ = ∞, queueing delays are equal, a property that might not hold at the
true optimum. Actually, in order to maximize efficiency, one expects the leader to adapt
its service rates to arrival rates. This can be achieved by incorporating a service-dependent
linear term into the objective. This term depends on a set of positive parameters ξj, to be
tuned, one for each facility. The resulting mathematical program is
(PH(ξ)) min
x, y, µ, λ,
w, p, ρ
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij ln xij + xijtij
]
+α
∑
j∈J∗
Wj(x, µj) +β
∑
j∈J∗
PKj(x, µj)+
∑
j∈J1
ξjµj
s.t. constraints (2.3.26), (2.3.27), (2.3.29)–(2.3.32).
This program is transformed and solved as a MILP where the linearization is based on the
techniques presented in Section 2.3.1. As before, a feasible flow assignment x compatible
with the location vector y and the service rate vector µ is retrieved by solving a convex
program. We now focus on the case K =∞ and θ =∞, when there are no fixed costs:
(PHY*(ξ)) min
y, µ, λ,
w, p, ρ
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
xijtij −α
∑
j∈J∗
ln(µj−(
∑
i∈I
xij))+
∑
j∈J1
ξjµj
s.t. constraints (2.3.26), (2.3.29)–(2.3.30), (2.C.3),
for which we provide a theoretical result, whose proof is provided in the e-companion.
Proposition 12. There exists a value of ξ∗ for which (PHY*(ξ∗)) yields an optimal solution
for (P*).
While the complexity of determining an optimal ξ vector is equivalent to that of solving
the initial problem, educated guesses may yield good values, as will be observed later.
2.4. Experimental setup and results
The MILP formulation was solved by IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimizer version 12.5. All
tests, either using the linear approximation method or heuristics, were performed on a 16
core Xeon(R) Intel(R) processor running at 2.4GHz frequency. For the linear approximation
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method, we opted for the MILP formulation based on the equality between the primal and
dual lower level objectives. Surprisingly, while approximate, this formulation outperformed
that based on complementarity constraints.
An initial set of experiments was intended to compare the linear approximation-based
method and the parameterized heuristic described in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, respectively,
that involve the parameterized model (PH(ξ)). The latter is solved for different values of
the parameter ξ. For each facility j, ξj is set to the negative of a scalar that increases with
demand and decreases with distance:
ξj = −c
∑
i∈I
di
tij + 1
, (2.4.1)
for some nonnegative parameter c. This is motivated by the fact that it makes sense, from
the leader’s perspective, to assign high service rates to facilities located close to high demand
nodes: the lower ξj, the larger µj in the optimal solution. The term 1 in the denominator
was added to tij to avoid dividing by a small number. The linear approximations involve 7,
5 and 5 uniformly distributed samples for x, λ and µ, respectively. The parameter α was
set to 10, while the algorithms were run for different combinations of parameters θ and β.
Travel times were varied between 0 and 100 for nodes belonging to a common cluster. Two
sensible choices for the parameter β are 50 or 100, as previously explained in Section 2.2.2.
In CPLEX branching rules, priority was given to the strategic location variables over the
binary variables required in the linearization process. The algorithm was stopped as soon
as the optimality gap dropped below 1%, CPLEX ran out of memory (4GB), or that CPU
exceeded 2,000 seconds.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report mean CPU times (in seconds), the optimality gap when the
stopping criteria is met, and the average ratio between the objective value found by the
heuristics and by the linear approximation method (as described in Section 2.3.1), for two
values of the available budget. Heuristics are run for different values of parameter c, as in
Eq. (2.4.1). We also report the best solutions found across these runs in the best column.
Additionally, we let CPLEX run to optimality (gap<0.1%), regardless of the execution time,
comparing the objective value obtained within 2,000 seconds and the one obtained with no
time limit; we report the percentage increase (the PI column).
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heuristic over linear approximation linear approximation
lin. approx. ratio relative gap(%) CPU(seconds) gap ≤0.1%
θ β c = 0 c = 1 best min average max lin. approx. c = 0 c = 1 PI(%) CPU(s)
0.2 50 0.99 0.93 1.01 0.99 11.3 25.4 1,778 110 11 −0.66 31,239
0.5 50 1.00 0.95 1.01 0.98 12.1 25.6 1,834 17 8 0.08 14,375
2.0 50 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.88 11.5 25.6 1,833 9 7 1.20 44,832
0.2 100 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.98 11.8 26.0 1,930 101 10 1.14 13,852
0.5 100 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 11.1 26.1 1,836 18 9 0.00 13,888
2.0 100 1.03 1.01 1.04 0.99 11.9 26.0 1,929 9 8 3.46 13,874
Table 2.1. Comparison between the linear approximation method and two heuristics. Bud-
get set to 500. Averages taken over 10 instances.
heuristic over linear approximation lin. approx.
linear approximation ratio relative gap(%) CPU(seconds) gap ≤0.1%
θ β c = 0 c = 1 c = 10 best min average max lin. approx. c = 0 c = 1 c = 10 PI(%) CPU(s)
0.2 50 0.86 0.86 0.62 0.94 0.93 12.0 24.2 1,862 20 12 5 0.14 56,616
0.5 50 0.83 0.86 0.62 0.93 2.22 13.7 21.6 2,011 10 9 5 1.40 22,871
2.0 50 0.83 0.86 0.63 0.94 2.25 12.8 21.3 2,010 9 8 5 0.10 39,029
0.2 100 0.84 0.86 0.58 0.88 0.99 11.3 20.7 1,826 15 10 6 −0.60 23,990
0.5 100 0.83 0.84 0.62 0.90 1.92 12.4 21.7 2,009 9 9 6 0.30 22,850
2.0 100 0.82 0.84 0.59 0.87 0.99 10.9 19.3 1,903 8 8 6 0.25 11,089
Table 2.2. Comparison between the linear approximation method and three heuristics.
Budget set to 250. Averages taken over 10 instances.
In most cases, CPLEX could not reach a gap less than 1% in the allotted CPU. As shown
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the average optimality gap lies in the [11,14] interval, when time is
limited. More precisely, when the budget is set to 500, roughly 40% of the tests finish with
a gap between 15% and 25%, while 40% of the tests end with a gap between 1%− 10%, and
20% of tests reach the optimality gap <0.1%. This was observed on all tests, regardless of
the combination of parameters. On the other, when the budget is set to 250, the optimality
gaps are slightly higher, after the allotted execution time. Namely, roughly 43% of gaps fall
in the [15%, 25%] interval, 25% in the [10%, 15%] interval, 15% in the [5%, 10%] interval,
15% in the [1%, 5%] interval, and only 3% of tests reach the 1% optimality gap.
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However, as illustrated in Figure 2.6, the optimal solutions are frequently found in the
early stages of the Branch-and-Bound process, while the remaining iterations are merely used
to prove optimality. The above observation is supported by the numbers in the PI column.
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Figure 2.6. Lower and upper bounds throughout the branch-and-bound process for an
instance of P-lin.
The percentage increase in objective value when running to optimality is not significant (less
than 1.5%, in most cases, and 3.5% when the budget is 500, θ = 2.0 and β = 100), despite
a large increase in CPU. In some cases we observe a small decrease in the objective value,
which is explained as follows: when running to optimality, there can be a small increase in
the approximate objective value (the one found by solving the MILP), however the optimal
solution corresponds to a slightly small true objective. We remind that the MILP is only an
approximated version of a highly nonlinear program.
Table 2.1 shows that, for a high budget, heuristics perform well, managing to attract and
serve, on average, the same number of customers as the linear approximation method, and
in some cases, outperforms it. This counterintuitive result is due to approximation errors in
the various linearizations performed at both the lower level and in the objective function of
the linear approximation method.
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Table 2.2 tells a similar story. In this case (budget = 250), taken individually, heuristics
for c = 0, c = 1 and c = 10 do not perform very well, capturing as little as 58% of the linear
approximated market in one case. However, when retaining the best out of the three, the
objective value lies around 87 − 94% of the linear approximated objective, and is achieved
at a much lower computational cost. For instance, for a budget of 250, the CPU required by
the linear approximation method exceeds by a factor of 50 (θ = 0.2, β = 50) and up to 91
(θ = 2.0, β = 50) the combined CPU of the three heuristics. This illustrates the limitations
of the linear approximation method, which, although superior in terms of solution quality,
does not scale well. We also observe that, in the heuristic case, and for identical values of the
parameter β, CPU is a decreasing function of θ, a parameter that is inversely proportional
to the standard deviation of the Gumbel random variable embedded into the logit process.
When θ is small, users are spread over the facilities more or less regardless of their disutility,
making for highly nonlinear instances that are difficult to linearize. In contrast, when θ is
large, variance is small, and users focus on a limited number of destination facilities.
Within the same experimental setup, it is interesting to compare the facilities opened
by the various algorithms. In Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, we display the ratio between two
numbers: the number of facilities opened by both methods, and the total number of facilities
openeds by the linear approximation algorithm.
The linear approximation method opens between 4 and 6 facilities, and on average 5.6−5.8
for a budget of 500. When the budget is set to 250, the number of facilities opened by the
linear approximation method decreases by at least one, on average. For both values of the
budget, the leader opens less facilities for β = 100 than for β = 50. Indeed, as β increases,
users require a higher service rate to make for the higher probability of balking. The budget
is then more focused on increasing service rates.
For the high budget and low values of c (0 or 1) the heuristics open on average 6.8− 8.4
facilities. Only half of the facilities opened by the linear approximation method are among
them. Nevertheless, the heuristic facilities yield large values of the objective function. For
low budget, a similar situation occurs although all methods open, on average, less facilities.
As a trend, the average number of open facilities decreases with c. The larger values of c
yield smaller values of ξ, therefore, larger values of µ, and the heuristics put more emphasis
on providing high service rates, versus opening several facilities. These results highlight the
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number of open facilities ratio of common facilities
θ β lin. approx. c = 0 c = 1 c = 0 c = 1
0.2 50 5.9 8.3 6.8 0.52 0.54
0.5 50 6.0 8.4 6.8 0.56 0.45
2.0 50 5.9 8.4 6.8 0.66 0.55
0.2 100 5.7 8.2 7.4 0.62 0.55
0.5 100 5.7 8.2 7.6 0.54 0.48
2.0 100 5.6 8.2 7.3 0.48 0.51
Table 2.3. Number of open facilities. Budget set to 500. Averages over 10 runs.
number of open facilities ratio of common facilities
θ β lin. approx. c = 0 c = 1 c = 10 c = 0 c = 1 c = 10
0.2 50 3.8 5.7 5.7 2.7 0.54 0.54 0.28
0.5 50 4.1 5.9 5.7 2.8 0.45 0.40 0.21
2.0 50 3.8 5.9 5.6 2.7 0.51 0.50 0.26
0.2 100 3.5 5.7 5.5 3.0 0.50 0.50 0.40
0.5 100 3.7 5.7 5.6 2.8 0.54 0.55 0.35
2.0 100 3.7 5.7 5.5 3.0 0.54 0.54 0.33
Table 2.4. Number of open facilities. Budget set to 250. Averages over 10 runs.
fact that determining the optimal facility locations is hard, and that solutions of similar
values can vastly differ in their topologies.
Although Table 2.2 suggests that heuristics do not perform very well when the budget is
small, a closer inspection reveals that for some values of c, they yield results close to those
of the linear approximation method, as shown in Table 2.5, where the best results among
those run for values of c ranging from 0 to 10 are displayed. The best results were usually
related to low values of c. In this setting, heuristics manage to capture between 90% and
95% of the number of customers obtained by the linear approximation method, at a much
lower computational cost.
In Table 2.6, we report the impact of c on the number of facilities opened, as well as on
the number of served customers, for 3 randomly chosen tests in our dataset. We vary the c
from 0 to 10, and report the best solution found for each test. We then compute the average
ratio between the latter and the optimum found by the linear approximation method. As c
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heuristic over total
θ β lin. approx. ratio CPU (sec.)
0.2 50 0.95 133
0.5 50 0.96 86
2.0 50 0.95 69
0.2 100 0.90 132
0.5 100 0.92 95
2.0 100 0.88 75
Table 2.5. Parameter c runs from 0 to 10. Budget set to 250.
increases, more importance is given to µ, and less budget is available for opening facilities. A
second trend is the concave-like behaviour (increasing, levelling, decreasing) of the number
of served customers with respect to c.
# of open facilities served customers
c test 1 test 2 test 3 test 1 test 2 test 3
0 6 6 6 113.92 124.70 122.57
1 6 6 6 113.92 124.88 122.64
2 6 6 6 114.82 124.95 123.29
3 6 6 6 115.94 122.55 123.33
4 4 5 7 99.39 119.54 123.75
5 3 4 6 84.42 98.82 124.07
6 3 1 6 84.42 45.70 123.99
7 2 1 5 74.21 45.70 116.87
8 1 1 4 53.64 45.70 106.71
9 1 1 3 53.64 45.70 90.48
10 1 1 1 53.64 45.70 62.30
Table 2.6. Sensitivity of analysis with respect to c in formula (2.4.1).
Finally, we assess the performance of the heuristics, given an optimal set of open facilities
provided by the linear approximation method. Restricted to the determination of service
levels, the problem remains a hard nonlinear bilevel program. All tests have been performed
on the same aforementioned dataset, using 10 samples for x and 9 for λ and µ. The results are
displayed in Table 2.7, where we observe a sharp improvement with respect to the case where
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facility locations are decision variables (Table 2.2). More precisely, due to approximation
errors, the linear approximation method was outperformed by the theoretically suboptimal
heuristics on some instances.
heuristic over lin. approx. ratio
θ β c = 0 c = 1 c = 10 best
0.2 50 1.02 (5) 1.02 (4) 0.84 (1) 1.02
0.5 50 1.02 (6) 1.01 (2) 0.86 (2) 1.02
2.0 50 1.02 (6) 1.00 (4) 0.83 (1) 1.02
0.2 100 1.01 (7) 1.00 (3) 0.88 (1) 1.02
0.5 100 1.02 (5) 1.00 (5) 0.89 (0) 1.02
2.0 100 1.02 (8) 1.00 (3) 0.89 (3) 1.02
Table 2.7. Heuristics run from facility locations provided by the linear approximation
method. Budget set to 250. Within parentheses: number of instances for which the corre-
sponding value of c yielded the best result. The sum of values exceed in some cases the total
number of tests, as sometimes, different heuristics yield the same optimum.
Accuracy of linearization
In order to measure the impact of the number of sample points involved in the approx-
imation of the nonlinear functions W˜ and P˜K , we varied λ and µ for values ranging from
1 to 10, for a step of 0.1. We then computed the difference between W and PK , and their
linearized counterparts across this fine-grained domain. Note that, due to nonconvexity in
the vicinity of the origin (see Figure 2.2), the tangents in this area can be very steep and
thus wildly overestimate the true value of the function. For this reason, linearization sample
points were not selected close to 0. As observed in Table 2.8, increasing the number of sample
points can actually worsen the approximation, due to non-convexity of the original functions.
The way around this issue would be to make nonconvex piecewise linear approximations,
the drawback being the addition of a significant number of binary variables that would yield
a sharp increase in the running time of the algorithm. When selecting a number of samples,
one has indeed to achieve a trade-off between the error on W , on PK , the running time and
the quality of the solution.
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# of samples Error (average) # of samples Error (average)
R (on λ) P (on µ) W PK R (on λ) P (on µ) W PK
3 3 1.34 0.29 7 3 2.10 0.20
3 5 1.33 0.36 7 5 2.00 0.42
3 7 1.77 0.38 7 7 2.17 0.42
3 10 2.94 0.41 7 10 5.51 0.42
5 3 1.13 0.38 10 3 2.05 0.26
5 5 1.24 0.41 10 5 2.00 0.43
5 7 2.67 0.41 10 7 3.36 0.43
5 10 4.37 0.42 10 10 3.18 0.43
Table 2.8. Linearization error for the waiting time and probability of balking. K = 10.
# of samples CPLEX recovered no of estimated no of
N (on x) R (on λ) P (on µ) CPU limit(s) CPU(s) gap(%) served customers served customers
2 2 2 1,000 562 9.71 88.15 80.35
5 3 3 2,000 829 0.92 97.89 100.65
7 3 3 5,000 1,057 0.97 98.33 100.65
7 5 5 7,000 5,752 0.94 102.24 103.42
10 5 5 10,000 8,856 7.78 100.66 103.81
10 7 7 15,000 12,478 1.14 104.91 106.80
12 7 7 20,000 16,921 16.56 94.13 93.69
Table 2.9. Number of attracted and served customers. K = 10, θ = 0.2, β = 50.
At last, we investigate the impact of sample size on the quality of the optimal solu-
tion of the generated MILP. Surprisingly (see Table 2.9), this impact is almost negligible,
and the objective can actually decrease when the sample size increases. This counterin-
tuive phenomenon was also observed in the paper of [Marcotte et al., 2013], and also
in [Marcotte, 1986] for a bilevel pricing model where a probability density function was
approximated by a coarse-grained histogram. Although the non-convexity of Wj and PKj
certainly plays a role, we could not theoretically devise a rule for selecting ‘optimal’ sam-
ples. This behaviour can also be explained by factors such as travel time. For instance,
if a facility is located far from a demand point, a small error in the waiting time will not
significantly impact the number of arriving customers. Another reason is the non-convexity
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of the approximated functions Wj and PKj. In this context, a larger number of ill-positioned
samples might not necessarily imply a tighter, more precise approximation. As observed
in Table 2.9, the value of the objective function estimated by the approximate model does
not correlate well with the actual optimal value obtained by performing an assignment of
users with respect to the service rate vector µ. Note that when the (N,R, P ) triplets were
set to (10, 7, 7) and (12, 7, 7) CPLEX was unable to find a feasible solution in the alloted
time, in 3 out of 10 tests. Since the true number of attracted and served customers is quite
insensitive to the number of samples, it is clearly advantageous to set those number to values
as small as possible, but yet not too small.
An illustrative case
In the province of Québec (Canada), walk-in clinics provide professional assessment
and treatment for minor illnesses or injuries, for the quarter of the population that lacks
a family doctor, as reported in Statistics [hea, 2017]. These clinics often function on a
first-come first-served basis and it is frequent that clients balk to avoid long waiting times.
In this section, we focus on the issue of optimizing the location and service rates of clinics
in the Mont-Tremblant area, with the aim of maximizing the number of patients served by
the clinics.
Number of open facilities
budget=15 budget=20 budget=25
θ β = 10 β = 50 β = 100 β = 10 β = 50 β = 100 β = 10 β = 50 β = 100
0.01 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
0.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
0.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Table 2.10. Parametric analysis on θ, β and the budget.
Mont-Tremblant has 17 population zones, to which we assign demand nodes assumed to
be spatially located in the center of each zone. The population count per demand node is
generated as follows. The initial population data is taken from Statistics [Census, 2016],
out of which only 25.2% would be interested to visit a walk-in clinic. Considering 250 days
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a year, 8 hours a day, and an average of 4 doctor visits per year, per person, the hourly
demand count represents 0.05% of the initial population.
There are already 4 medical clinics (the competition) in Mont-Tremblant that we consider
serving on average between 1 and 3 clients per hour. Assuming the balking threshold at 10
(people balk if there are 10 or more people waiting in line), and a fixed cost/variable cost
ratio of 5:1, we perform a parametric analysis on β, θ and the budget see Table 2.10.
Figure 2.7. Population Map of Mont-Tremblant, Qc, Canada
Note that for small values of θ, the number of open facilities increases with the budget,
which is expected. For higher values of θ, only two facilities are open, regardless of the
increase in the budget. When θ is close to 0, clients choose facilities with almost no regard
to their disutility. When θ is higher, the clinic must ensure low waiting time and probability
of balking. For instance, when θ = 0.1, it opens 3 facilities for β = 10 and only 2 when
β = 100, for a budget of 25. When clients are not much impacted by the probability of
balking (e.g. β = 10), more money can be spent in opening new clinics. On the other hand,
when θ = 100, only two facilities are opened, while the bulk of the budget is spent on service.
Figure 2.7 displays the spatial distribution of the facilities. The main observation is
that facilities are opened adjacent to the highly populated areas, but not within them.
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This illustrates the difficulty of determining the righ locations. We also note that emerging
facilities lie close to the competitor’s facilities.
2.5. Conclusion and extensions
In this paper, we addressed a bilevel location model involving both combinatorial and non-
linear elements, and proposed for its solution approximation schemes, as well as a heuristic
that exploits the problem’s structure. Our model is flexible and can accommodate numerous
situations, while the proposed algorithms remain applicable. For instance, balking is an
additional feature that can be removed if it is not suited for a given application. The budget
constraint can be incorporated in the objective, as a total setup cost. For the sake of simplic-
ity, only one server is available in our model, however, any M/M/s/K, and M/M/s queues
can be considered, provided that the number of server s is fixed, and the decision variable is
the service rate µ. In this case the waiting time and probability of balking formulas would
change, but they do not hinder the algorithm.
While the results are more than encouraging, our findings raise a number of issues, from
either the modelling, theoretical or algorithmic viewpoints. For instance, the surprising
result that the standard linearization of the lower level complementarity constraints proved
less efficient, numerically, than an approach based on a triangular approximation involving
a larger number of binary variables, is certainly worth investigating.
On the modelling side, future work will integrate features such as variable demand and
the possibility of either increasing or decreasing the service rates of existing facilities. This
will involve a piecewise affine investment function whose two slopes reflect the fact that
economies resulting from lowering service are less than those of increasing it. More realistic
models where the price of service depends on location should also be considered.
On the algorithmic side, three avenues can be pursued: (i) the design of improved approx-
imations for the nonlinear terms involved in the linear approximation method, and (ii) the de-
sign of fast heuristics for determining good sets of facility locations, from which efficient meth-
ods for determining optimal service rates can be initiated and, finally (iii) the investigation
of approximations based on the exact mixed integer formulation of the logit-based location
models proposed by [Haase, 2009], [Benati and Hansen, 2002], [Zhang et al., 2012],
and numerically analyzed by [Haase and Müller, 2014].
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Appendix
2.A. Notation and proofs
In this e-companion we present the notation used throughout this paper, and we complete
the proofs of some propositions.
2.B. Notation
Sets
I: set of demand nodes;
J : set of candidate facility locations (leader and competition);
Jc: set of competition’s facilities;
J1: set of leader’s candidate sites;
J∗1 ⊆ J1: set of leader’s open facilities
J∗ ⊆ J : set of open facilities (leader and competitor).
Parameters
di: demand originating from node i ∈ I;
tij: travel time between nodes i ∈ I and j ∈ J ;
α: coefficient of the waiting time in the disutility formula;
β: coefficient of the balking probability in the disutility formula;
B: available budget (for opening new facilities and associated service rates);
cf : fixed cost associated with opening a new facility;
cµ : cost per unit of service;
µ¯ : maximum service rate allowed by the budget;
p: number of facilities to open.
Basic decision variables
yj: binary variable set to 1 if a facility is open at site j, and to 0 otherwise;
µj: service rate at open facilities.
Additional variables
xij: arrival rate at at facility j ∈ J originating from demand node i ∈ I;
λj: arrival rate at node j ∈ J ;
ρj: utilization rate of facility j ∈ J ;
λ¯j: throughput rate (customers accessing service) at node j ∈ J ;
wj: mean queueing time at facility j.
2.C. Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and Theorem 9
Proposition 1. The waiting time wj is increasing in λj.
Proof. Proof. The derivative of wj with respect to λj (see Equation (2.2.10)) is
∂wj
∂λj
=
∂wj
∂ρj
∂ρj
∂λj
=
∂wj
∂ρj
1
µj
.
To show that ∂wj/∂ρj is nonnegative for all ρj 6= 1, let us consider
∂wj
∂ρj
=
1
µj

− K2ρK − 1j(
ρKj − 1
)2 + 1(ρj − 1)2

 .
Basic algebraic manipulation yields
1
(ρj − 1)2
≥ K
2ρK − 1j(
ρKj − 1
)2 ⇐⇒
K−1∑
i=0
ρij ≥ Kρ(K − 1)/2j . (2.C.1)
To prove that the right-hand inequality holds true, we consider two cases.
If K is odd:
K−1∑
i=0
ρij =
(K−1)/2−1∑
i=0
(
ρij + ρ
K − 1− i
j
)
+ ρ
(K − 1)/2
j
≥ 2
(K−1)/2−1∑
i=0
ρ
(K − 1)/2
j + ρ
(K − 1)/2
j = Kρ
(K − 1)/2
j .
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If K is even:
K−1∑
i=0
ρij =
(K−2)/2∑
i=0
(
ρij + ρ
K − 1− i
j
)
≥ 2
(K−2)/2∑
i=0
ρ
(K − 1)/2
j = Kρ
(K − 1)/2
j .
It follows that wj is an increasing function of λj. 
Proposition 2. The probability of balking pKj is increasing in λj.
Proof. Proof. The derivative of pKj with respect to λj is
p′Kj =
λK − 1j µj(
λK + 1j − µK + 1j
)2
[
λK + 1j − (K + 1)λjµKj +KµK + 1j
]
= σ[xK + 1 − (K + 1) x+K],
where σ is a positive number and x = λj/µj. By differentiating with respect to x, we
find that the right-hand-side achieves its minimum value 0 at x = 1, which concludes the
proof. 
Proposition 4. When K =∞, i.e., balking does not occur (in this case, the model admits a
solution only if the total service rate exceeds the total demand rate), the lower level objective
function is convex jointly in λ and µ.
Proof. Proof. If K = ∞, the probability of balking can be removed from the objective,
since it is equal to 0. Moreover, wj = 1/(µj − λj), and the lower level objective takes the
form ∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
xij ln xij + xijtij
]
− α
∑
j∈J∗
ln(µj − λj).
Basic algebra shows that its Hessian is positive semidefinite, hence the function is convex. 
Proposition 5. The integral of the waiting time, Wj(λj, µj) is pseudoconvex.
Proof. Proof. Let x = (λx, µx) and y = (λy, µy). Assume that ∇W (x)(y − x) ≥ 0. Then
we have: (
wj(x),−λx
µx
wj(x)
)
(λy − λx, µy − µx) ≥ 0
⇒ (ρy − ρx)wj(x) ≥ 0
⇒ ρy ≥ ρx, (2.C.2)
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since wj is nonnegative. On the other hand, ∂Wj/∂ρ = µjwj is nonnegative, we have that
Wj is increasing in ρ, so ρy ≥ ρx ⇒ Wj(y) ≥ Wj(x). From Eq (2.C.2) it follows that if
∇W (x)(y − x) ≥ 0 then Wj(y) ≥ Wj(x), hence Wj is pseudoconvex. 
Proposition 6. G1 is strongly monotone in x of modulus θ · dMAX.
Proof. Proof. [Gilbert et al., 2015] have already argued that G1 is strongly monotone.
Indeed, the associated Jacobian is a positive definite diagonal matrix over D, with the
smallest possible eigenvalue 1/(θ · dMAX). It follows that G1 is strongly monotone with
modulus θ · dMAX. 
Proposition 7. G2 is monotone in x.
Proof. Proof.
〈G2(µ, x)−G2(µ, y), x− y〉 =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗

 1
µj −
∑
l∈I
xl,j
− 1
µj −
∑
l∈I
yl,j

 · (xij − yij)
=
∑
j∈J∗


µj −
∑
l∈I
yl,j − µj +
∑
l∈I
xl,j(
µj −
∑
l∈I
xl,j
)
·
(
µj −
∑
l∈I
yl,j
) ·∑
i∈I
(xij − yij)


=
∑
j∈J∗


∑
l∈I
(xl,j − yl,j)
∑
l∈I
(xl,j − yl,j)(
µj −
∑
l∈I
xl,j
)
·
(
µj −
∑
l∈I
yl,j
)


≥ 0

Proposition 10. If K =∞ and there are no fixed costs, the surrogate model is convex.
Proof. Proof. According to Proposition 4, the objective is jointly convex in µ and λ.
Moreover one can, without loss of generality, open all facilities and hence dispense with the
binary vector y. Notwithstanding, a facility can be closed by setting its service level to
zero. 
60
Proposition 11. At the optimum of (PH*), if K = ∞, queueing delays are equal for all
leader’s
Proof. Proof. For fixed y variables, Equation (2.3.27) can be rewritten as
∑
j∈J∗
µj ≤ µ¯, (2.C.3)
where µ¯ is the maximum possible total service rate allowed by the budget. But K =∞, so
wj(λj, µj) = 1/ (µj − λj) and pKj(λj, µj) = 0, which yields the mathematical program
(PHY*) min
µ, x
∑
i ∈ I
∑
j ∈ J∗
xijtij − α
∑
j ∈ J∗
ln(µj − (
∑
i ∈ I
xij))
s.t. constraints (2.3.26), (2.3.29), (2.3.30), (2.C.3)
Let δi, πij and γ be the Lagrange multipliers associated with Equations (2.3.26), (2.3.30) and
(2.C.3), respectively. Variables δi are free, while γ and πij are restricted to be nonnegative.
The stationarity conditions of the above program are:
∂L
∂xij
= 0 ⇒ tij + αwj(λj, µj)− δi − πij = 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J∗ (2.C.4)
∂L
∂µj
= 0 ⇒ −αwj(λj, µj) + γ = 0, ∀j ∈ J∗ ∩ J1, (2.C.5)
and the conclusion follows from Equation (2.C.5). 
We observe, after plugging αwj(λj, µj) from Equation (2.C.5) into Equation (2.C.4) for
a given demand node i, that only one flow xij is nonzero, provided that transportation times
to the leader’s facilities are distinct.
Proposition 12. There exists a value of ξ∗ for which (PHY*(ξ∗)) yields an optimal solution
for (P*).
Proof. Proof. Let y∗ and µ∗ be optimal for (P*). Without loss of generality (there are
no fixed costs) we assume that all facilities are open. At equilibrium, let c∗i be the cost
associated with demand node i and optimal service rate µ∗. Let x∗, wj(x
∗, µ∗j) and c
∗
i satisfy
Equation (2.2.24) and (2.2.25). If xij is positive, we have:
tij + αwj(x
∗, µ∗) = c∗i , ∀j ∈ J, ∀i ∈ I. (2.C.6)
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Let C = maxi∈I {c∗i } in the initial formulation. For j ∈ J , we let ξj = c∗i − tij −C and select
and index i corresponding to a positive flow x∗ij. If no such i exists, then µ
∗
j = 0, otherwise
the leader would waste monetary resources. We then set ξj = −C.
Now, let δi, πij and γ be the Lagrange multipliers associated with Equations (2.3.26),
(2.3.30) and (2.C.3), respectively. Variables δi and γ are free, while πij are restricted to be
nonnegative. The stationarity conditions of the program above take the form
∂ L
∂xij
= 0 ⇒ tij + αwj(x, µj)− δi = 0, if xij > 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J (2.C.7)
∂ L
∂µj
= 0 ⇒ −αwj(x, µj) + γ + ξj = 0, ∀j ∈ J1. (2.C.8)
Note that the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to xij is left unchanged, i.e., Equa-
tion (2.C.7) is equivalent to Equation (2.C.4). If γ = C, we derive from Equation (2.C.8)
that αwj(x, µj) = c
∗
i − tij, which is equivalent to Equation (2.C.7). This completes the proof,
since for the given values of ξ, variables x and µ match the optimal solution of (P*). 
Theorem 9. The error of the upper-level objective function is O(1/N1 + 1/N2), where N1
and N2 are the number of samples for the linearization of g1 and g2, respectively.
Proof. Proof. Let G¯ be an approximation of G. We denote by x¯ the solution of
IV(G¯(µ, ·), D), and by x the solution of IV(G(µ, ·), D). Then the following inequalities
hold:
〈G(µ, x), x¯− x〉 ≥ 0〈
G¯(µ, x¯), x− x¯〉 ≥ 0
⇒ 〈G¯(µ, x¯)−G(µ, x), x− x¯〉 ≥ 0 (2.C.9)
From the strong monotonicity of G and Eq. (2.C.9) it follows that
〈
G¯(µ, x¯)−G(µ, x¯), x− x¯〉 ≥ 1
θ · dMAX ||x− x¯||
2. (2.C.10)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
θ · dMAX · ||G¯(µ, x¯)−G(µ, x¯)|| ≥ ||x− x¯||. (2.C.11)
It follows that
62
|f(x)− f(x¯)| = |
∑
i ∈ I
∑
j ∈ J∗1
(xij − x¯ij) | ≤
√
|I| · |J |||x− x¯|| (Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
≤
√
|I| · |J | θ · dMAX · ||G¯(µ, x¯)−G(µ, x¯)||. (2.C.12)
We perform two separate linear approximations on g1 and g2, respectively. Then the
mappings G¯1(x) and G¯2(x) are piecewise constant approximations, that we detail separately.
A. G¯1 : Each component (i, j) of this vector is a piecewise constant approximation of
log(xij), satisfying:
i) there are N1 total samples on xij, starting from rmin to dMAX;
ii) the sampling points are chosen so that the segments are vertically equidistant;
iii) the vertical positions of the segments are the slopes of the tangents to x log(x),
evaluated at the sampling points.
Let ∆1 be the difference between two consecutive slope values:
∆1 =
log(dMAX)− log(rmin)
N1 − 1 .
Then |G¯1(i,j) −G1(i,j)| ≤ ∆1, which yields:
||G¯1(x)−G1(x)|| =
√∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
|G¯1(i,j) −G1(i,j)|2 ≤ (log(dMAX)− log(rmin))
√|I| · |J |
N1 − 1
(2.C.13)
B. G¯2 : is a mapping whose (i, j)-component is a constant piecewise approximation of
1/qj, where qj = µj−
∑
i ∈ I
xij. Similar to G¯1, this linearization satisfies the following:
i) there are N2 total samples, starting from ψ to µMAX;
ii) the sampling points are chosen so that the segments are vertically equidistant;
iii) the vertical positions of the segments are the slopes of the tangents − log(q) eval-
uated at the sampling points.
We note by ∆2 the difference between two consecutive slope values:
∆2 =
1
ψ
− 1
µMAX
N2 − 1
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Then |G¯2(i,j) −G2(i,j)| ≤ ∆2, which yields
||G¯2(x)−G2(x)|| =
√∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
|G¯2(xij)−G2(xij)|2 ≤
(
1
ψ
− 1
µMAX
)√|I| · |J |
N2 − 1 (2.C.14)
From Eq. (2.C.12) it follows that, given y and µ:
|f(x)− f(x¯)| ≤ θ · dMAX|I| · |J |

(log(dMAX)− log(rmin))N1 − 1 + α
1
ψ
− 1
µMAX
N2 − 1

 ∈ O( 1N1 + 1N2 ).
(2.C.15)

Theorem 9 has several implications.
— For a given set of open facilities, the absolute difference between the optimal and the
approximated objective value is bounded by the right-hand-side of inequality (2.C.15).
For large values of N1 and N2, the two values are very close.
— If the optimal solution is unique in terms of the location vector y, and the absolute
difference between the objective and other solutions objectives are lower than the right
hand side of inequality (2.C.15), the approximation algorithm will find the optimum
locations.
2.D. Linearization of optimality conditions
2.D.1. Complementarity constraints for Program (P2-lin)
Let γi, δj, ν
n
ij, π
rp
j , η
rp
j , and φij be the dual variables associated with constraints (2.3.8),
(2.3.9), (2.3.10), (2.3.11), (2.3.12) and (2.3.13), respectively. Then the complementarity
constraints for program (P2-lin) can be written as:
γi
(∑
j∈J∗
xij − di
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.D.1)
δj
(
λj −
∑
i∈I
xij
)
= 0 ∀j ∈ J∗ (2.D.2)
νnij
(
vij − anfxij − bnf
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀n ∈ N (2.D.3)
πrpj
(
uj − arpg λj − brpg µj − crpg
)
= 0 ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P (2.D.4)
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ηrpj (zj − arph λj − brph µj − crph ) = 0 ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P (2.D.5)
φijxij = 0 ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗, (2.D.6)
and can be linearized in the standard fashion, through the introduction of binary variables
and big-M constants. For instance, the last constraint is replaced by the inequalities
φij ≤ Muij
xij ≤ M(1− uij),
where uij ∈ {0, 1}. Although is possible to find a valid upper bound for the variable φij, a
large value ofM is required, which leads to a poor relaxation and consequently an ill-behaved
branch-and-bound algorithm.
2.D.2. Equality between primal and dual objectives
Alternatively, constraints (2.D.1) – (2.D.6) can be replaced with constraint (2.D.7), which
represents the equality between between the primal and dual objective of (P2-lin). Then the
optimality constraints of (P2-lin) are
∑
i∈I
γidi +
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
νnijb
n
f +
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
∑
j∈J
(
brpg µjπ
rp
j + b
rp
h µjη
rp
j + c
rp
g π
rp
j + c
rp
h η
rp
j
)
=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[
1
θ
vij + xijtij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J
uj + β
∑
j∈J
zj, (2.D.7)
∑
j∈J
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J
vij − anfxij ≥ bnf , ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J ; ∀n ∈ N
uj − arpg λj − brpg µj ≥ crpg , ∀j ∈ J ; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P
zj − arph λj − brph µj ≥ crph , ∀j ∈ J ; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P
γi + δj −
∑
n∈N
anfν
n
ij ≤ tij, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J
− δj −
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
(
arpg π
rp
j + a
rp
h η
rp
j
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ J
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∑
n∈N
νnij =
1
θ
, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J
∑
r∈R
∑
p ∈ P
πrpj = α, ∀j ∈ J
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
ηrpj = β, ∀j ∈ J
πrpj , η
rp
j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J ; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P
xij ≥ 0, νnij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J ; ∀n ∈ N.
To obtain a MILP formulation, we linearize the nonlinear terms µjπ
rp
j and µjη
rp
j via
the triangle method described in [D’Ambrosio et al., 2010]. For each term µjπ
kq
j we
introduce 2(R − 1)(P − 1) binary variables lpijrpkq and lpijrpkq associated with the upper and
lower triangles, respectively, of the rectangle defined by the intervals [πr, πr+1) and [µp, µp+1).
Note that the values of π and η are upper bounded by α and β, respectively. Additionally,
µ is bounded by the maximum value allowed by the leader’s budget, µ¯. Next, we introduce
J1RP continuous variables sjrpkq ∈ [0, 1] which will be used to express the couple (πkqj , µj) as
a convex combination of triangle vertices. We introduce a similar linearization for the term
µjη
kh
j . The approximation of µjπ
kq
j and µjη
kq
j is then
R−1∑
r=1
P−1∑
p=1
(
l
pi
jrpkq + l
pi
jrpkq
)
= 1, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.8)
spijrpkq ≤ l
pi
jrpkq + l
pi
jrpkq + l
pi
jrp−1kq + l
pi
jr−1p−1kq + l
pi
jr−1p−1kq + l
pi
jr−1pkq,
∀j ∈ J1; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P ; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P
(2.D.9)
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
spijrpkq = 1, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.10)
πkqj =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
spijrpkqπ
r, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.11)
µj =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
spijrpkqµ
p, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.12)
epijkq =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
spijrpkqπ
rµp, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.13)
66
R−1∑
r=1
P−1∑
p=1
(
l
η
jrpkq + l
η
jrpkq
)
= 1, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.14)
sηjrpkq ≤ l
η
jrpkq + l
η
jrpkq + l
η
jrp−1kq + l
η
jr−1p−1kq + l
η
jr−1p−1kq + l
η
jr−1pkq,
∀j ∈ J1; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P ; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P
(2.D.15)
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sηjrpkq = 1, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.16)
ηkqj =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sηjrpkqη
r, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.17)
µj =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sηjrpkqµ
p, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.18)
eηjkq =
R∑
r=1
P∑
p=1
sηjrpkqη
rµp, ∀j ∈ J1; ∀k ∈ R; ∀q ∈ P (2.D.19)
The complete MILP formulation is presented below. It involves variables associated with
the original fixed point (or bilevel) formulation (y, µ, x), together with variables issued from
the linearizations and primal-dual optimality conditions.
(P-lin)
max
x, y, µ, λ, u, v, z,
e, π, η, ν, γ, δ, l
pi
, lpi,
spi, epi, sη, l
η
, lη
s, l, l
∑
j∈J1
ej
∑
j∈J1
yjcf +
∑
j∈J1
cµµj ≤ B,
µj ≤ µ¯yj, ∀j ∈ J1∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
∑
j∈Jc
(
brpg π
rp
j µj + b
rp
h η
rp
j µj + c
rp
g π
rp
j + c
rp
h η
rp
j
)
+
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
νnijb
n
f
+
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
∑
j∈J1
(
brpg e
pi
jrp + b
rp
h e
η
jrp + c
mp
g π
rp
j + c
rp
h η
rp
j
)
+
∑
i ∈ I
γidi
=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[
1
θ
vij + xijtij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J
uj + β
∑
j∈J
zj,
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∑
j∈J
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J
vij − anfxij ≥ bnf , ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J ; ∀n ∈ N
uj − arpg λj − brpg µj ≥ crpg , ∀j ∈ J ; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P
zj − arph λj − brph µj ≥ crph , ∀j ∈ J ; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P
γi + δj −
∑
n∈N
anfν
n
ij ≤ tij, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J
− δj −
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
(
arpg π
rp
j + a
rp
h η
rp
j
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ J
∑
n∈N
νnij =
1
θ
, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
πrpj = α, ∀j ∈ J
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈P
ηrpj = β, ∀j ∈ J
constraints (2.D.8)–(2.D.19) and (2.3.14)–(2.3.19),
yj ∈ {0, 1}, µj, πrpj , ηrpj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J ; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P
xij ≥ 0, νnij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J ; ∀n ∈ N.
2.D.3. Example of lower level linearization when K =∞
Recall that, according to Proposition 4, the function is convex if the buffer zone is infinite
(no balking). In that situation, the maximum of the linear approximations is consistent with
the original function, give or take the approximation error. Proceeding as before, we obtain
grp(λ, µ) = arpg λ+ b
rp
g µ+ c
rp
g =
α
µp − λrλ−
α
µp − λrµ− α(ln(µ
p − λr)− 1). (2.D.20)
This yields the linearized lower level program
(P2∞) min
x, v, u, λ
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
[
1
θ
vij + xijtij
]
+ α
∑
j∈J∗
uj (2.D.21)
s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di, ∀i ∈ I (2.D.22)
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λj =
∑
i∈I
xij, ∀j ∈ J∗ (2.D.23)
vij − anfxij ≥ bnf , ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀n ∈ N (2.D.24)
uj − arpg λj − brpg µj ≥ crpg , ∀j ∈ J∗; ∀r ∈ R; ∀p ∈ P (2.D.25)
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I; ∀j ∈ J∗. (2.D.26)
2.D.4. Taxonomy
This section provides a taxonomy of the models most relevant to our research, with
respect to four features: (i) user choice environment (yes or no), (ii) stochastic (or not),
(iii) inclusion of congestion (or not) at facilities, (iv) inclusion (or not) of competition. The
relevant information is displayed in Table 2.D.1.
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Authors user choice stochastic congestion competition
[Abouee-Mehrizi et al., 2011] × × ×
[Averbakh et al., 2007] ×
[Berman and Drezner, 2006] × ×
[Camacho-Vallejo et al., 2014] ×
[Castillo et al., 2009] × ×
[Desrochers et al., 1995] ×
[Kim, 2013] ×
[Küçükaydin et al., 2011] × × ×
[Labbé and Hakimi, 1991] ×
[Marianov and Serra, 2001] ×
[Marianov, 2003] × ×
[Marianov et al., 2008] × × × ×
[Marić et al., 2012] ×
[Rahmati et al., 2014] × ×
[Vidyarthi and Jayaswal, 2014] × ×
[Zhang et al., 2010a] × ×
Table 2.D.1. Taxonomy of congested facility location models
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Chapter 3
An exact algorithm for a class of mixed-integer programs
with equilibrium constraints
The second article is dedicated to an exact algorithm for solving a subclass of mathemat-
ical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) involving both integer and continuous
variables. We demonstrate that our algorithm can be successfully applied to a location prob-
lem, which embeds a variant of a queueing model where the number of servers at facilities are
integer decision variables. Although the model considered in the second article is somewhat
similar to the one in the first article, it calls for an entirely different approach due to its
highly combinatorial aspects.
Let us consider the following global MPEC model
min
x∈Rn,y∈Rm
f(x, y)
s.t. gk(x, y) ≤ 0 k = 1, . . . , r
xi integer i = 1, . . . , n ,
(3.0.1)
where the vector y ∈ Y (x) satisfies the lower level variational inequality
〈F (x, y), y − y′〉 ≤ 0 ∀y′ ∈ Y (x) , (3.0.2)
with Y (x) = {y ≥ 0 : hj(x, y) = 0, j = 1, . . . , p}.
We assume all functions continuously differentiable, f and gk : R
n → R convex, hj :
R
n+m → R affine, and the mapping F : Rn+m → Rm monotone in its second argument y. If
F is a gradient mapping, the global model can be written as a mathematical program with
complementarity constraints (MPCC)
P: min
σ,x,y
f(x, y)
s.t. gk(x, y) ≥ 0 k = 1, ..., r
xi integer i = 1, . . . , n
hj(x, y) = 0 j = 1, ..., p (3.0.3)
0 ≤ y ⊥ F (x, y) +
p∑
j=1
σj∇yhj(x, y) ≥ 0 , (3.0.4)
where the vector of multipliers σ ∈ Rp is associated with the set of linear constraints.
One of the main challenges associated with MPCCs arises from the violation of the
linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ) and of the Mangasarian-Fromovitz con-
straint qualification (MFCQ), at all feasible points. Failure of these regularity conditions
results in unboundedness and nonuniqueness of the multipliers, which yields a poor perfor-
mance of most nonlinear programming (NLP) algorithms [Andreani and Martínez, 2001,
Baumrucker et al., 2008].
Designing exact algorithms for this class of problems is extremely difficult due to their
nonconvexity. Our novel algorithmic framework is based on a sophisticated combination
of several algorithmic ingredients like linearization, relaxation, reformulation, Mixed-Integer
Linear Programming (MILP), and the iterative solution of convex (lower-level) subproblems.
The main idea is to perform a standard Branch and Bound (B&B) on a MILP relaxation
of the original problem, while virtually treating each node of the B&B tree as a separate
optimization problem. This flexible tree management allows for full flexibility and one can
potentially adapt the formulation, or the solution technique at some strategic nodes.
We illustrate our algorithm on an extension of the classical discrete FLP, that is different
from the one in the first article, in the following aspects. The facilities are modelled as
infinite capacity M/M/s queues equipped with a fixed service rate µ. The decision variable
is the integer vector s, i.e., the number of servers at each open facility. This adds to the
combinatorial complexity of the problem, but it makes the upper-level entirely integer. In
our algorithm we exploit this property, along with the other specific attributes of the model.
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An exact algorithm for a class of mixed-integer
programs with equilibrium constraints
Teodora Dan, Andrea Lodi, Patrice Marcotte
ABSTRACT
In this study, we consider a rich class of mathematical programs with equilibrium con-
straints (MPECs) involving both integer and continuous variables. Such a class, which
subsumes mathematical programs with complementarity constraints, as well as bilevel pro-
grams involving lower level convex programs is, in general, extremely hard to solve due
to complementarity constraints and integrality requirements. For its solution, we design
an (exact) branch-and-bound (B&B) algorithm that treats each node of the B&B tree as
a separate optimization problem and potentially changes its formulation and solution ap-
proach by designing, for example, a separate B&B tree. The algorithm is implemented and
computationally evaluated on a specific instance of MPEC, namely a competitive facility
location problem that takes into account the queueing process that determines the equilib-
rium assignment of users to open facilities, and for which, to date, no exact method has been
proposed.
Keywords: bilevel location, mixed integer programming, global optimization
3.1. Introduction
Mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs) are NP-hard optimization
problems that arise in engineering design, transportation, economics and multilevel games,
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to name a few areas of application. They embed constraints that are typically expressed
as variational inequalities, which makes them highly nonconvex, even in the simplest cases.
The aim of this work if twofold. First, we design an exact algorithm for an important class
of mixed-integer MPECs, i.e., MPECs that involve both continuous and discrete variables.
Next, we computationally evaluate the algorithm on a complex location-queueing model.
Formally, the model that we consider takes the mathematical form
min
x∈Rn,y∈Rm
f(x, y)
s.t. gk(x, y) ≤ 0 k = 1, . . . , r
xi integer i = 1, . . . , n ,
(3.1.1)
where the vector y ∈ Y (x) satisfies the lower level variational inequality
〈F (x, y), y − y′〉 ≤ 0 ∀y′ ∈ Y (x) , (3.1.2)
with Y (x) = {y ≥ 0 : hj(x, y) = 0, j = 1, . . . , p}.
Throughout the paper, we make the assumptions that all functions involved are continu-
ously differentiable. Furthermore, f and gk : R
n → R are convex, hj : Rn+m → R are affine,
and the mapping F : Rn+m → Rm is monotone in its second argument y. Whenever the
Jacobian of F with respect to y is symmetric, F is a gradient mapping, i.e., F = ∇φ for
some convex function φ. In that case, a vector y satisfies the variational inequality (3.1.2) if
and only if it is a solution of the lower level convex program
LL: min
y
φ(y)
s.t. hj(x, y) = 0 j = 1, . . . , p
y ≥ 0 .
(3.1.3)
Under our monotonicity and differentiability assumptions, the variational inequality (3.1.2)
can be replaced by a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system. This allows to reformulate the
global model as the mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC)
P: min
σ,x,y
f(x, y)
s.t. gk(x, y) ≥ 0 k = 1, ..., r
xi integer i = 1, . . . , n
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hj(x, y) = 0 j = 1, ..., p (3.1.4)
0 ≤ y ⊥ F (x, y) +
p∑
j=1
σj∇yhj(x, y) ≥ 0 , (3.1.5)
where the vector of multipliers σ ∈ Rp is associated with the set of linear constraints.
The main difficulty associated with MPCCs is that the complementarity constraints
involve both upper level (x), and lower level (y, σ) variables. Even in its simplest form
0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 over scalars a and b, the feasible set is the union of two convex polyhedra,
namely {(a, 0) : a ≥ 0} ∪ {(b, 0) : b ≥ 0}. The linear independence constraint qualification
(LICQ), requiring the gradients of the active constraints to be independent, is violated
at all feasible points, which results in nonuniqueness of the constraint multipliers. The
weaker Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ) is not satisfied either. We
recall that MFCQ requires linear independence of the gradients of the equality constraints,
and the existence of a direction d pointing into the interior of the region defined by the
gradients of the active inequality constraints, such that 〈∇hj, d〉 = 0. Failure of LICQ
and MFCQ results in unboundedness and nonuniqueness of the multipliers, therefore, many
nonlinear programming (NLP) algorithms (and codes) could perform poorly because their
performance strongly rests on these regularity conditions [Andreani and Martínez, 2001,
Baumrucker et al., 2008].
Designing exact algorithms for this class of problems is a challenging task. Our novel
algorithmic approach is based on a sophisticated combination of Mixed-Integer Linear Pro-
gramming (MILP), linearization techniques and the iterative solution of convex subproblems.
Roughly speaking, we start by embedding the solution space of P into an MILP relaxation
– which is already nontrivial due to its nonconvexity – and, while performing a standard
Branch and Bound (B&B), we iteratively solve either problem LL, to recover the true value
of the objective function of a leaf (corresponding to a mixed-integer node), or some subprob-
lems with strengthened relaxation (associated with a fractional node) to perform additional
pruning in the tree and speed up convergence. In other words, we virtually treat each node
of the B&B tree as a separate optimization problem to which we can adapt the formulation
and, consequently, the solution technique, by building, for example, a separate B&B tree.
The algorithm is implemented and computationally tested on a specific instance of P,
namely the competitive congested user-choice discrete facility location problem CC–FLP.
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CC–FLP is an extension of the classical (discrete) facility location problem, a fundamental
structure in discrete optimization that is well suited to a variety of real-life applications.
While it has been extensively considered in the literature, few studies have incorporated the
specific features of a user-choice environment, which frequently involves congestion, either
along the paths leading to a facility, or at the facility itself. The congested user-choice model
belongs to the MPEC class and can be reformulated as an NP-hard bilevel program, thus
falling into the category of mathematical programs with complementarity constraints.
Paper Contribution. The paper provides two strong contributions.
— On the one side, it proposes a novel exact algorithm for solving a fairly general class of
mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints. To some extent, such an algo-
rithm virtually treats every node as a separate, i.e., different, optimization problem,
adapting either the relaxation or the solution method (or both) depending on some
triggering conditions. This is done to achieve full flexibility and to exploit in the most
effective way both the strength of the MILP solvers, e.g., their strong preprocessing at
the root node, and the pieces of information acquired while exploring the enumeration
tree, which could lead to alternative algorithmic decisions and/or problem formula-
tions. Although this is not the only way to exploit this idea (see next section), we
believe that it is a fundamental step in the direction of designing complex adaptive
algorithms that have the capability, within the same B&B tree, to change solution
strategies and formulations, whenever required.
— On the other side, and to the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first exact
method for CC–FLP, which is a practically relevant and remarkably difficult general-
ization of the classical facility location problem. So far, in the literature, CC–FLP or
variants thereof were only addressed by means of heuristic methods.
Paper Organization. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we detail the novel
solution method for P and discuss its connection with existing literature, together with its
underlying assumptions and limitations. In Section 3.3, we describe CC–FLP, including a
literature review, and we provide all necessary details for adapting the proposed algorithm
to this application. In Section 3.5, we report on the extensive computational experiments for
exactly solving CC–FLP. Finally, in Section 3.6, we draw some conclusions and open avenues
for further research on this topic.
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3.2. Algorithmic framework
Based on B&B, our solution approach consists of two main phases.
Phase I. In the first phase, we perform a linearization of nonlinear terms and constraints,
in order to reduce the original program to an MILP. In our generic model P, there are two
distinct sources of nonlinearity, namely F and the complementarity constraints. For linear
F , the only linearization needed would involve the complementarity constraints, for which
we could write an exact linear reformulation via binary variables 1. For the sake of generality,
we henceforth consider F to be nonlinear. Then, there are several options for linearization.
— Single level linearization:
— Perform a piecewise linear approximation of F .
— Introduce big-M constraints to linearize the complementarities.
— Bilevel linearization:
— Replace the equilibrium constraints by a lower-level program, linearize it, then
write the KKT optimality conditions.
— Linearize the resulting program by replacing the bilinear terms with McCormick
envelopes.
The main difficulty in both cases is to perform linear approximations that guarantee that
the objective function of the obtained MILP is a bounding function for the objective of the
original program. Let F¯ be a piecewise linear approximation of F and let (σ˜, x˜, y˜) be a
feasible solution of P. Similarly, given x˜, let (σ¯, y¯) satisfy (3.1.4)–(3.1.5) when F is replaced
by F¯ . Due to the approximation of F , y¯ may not correspond to the true solution of the lower
level, therefore y¯ may differ from y˜. It follows that f(x¯, y¯) may also differ from f(x˜, y¯). This
implies that, after linearization and relaxation of integrality constraints at integer nodes, the
approximated objective value may not correspond to the true objective value. Our approach
is to perform a linear approximation such that the objective function of the obtained MILP
be a valid upper bound on the objective of the original program. This will ensure that
optimum of relaxed MILP ≤ optimum of MILP ≤ optimum of original problem. (3.2.1)
1. The reader is referred to [Hijazi and Liberti, 2014, Jeroslow and Lowe, 1984] for a discussion
on the theoretical representability of unbounded disjunctions.
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Inequality (3.2.1) must hold in order for B&B not to prune nodes that might contain the
optimal solution. In other words, the constructed MILP must be a valid relaxation of P .
Phase II. In the second phase, we implement a B&B algorithm to find the optimal solution of
the original problem. At the leaves of a standard B&B tree, the bound equals the value of the
corresponding solution. In our case, this is not necessarily true, due to the approximations
performed in Phase I. We tackle this issue by interacting with the B&B throughout its
execution, i.e., by computing the correct value of the objective function at any associated
leaf. To achieve this, we fix the upper level (integer) variables to their corresponding values
at the current node, we compute the optimal solution of the (convex) lower-level problem,
and we recover the associated objective value of the original problem. In order to reduce the
size of the B&B tree and to make the algorithm more efficient, in some of the fractional nodes
we compute an on-the-fly lower-bound for the subtree rooted at the corresponding node, by
taking into account the bounds of some of the variables. This algorithmic framework is
summarized in Algorithm 1 (see pseudocode below).
Algorithm 1
1: perform linear approximations of nonlinear terms and constraints so as to satisfy (3.2.1)
2: solve the resulting MILP using B&B:
3: for all nodes in the tree do
4: if integer node then
5: compute the true corresponding objective function value
6: else
7: if some condition holds then
8: compute a tighter lower bound (by improving the relaxation)
9: return best found solution
Algorithm 1 performs Phase I at Step 1. This can be achieved either under the single level
or bilevel linearization. The quality of those linearizations will be discussed later on in the
paper and especially evaluated in the computational investigation for the special case of the
CC–FLP. The rest of Algorithm 1 concerns Phase II and implements the idea, outlined in the
introduction, that every node of the B&B tree can potentially be treated differently. What
is described in the algorithm above is the distinction between fractional and integer nodes,
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where we either (potentially) improve the relaxation or compute the real objective function
value by solving an auxiliary continuous optimization problem, respectively. However, a
third special case for the CC–FLP involves B&B nodes in which a certain set of variables,
namely the facility location ones, is settled, i.e., all decisions on where locating the facilities
are taken but some other integer decisions are not. Each of those nodes is reformulated and
solved by the MILP solver IBM CPLEX as a separate MILP within the same B&B algorithm
by taking advantage of callback functions, which allows the solver to exploit the full power
of its preprocessing phase by heavily simplifying the formulation. Of course, the overall
branching scheme is tailored so as the location variables are settled first, thus encountering
those nodes as early as possible in the search tree.
We close this discussion by outlining the relationship between our solution approach and
the relevant literature with respect to the management of the B&B tree.
— First, our algorithm clearly borrows from the vast literature on Global Optimization
(GO) the idea (and the need) of iteratively improving the relaxation within the enu-
meration scheme. In GO, this is achieved by Spatial Branching (i.e., by iteratively
improving the convex relaxation) and by applying expensive bound tightening in virtu-
ally any node. Of course, the relaxation can be (and is actually) improved in MILP as
well by cutting plane generation. However, our approach is a hybrid because, within an
MILP scheme, what we do in the majority of cases in (selected) fractional nodes is to
tighten the formulation not by exploiting integrality (like for cut generation in MILP)
but by improving the linearization of the nonlinear component(s) of the original prob-
lem. This is in the spirit, for example, of the work of [Belotti et al., 2016], where
big-M constraints are iteratively strengthened within the MILP B&B as a GO solver
would do. With respect to [Belotti et al., 2016], Step 8 of Algorithm 1 goes slightly
further by providing a different formulation of the node (by improving the piecewise
linear approximation) instead of simply tightening some of its constraints individu-
ally. This is related to the work of [Furini and Traversi, 2013] where, at some
nodes of the B&B tree of a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) approach
to binary quadratic programming, an alternative semidefinite programming (SDP)
relaxation is defined and solved with the aim of improving the bound, thus possibly
fathoming the node. The difference is that in Algorithm 1 the improved reformulation
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of a node is kept in the entire subtree rooted at the node itself, while the SDP node
in [Furini and Traversi, 2013] is discarded if its improved bound does not allow
the subtree to be fathomed. Ideally, of course, one can think of solving the associated
mixed-integer SDP instead, which is not done in [Furini and Traversi, 2013].
— Second, the idea of reformulating some of the nodes of a B&B scheme so as to ex-
ploit some special structure has been used with different flavors, for example, in
[Raghunathan, 2013]. More precisely, [Raghunathan, 2013] solves by B&B a
convex MINLP relaxation of a water network design problem. However, at the nodes
in which all binary variables are decided (namely, the diameters of the pipes in the
designed network), instead of solving the associated continuous convex relaxation, it
is observed that the original nonconvex counterpart has a unique solution and such a
problem is efficiently solved directly. In other words, the convex MINLP relaxation
is used to embed the solution approach within a rather efficient (although nonlinear)
B&B framework, while the special structure of the continuous optimization problems
obtained after fixing the diameters is exploited to more accurately solve those nodes.
This is precisely what we achieve at Step 5 of Algorithm 1.
Overall, Algorithm 1 yields an effective framework that uses in a flexible way several
algorithmic ingredients like preprocessing, reformulation, linearization, etc. through an ex-
tremely sophisticated tree management. We believe that managing the enumeration tree
flexibly is key to solving extremely difficult nonconvex MINLPs like the one discussed in the
next section.
3.3. CC–FLP
To illustrate our algorithmic framework, we consider the problem faced by a company
making location and service level decisions in a market where competitors already operate.
The aim of the company is to maximize the number of attracted customers, subject to a
budget constraint. In the model, queueing at facilities, together with user’s selfish behavior,
are explicitly taken into account. Under these assumptions clients select and patronize the
facility minimizing their disutility, expressed as the weighted sum of travel and waiting time.
Assuming constant travel times, the underlying network reduces to a bipartite graph. Let
V = I × J be a complete bipartite graph, where I denotes the set of demand nodes, and J
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the set of locations. Every node i ∈ I represents a population zone of a city, and is endowed
with an inelastic demand di. Let J1 denote the set of candidate locations of the emerging
company, while Jc is the set of competitors’ locations. A client originating from node i ∈ I
and patronizing facility j ∈ J incurs a travel time tij. Arriving at facility j, she enters an
M/M/cj/∞ queue, equipped with cj servers having identical mean service rate µ, and mean
(queueing plus service) delay wj . The disutility uij is defined as a linear combination of
travel time queueing, and service time at the facility, namely
uij = tij + αwj, (3.3.1)
where α is a positive weight coefficient.
3.3.1. Literature review
Although location problems have been widely studied, few models incorporate user be-
havior, congestion and competition. In our model, customers select the facilities to patronize,
based on the travel time and waiting time at facilities, the latter being a congestion trait.
User behavior can be modeled as a Stackelberg game, in which the company locating facilities
is the leader, and users represent the follower, fitting the bilevel paradigm. When describing
the patronizing behavior, we identify two possibilities: deterministic and probabilistic.
In the deterministic case, users select the facility that minimizes their disutility. In
simpler models, all users originating from a demand point patronize the same facility, and
disutility does not account for congestion. Under these assumptions [Marić et al., 2012]
implement three metaheuristics to solve a bilevel formulation of the uncapacitated FLP
with user preferences. Similarly, in [Camacho-Vallejo et al., 2014], the bilevel FLP
with user preferences is solved by using a Stackelberg Evolutionary Algorithm. In
[Vidyarthi and Jayaswal, 2014], a model where congestion is minimized in the objective
function, and users patronize the closest facility is considered. The authors solve their
model by constraint generation.
When demand can be split between several facilities, a tie resolution rule must be imple-
mented as well. Within this framework we note the work of [Desrochers et al., 1995] who
consider a centralized model of a deterministic facility location problem, where individual
delays increase with distance. The authors provide a user-choice version of their model that
fits the bilevel programming paradigm, although they do not propose a solution algorithm.
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In [Berman and Drezner, 2006], the location of congested facilities when demand is elas-
tic with respect to distance is investigated. The objective is to maximize total demand,
subject to constraints on the waiting time at facilities. Heuristic procedures are proposed.
The presence of non-linearities in the user utility makes the problem even more difficult
to solve, thus, only few papers tackle this aspect. We cite here [Sun et al., 2008], who
consider a generic bilevel facility location model, where the upper level is making locational
decisions that minimize the sum of total cost and a congestion function, and the lower
level (users) minimizes a non-linear function. The authors propose a heuristic algorithm as
solution method. Another work worth mentioning is that of [Zhang et al., 2010a], who
propose a methodology for addressing a congested facility network design, with the aim of
maximizing the participation rate, in a preventive healthcare setting. Demand is elastic with
respect to total expected time (travel + waiting time at facilities) experienced by clients.
Users patronize the facility minimizing the sum of waiting and travel time. The proposed
solution method is a Tabu Search procedure.
In the probabilistic case, users behave according to a discrete choice model based on the
random utility paradigm. In the case of Gumbel distributed random terms, this yields Logit
closed form expressions for the origin-destination flows. Similar to the deterministic case,
most papers consider the utility to be solely based on proximity.
A more elaborate model is proposed by [Abouee-Mehrizi et al., 2011], who consider
simultaneous decision-making over the location, service rate and price, for facilities located
at vertices of a network. Demand is elastic with respect to price, and congestion arising at
facilities is characterized by queueing equations. Clients spread among facilities based on
proximity only, according to a Multinomial Logit random utility model that takes balking
into account. As solution method, the authors propose a hybrid between Tabu Search and
a tailored heuristic algorithm.
When it comes to utility, most papers make simplifying assumptions. For one, they
assume that users patronize facilities based solely on proximity. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the first paper to address congestion in a competitive user-choice environment is that
of [Marianov et al., 2008]. The authors consider a scenario in which a company locates
p facilities on the vertices of a network where competitors are already operating. The de-
mand is inelastic and users patronize the facility minimizing their disutility, given by the
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sum of travel and waiting time. The model is solved by using a two-phase metaheuristic
procedure combining GRASP and Tabu Search. In the initial phase, facility locations are
selected and a nonlinear assignment problem is solved using the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
In [Dan and Marcotte, 2017], it is considered a bilevel network design problem, where
a firm makes decisions on both location and service levels, and users patronize the facility
minimizing the travel and waiting time at facilities, yielding a non-linear bilevel program.
The authors propose an approximation algorithm that is asymptotically optimal, as well as
a heuristic that exploits the structure of the problem.
3.3.2. Modeling CC–FLP
Throughout this paper we will be using the following notation.
Sets
I: set of demand nodes;
J : set of candidate facility locations (leader and competitor);
Jc: set of competition’s facilities;
J1: set of leader’s candidate sites;
J∗1 ⊆ J1: set of leader’s open facilities;
J∗ ⊆ J : set of open facilities (leader and competitor).
Parameters
di: demand originating from node i ∈ I;
µ: service rate at open facility j ∈ J ;
tij: travel time between nodes i ∈ I and j ∈ J ;
α: coefficient of the waiting time in the disutility formula;
B: available budget (for opening new facilities and associated service rates);
fc: fixed cost associated with opening a new facility;
vc : cost per server.
Basic decision variables
yj: binary variable set to 1 if a facility is open at site j, and to 0 otherwise;
cj: number of servers at open facility j ∈ J .
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Additional variables
xij: arrival rate at facility j ∈ J originating from demand node i ∈ I;
λj: arrival rate at node j ∈ J ;
ρj: traffic intensity at facility j ∈ J ;
wj: mean queueing time at facility j;
γi: disutility of users originating from node i.
Let xij be the number of clients from demand node i patronizing facility j. We define
the arrival rate λj =
∑
i∈I xij at facility j, as well as the number cj of servers operating at
j. Then, the mean waiting time (queueing plus service) at facilities w is a bivariate function
depending on both the arrival rate and number of servers [Kleinrock, 1975]
w(λj, cj) =
1
(µcj − λj)
(
1 +
(1− ρj) cj!
(cjρj)cj
cj−1∑
k=0
(cjρj)
k
k!
) + 1
µ
, (3.3.2)
where ρj = λj/(µcj) < 1 is the traffic intensity.
In a user-choice environment, users patronize facilities minimizing their disutility. Given
the facility locations and the assigned number of servers, the lower level problem is a user
equilibrium problem (Wardrop). The equilibrium is defined by the complementarity system
0 ≤ xij ⊥ tij + αwj − γi ≥ 0, i ∈ I; j ∈ J. (3.3.3)
The complete model is as follows.
CC–FLP:
LEADER (COMPANY)
max
y,c,x,γ
z =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xij (3.3.4)
s.t.
∑
j∈J1
(fc · yj + vc · cj) ≤ B (3.3.5)
cj ≤M · yj j ∈ J1 (3.3.6)
cj ≥ yj j ∈ J1 (3.3.7)
yj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1 (3.3.8)
cj ≥ 0, cj integer j ∈ J1 (3.3.9)
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FOLLOWER (USERS)
0 ≤ xij ⊥ tij + αwj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J (3.3.10)
wj =
1
(µcj − λj)
(
1 +
(1− ρj) cj!
(cjρj)cj
cj−1∑
k=0
(cjρj)
k
k!
) + 1
µ
j ∈ J (3.3.11)
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij j ∈ J (3.3.12)
ρj =
λj
µcj
j ∈ J (3.3.13)∑
j∈J
xij = di i ∈ I (3.3.14)
λj ≤ µjcj j ∈ J (3.3.15)
xij ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J, (3.3.16)
where M is a suitably large constant, that we set to (B − fc)/vc, as a direct consequence of
(3.3.6).
The decision variables are the vectors y (locations) and c (number of servers), while
the user assignment x is the solution of an equilibrium problem that can be equivalently
obtained by solving a convex optimization problem. The objective in Eq. (3.3.4) is to maxi-
mize the total number of users that patronize the leader’s facilities, while constraint (3.3.5)
ensures that the total cost does not exceed the budget B. Constraints (3.3.6) set the up-
per bound for the number of servers per facility. In order to avoid irrelevant solutions,
constraints (3.3.7) specify that at least one server must be assigned to any open facility.
Logical constraints (3.3.10)–(3.3.13) enforce the user equilibrium conditions. Finally, con-
straints (3.3.14) ensure that demand is satisfied, and constraints (3.3.15) guarantee that the
arrival rate does not exceed the total service rate.
It is clear that CC–FLP fits the generic model P. We now discuss some simple but
important properties of our model.
Proposition 3.3.1. The waiting time function w is strictly increasing in λ and strictly
decreasing in c.
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Proof. We note that A =
c!
(cρ)c
c−1∑
k=0
(cρ)k
k!
. Then, w(λ, c) =
C
µc− λ , where C =
1
1 + (1− ρ)A . We have that
∂C
∂ρ
= −C2
[
−A+ (1− ρ)∂A
∂ρ
]
= C2
[
c!
cc
c−1∑
k=0
ckρk−c−1
k!
((c− k) (1− ρ) + ρ)
]
> 0.
C is thus, strictly increasing in ρ. But
1
µc− λ is strictly increasing in λ and strictly decreasing
in c, so the conclusion follows. 
Proposition 3.3.2. [Lee and Cohen, 1983] The waiting time function w is convex in λ.
Now, for given couples (λ, c), we consider under and over estimators of w, respectively w˜
and wˆ, such that
w˜(λ, c) ≤ w(λ, c) , and wˆ(λ, c) ≥ w(λ, c) . (3.3.17)
We will now show that, if we replace wj with w˜j at the leader’s facilities, and with wˆj
at competitors facilities, the optimal solution of the resulting program yields a valid upper
bound on the optimum of the initial problem.
The objective function defined by Eq. (3.3.4) can be expressed as z =
∑
j∈J1
λj, where
λj is the total number of users patronizing facility j. Let CC–FLP’ be a modified version
of CC–FLP, where wj in constraints (3.3.10)–(3.3.11) has been replaced by w˜j at leader’s
facilities, and with wˆj at competitors’ facilities. Let x
′, λ′ and γ′ be an optimal solution of
CC–FLP’, with objective z′ =
∑
j∈J1
λ′j .
Proposition 3.3.3. For any feasible pair (y, c), the optimal objective function of CC–FLP’
is greater or equal than the optimal objective of CC–FLP.
Proof (by contradiction). Assume that the proposition is false. Then,
∑
j∈J1
λj >∑
j∈J1
λ′j implies the existence of a facility j ∈ J1 such that λ′j < λj, and there exists k ∈ Jc
such that λ′k > λk. From Proposition 3.3.1, it follows that
w(λk, c) < w(λ
′
k, c) ≤ wˆ(λ′k, c) (3.3.18)
w(λj, c) > w(λ
′
j, c) ≥ w˜(λ′j, c) . (3.3.19)
87
In other words, a fraction of the population patronizing the leader’s facilities in CC–FLP
switches to competitors’ facilities in CC–FLP’. Therefore, there exists a demand node i,
together with a population ǫ that originates from i, patronizes both facility j ∈ J1 in CC–
FLP and facility k ∈ Jc in CC–FLP’. Then,
0 < x′ij + ǫ = xij , and xik + ǫ = x
′
ik .
From Eq.(3.3.10), we have that tij+αw(λj, c) = γi (since xij > 0). If follows from Eq.(3.3.19)
that tij+αw(λj, c) > tij+αw˜(λ
′
j, c) ≥ γ′i, and we have γi > γ′i . Similarly, from Eq.(3.3.10), we
have that tik+αw(λk, c) ≥ γi, and from Eq.(3.3.18) we have tik+αw(λk, c) < tik+αwˆ(λ′k, c) =
γ′i, which yields γi < γ
′
i, a contradiction. 
3.3.3. Linearization
The first phase of our algorithmic framework is the linearization of the non-linear terms
and constraints, in order to reformulate CC–FLP as an MILP. The key task is the lineariza-
tion of the highly nonlinear two-variable waiting time function. As previously mentioned for
CC–FLP, we will consider two approximation schemes, respectively single-level and bilevel.
3.3.3.1. Single-level linearization
The underlying idea of this method is to directly linearize the complementarity condi-
tion (3.1.5), i.e., Wardrop conditions (3.3.3) and, independently, the waiting time functions,
with the aim to obtain an MILP. This is outlined below.
Linearization of equilibrium constraints
For a given set of open facilities y and their assigned number of servers c, the lower level
flows xij are solution of the non-linear complementarity problem
0 ≤ xij ⊥ tij + αwj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J (3.3.20)
which is linearized through the introduction of binary variables and big-M constants:
tij + αwj − γi ≤Mγsij i ∈ I; j ∈ J (3.3.21)
xij ≤ di(1− sij) i ∈ I; j ∈ J (3.3.22)
sij ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ I; j ∈ J . (3.3.23)
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Tight values for the constant Mγ can be derived from information concerning the maximal
queueing time wmax and maximal travel time tmax = maxi∈I,j∈J{tij}. Since the total demand
must be strictly less than the total service rate, there must exist a minimum number of
servers C so that
∑
i∈I di < Cµ. Let ℓ = ⌊B/fc⌋ be the maximum number of facilities
allowed by the budget, and let ε = (C −∑i∈I di)/(ℓ + |Jc|). Then, an upper bound C on
the number of servers at leader’s or competitor’s facilities is
C = max
{
max
j∈Jc
{cj}, (B − fc)/vc
}
.
At optimality, there exists at least one facility j1, belonging either to the leader or to the
competition, such that cj1µ ≥ λj1 + ε. A priori, facility j1 is unknown, but its number of
servers can vary from 1 to C. There follows the upper bound
wmax ≤ max
c∈{1,...,C¯},cµ>ε
{w(cµ− ε, c)} . (3.3.24)
Let γmax and γmin be the maximum and minimum values that γ can assume at optimality,
respectively. Since γmin ≥ 0 and γmax ≤ tmax+αwmax, one can set Mγ = tmax+αwmax. Note
that for a given number No of leader’s open facilities the value of Mγ can be further reduced,
yielding
C = max
{
max
j∈Jc
{cj}, (B −Nofc)/vc
}
and ε = (Cµ−∑i∈I di)/(No − |Jc|). In some cases, this yields a smaller value of Mγ.
Linearization of waiting time
In order to derive an upper bound on the leader’s profit, we perform an under approx-
imation of queueing delays at its facilities, and an over approximation of the delays at the
competitor’s facilities, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The waiting time at the leader’s facilities is a nonlinear bivariate function of variables λj
and cj. Given wmax, and for each number of servers k, we select a number λ
k
max < µk such that
w(λkmax, k) ≥ wmax. Considering the maximum number of servers cmax allowed by the budget
B, one samples each interval [0, λkmax] using Nl points λ
kn, k = 0, . . . , cmax, n = 1, . . . , Nl such
that λki < λkj for all 1 ≤ k ≤ cmax and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ Nl. Next, we compute the tangent
lines at λkn, as well as the intersections between each two consecutive lines, yielding Nl + 1
points, including the endpoints 0 and λkmax. We denote these points as (λ˜
kn, wkn), where λ˜kn
corresponds to the sample on λ, and wkn is an under approximation of w at (λ˜kn, k). Since
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k
(a) Leader: under approximation w˜
cj
(b) Follower: over approximation wˆ
Figure 3.1. Piecewise linear approximation of queueing delay w.
wj is convex in λj, the piecewise linear approximation provides a valid lower bound. Next,
we base our linear approximation of the w constraint on the triangle technique described
in [D’Ambrosio et al., 2010]. This yields
cmax∑
k=0
Nl+1∑
n=1
(
ljkn + ljkn
)
= 1, j ∈ J1 (3.3.25)
s˜jkn ≤ ljkn + ljkn + ljkn−1+ ljk−1n−1 + ljk−1n−1 + ljk−1n
j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax;n = 1, . . . , Nl + 1 (3.3.26)
cmax∑
k=0
Nl+1∑
n=1
s˜jkn = 1, j ∈ J1 (3.3.27)
λj =
cmax∑
k=0
Nl+1∑
n=1
s˜jknλ˜
kn, j ∈ J1 (3.3.28)
cj =
cmax∑
k=0
Nl+1∑
n=1
s˜jknk, j ∈ J1 (3.3.29)
w˜j ≥
cmax∑
k=0
Nl+1∑
n=1
s˜jknw
kn, j ∈ J1 (3.3.30)
ljkn, ljkn ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax;n = 1, . . . , Nl + 1 (3.3.31)
0 ≤ s˜jkn ≤ 1 j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax;n = 1, . . . , Nl + 1 (3.3.32)
lj,−1,n = 0, lj,−1,n = 0 j ∈ J1;n = 1, . . . , Nl + 1 (3.3.33)
lj,cmax,n = 0, lj,cmax,n = 0 j ∈ J1;n = 1, . . . , Nl + 1 (3.3.34)
lj,k,0 = 0, lj,k,0 = 0 j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax (3.3.35)
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lj,k,Nl+1 = 0, lj,k,Nl+1 = 0 j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax. (3.3.36)
We perform a similar linearization for the waiting time at competing facilities, where the
number of servers cj is constant. Next, we construct a piecewise linear function wˆj so that
wˆj ≤ wj, ∀j ∈ Jc. Given wmax, we compute λˆjmax < µcj such that wj(λˆjmax, cj) ≥ wmax and
sample the interval [0, λˆjmax] using Nc points λˆ
jn, n = 1, . . . , Nc such that λˆ
jn < λˆjm for all
1 ≤ n < m ≤ Nc. This yields the linearization
Nc∑
n=1
sˆjn = 1 j ∈ Jc (3.3.37)
λj =
Nc∑
n=1
sˆjnλˆ
jn j ∈ Jc (3.3.38)
wˆj ≤
Nc∑
n=1
sˆjnw(λˆ
jn, cj) j ∈ Jc (3.3.39)
Nc∑
n=1
lˆjn = 1 j ∈ Jc (3.3.40)
sˆjn ≤ lˆjn + lˆjn−1 j ∈ Jc; n = 1, . . . , Nc (3.3.41)
lˆjn ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ Jc; n = 1, . . . , Nc (3.3.42)
0 ≤ sˆjn ≤ 1 j ∈ Jc; n = 1, . . . , Nc (3.3.43)
lˆj,0 = lˆj,Nc = 0 j ∈ Jc. (3.3.44)
The inequality form of constraints (3.3.30) and (3.3.39) ensure that the original w is feasible
for the approximated problem. The MILP relaxation of CC–FLP then becomes
CC–FLP1: max
y,c,x,γ
z =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xij
s.t. constraints (3.3.5)–(3.3.9), (3.3.12)–(3.3.16), (3.3.20)–(3.3.23), (3.3.25)–(3.3.44).
3.3.3.2. Bilevel linearization
An alternative to the linearization of the user equilibrium conditions (3.3.10)–(3.3.14) is
to replace the latter by the convex optimization problem [Beckmann et al., 1956]
PL: min
x,λ
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
xijtij + α
∑
j∈J∗
∫ λj
0
wj(τ, cj)dτ (3.3.45)
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s.t.
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di i ∈ I
xij ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J∗
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij j ∈ J∗,
whose KKT conditions match the Wardrop conditions (3.3.20). Based on this formulation,
an MILP approximation can be obtained by (i) performing a piecewise linearization of the
sole nonlinear term
∫ λj
0
wj(q, cj), (ii) writing an equivalent linear program, (iii) linearizing
the complementarity term of the optimality conditions.
We now provide the technical details. Let us construct piecewise linear functions W˜ (λ, c)
(leader) and Wˆ (λ, c) (competition), whose respective derivatives w˜(λ, c) and wˆ(λ, c) sat-
isfy (3.3.17). This is achieved as follows. Given wmax as defined by Eq. (3.3.24), and for each
number of servers c, let λ˜cmax < µc. We sample Nl points λ˜
cn (c = 1, . . . , cmax, n = 1, . . . , Nl),
sorted in increasing order, in each interval [0, λcmax]. Then, for each value of c, the integral
of the waiting time at leader’s facilities is approximated by the piecewise linear function
W˜j(λ, c) = (λ− λ˜cl)w(λ˜cl, c) +
l∑
k=2
(λ˜ck − λ˜c,k−1)w(λ˜c,k−1, c) if λ ∈ [λ˜cl, λ˜c,l+1]
= λw(λ˜cl, c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f˜ clj
+
l∑
k=2
(λ˜ck − λ˜c,k−1)w(λ˜c,k−1, c)− λ˜clw(λ˜cl, c)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g˜clj
. (3.3.46)
Similarly, we linearize the integral of the waiting time at competitors’ facilities. Given wmax,
we set λˆjmax < µcj such that wj(λˆ
j
max, cj) ≥ wmax. We sample the interval [0, λˆjmax] using
Nc points λˆ
jn, n = 1, . . . , Nc, sorted in increasing order and consider the piecewise linear
approximation
Wˆ (λ, cj) = (λ− λˆjn)w(λˆj,n+1, cj) +
n∑
k=2
(λˆjk − λˆj,k−1)w(λˆjk, cj) if λ ∈ [λˆjn, λˆj,n+1]
= λw(λˆj,n+1, cj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fˆ jn
+
n∑
k=2
(λˆjk − λˆj,k−1)w(λˆjk, cj)− λˆjnw(λˆj,n+1, cj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gˆjn
. (3.3.47)
Let w˜ and wˆ denote the derivatives of W˜ and Wˆ , respectively. It is easy to check that
w˜(λ, c) = w(λ˜c,l−1, c) if λ ∈ [λ˜c,l−1, λ˜c,l) and l ∈ {2, 3, . . . , Nl}
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wˆ(λ, cj) = w(λˆ
jn, cj) if λ ∈ [λˆj,n−1λˆjn) and n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nc − 1} .
Then, w˜ and wˆ are piecewise constant approximations of w in λ, satisfying (3.3.17), as
illustrated in Figure 3.2.
(a) w˜ (b) wˆ
Figure 3.2. Piecewise constant approximations of w.
Since w is increasing in λ according to Proposition 3.3.1, for each couple(λj, cj) we have
that w˜j(λj, cj) ≤ wj(λj, cj) and wˆj(λj, cj) ≥ wj(λj, cj).
We now replace
∫ λj
0
w(τ, cj)dτ in (3.3.45) with W˜j for the leader and Wˆj for the competi-
tor, as defined by (3.3.46) and (3.3.47). This yields the approximated lower level
PL2: min
x
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
xijtij + α

∑
j∈J∗
1
W˜ (λ, cj) +
∑
j∈Jc
Wˆ (λ, cj)


s.t. constraints (3.3.12), (3.3.14), (3.3.16), (3.3.46)–(3.3.47).
Next, we substitute variables v˜ and vˆ with W˜ and Wˆ , respectively. This allows to rewrite
PL2 as a linear program, whenever the upper level vector c is fixed:
PLL: min
x
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J∗
xijtij + α
∑
j∈J∗
1
v˜j + α
∑
j∈Jc
vˆj
s.t. v˜j − f˜ cj ,lj · λj − g˜cj ,lj ≥ 0 j ∈ J∗1 ; l = 1, . . . , Nl (3.3.48)
vˆj − fˆ jn · λj − gˆjn ≥ 0 j ∈ Jc;n = 1, . . . , Nc (3.3.49)
∑
j∈J∗
xij = di i ∈ I (3.3.50)
∑
i∈I
xij − λj = 0 j ∈ J∗ (3.3.51)
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I; j ∈ J∗. (3.3.52)
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Upon introduction of the dual variables π˜lj ≥ 0, πˆnj ≥ 0, ηi, δj and φij ≥ 0 associated with
constraints (3.3.48)–(3.3.52), we derive the primal-dual optimality conditions
tij + δj + ηi − φij = 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J∗
Nl−1∑
l=1
f˜ clj π˜
l
j − δj = 0 j ∈ J∗1
Nc−1∑
n=1
fˆ jnπˆnj − δj = 0 j ∈ Jc
Nl−1∑
l=1
π˜lj = α j ∈ J∗1
Nc−1∑
n=1
πˆnj = α j ∈ Jc(
v˜j − f˜ cj ,lj · λj − g˜cj ,lj
)
π˜lj = 0 j ∈ J∗1 ; l = 1, . . . , Nl − 1 (3.3.53)(
vˆj − fˆ jn · λj − gˆjn
)
πˆnj = 0 j ∈ Jc;n = 1, . . . , Nc − 1 (3.3.54)
xijφij = 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J∗ (3.3.55)
constraints (3.3.48) – (3.3.52) .
We now replace constraints (3.3.10)–(3.3.16) in the original formulation CC–FLP with the
above optimality conditions. The optimum of the latter program yields an upper bound on
the objective function of CC–FLP .
Linear relaxation of bilinear terms
To complete the linearization process, we approximate the bilinear terms f˜
cj ,l
j π˜
l
j and
f˜
cj ,l
j λj by their McCormick envelopes, and linearize the complementarity constraints in
Eqs. (3.3.53), (3.3.54) and (3.3.55) using big-M constants. This yields the final MILP for-
mulation
CC–FLP2: (3.3.56)
max
y,c
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xij
s.t.
∑
j∈J1
(fc · yj + vc · cj) ≤ B
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λj ≤ µ · cj j ∈ J1
λj ≤ λmax j ∈ Jc
cj ≤M · yj j ∈ J1
cj ≥ yj j ∈ J1
cj =
cmax∑
k=0
k · lwj,k, j ∈ J1
cmax∑
k=0
lwj,k = 1 j ∈ J1
yj ∈ {0, 1}, lwj,k ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . cmax
cj ≥ 0, cj ≤ cmax, cj integer j ∈ J1∑
j∈J
xij = di i ∈ I
∑
i∈I
xij = λj j ∈ J
v˜j − zwλj,l − G˜lj ≥ 0 j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
vˆj − fˆ jn · λj − gˆjn ≥ 0 j ∈ Jc;n = 1, . . . , Nc
0 ≤ c˜jk ≤ 1 j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax (3.3.57)
cmax∑
k=0
c˜jk = 1 j ∈ J1 (3.3.58)
cj =
cmax∑
k=0
k · c˜jk j ∈ J1 (3.3.59)
f˜ lj =
cmax∑
k=0
c˜jk · w(λ˜kl, k) j ∈ J ; l = 1, . . . , Nl
G˜lj =
cmax∑
k=0
c˜jk · g˜kl j ∈ J ; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zwλj,l ≥ wmax · λj + λ˜lUB · f˜ lj − wmax · λ˜lUB j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zwλj,l ≤ λ˜lUB · f˜ lj j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zwλj,l ≤ wmax · λj j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zwλj,l ≥ 0 j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
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xi,j ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
tij + δj + γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
Nl−1∑
l=1
π˜lj = α j ∈ J1 (3.3.60)
Nc−1∑
n=1
πˆnj = α j ∈ Jc (3.3.61)
Nl−1∑
l=1
zpi,fj,l − δj = 0 j ∈ J1
Nc−1∑
n=1
πˆnj fˆ
jn − δj = 0 j ∈ Jc
zpi,fj,l ≥ α · f˜ lj + wmaxπj,l − wmax · α j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zpi,fj,l ≤ wmaxπj,l j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zpi,fj,l ≤ α · f˜ lj j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
zpi,fj,l ≥ 0 j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
π˜lj ≤ α · s˜pij,l j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
v˜j − zwλj,l − g˜lj ≤
(
1− s˜pij,l
) ·Mpi j ∈ J1; l = 1, . . . , Nl
πˆnj ≤ α · sˆpij,n j ∈ Jc;n = 1, . . . , Nc
vˆj − fˆ jnλj − gˆjn ≤
(
1− sˆpij,k
) ·Mpi j ∈ Jc;n = 1, . . . , Nc
tij + δj + γi ≤ sφi,j ·Mφ i ∈ I; j ∈ J
xij ≤
(
1− sφi,j
)
D i ∈ I; j ∈ J
sφi,j ∈ {0, 1}, spii,j ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ I; j ∈ J
where g˜cl, fˆ jn, and gˆjn are computed according to (3.3.46) and (3.3.47), λlUB = max
c=0,...,cmax
(λ˜cl),
and D =
∑
i∈I di. Valid expressions for the big-M constants Mφ and Mpi are obtained as
follows. Eqs. (3.3.60) and (3.3.61) imply that πlj ≤ α and πnj ≤ α. We set
δLmax =
Nl∑
l=1
max
c=1,...,cmax
(
αw(λ˜cl, c)
)
, δCmax =
Nc∑
n=1
max
j∈Jc
(
αw(λˆj,l, cj)
)
,
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and δmax = max(δ
L
max, δ
C
max). It follows that γi ∈ [−tmax − δmax, 0], and Mφ = tmax + δmax.
Similarly, we set Mpi = max(v
L
max, v
C
max), where
vLmax = max
c=1,...,cmax
{
max
l=1,...,Nl
(
D · w(λ˜cl, c) + g˜cl
)}
vCmax = max
j∈Jc
{
max
n=1,...,Nc
(
D · w(λˆjl, cj) + gˆjn
)}
.
3.4. Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
This section is devoted to an exact algorithm for CC–FLP that exploits the upper bound
on the objective provided by the approximate programs CC–FLP1 and CC–FLP2 while, for
a given leader solution (y, c), a lower bound is obtained solving the corresponding lower level
program for an equilibrium assignment of users to facilities. Our main issue is that, in sharp
contrast with ‘standard’ B&B, there is a gap between the objective of the true formulation
CC–FLP and that of the approximation CC–FLP1. Our aim is to overcome this difficulty
through the efficient interaction with the Branch-and-Bound software, through callbacks.
While our implementation is based on the IBM CPLEX suite, any software that allows for
callbacks could have been used.
Our algorithm is based on a nested B&B tree structure. Nodes of the main tree relate
to the location variables yj and are labeled by the y vector. Whenever, at a given node of
the main tree, the y-solution of the relaxed problem is integer-valued (such a node is called
a ‘leaf’), we grow an inner subtree (Figure 3.1) that focuses on the cj variables (number
of servers) and other intermediate variables by defining and solving a new and separate
MILP. Due to the gap between the true objective and that of the relaxed problem, ‘manual’
interaction with the software is required in order not to wrongly fathom nodes of the main
tree. In particular, the true value of a leaf’s objective must be retrieved before it can be
used for fathoming or pruning purposes, both in the main tree and the inner subtrees.
We now detail the implementation and functionality of the nested structure. As discussed
in Section 3.1, the reason for treating each of those nodes as a separate MILP is to leverage
at the same time the CPLEX preprocessing capability and the pieces of information collected
until that point in the tree to tighten the formulation of the subproblem originated at this
node.
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(a) Main B&B tree
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\
improve UB
pruned
(b) Inner B&B subtree
Figure 3.1. The nested B&B trees.
3.4.1. Main B&B tree
Let CC–FLP1(y∗) and CC–FLP2(y∗) denote the restriction of CC–FLP1 and CC–FLP2
obtained by fixing the location vector y at y∗. The main B&B solves a relaxation of the
MILP approximation (CC–FLP1 or CC–FLP2), where the integrality requirement is relaxed
on all variables, with the exception of the location vector y. The initial lower and upper
bounds for the MILP are computed by the solver. At every integer node, we use the current
solution y∗, call the subroutine solving for the optimal number of servers, and append the
no-good global cut ([D’Ambrosio et al., 2010])
∑
j∈J1,y∗j=0
yj +
∑
j∈J1,y∗j=1
(1− yj) ≥ 1 (3.4.1)
to the model. The latter ensures that the current solution does not appear elsewhere in
the tree. The rejection of all feasible solutions is required to guarantee the validity of the
branching and pruning rules. Indeed, if a solution were not rejected, CPLEX would accept
it along with its approximate objective, and its update of bounds might be inconsistent with
the values of the true model. Whenever an improved solution is obtained while solving a
restricted problem, the corresponding cut is global and allows to update the lower bound,
while the incumbent is updated externally.
98
We have implemented the sequence of operations described above in a Lazy Constraint
Callback, called at every feasible (integer) node. A feature of this operation is that it is
called only and in all feasible integer nodes, and that it allows for appending user cuts that
might cut off integer parts of the domain. Its pseudocode is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Lazy Constraint Callback in the main B&B
1: y∗ ← currentSolution
2: restrictedBestObj ← Solve CC–FLP1(y∗) or CC–FLP2(y∗)
3: if restrictedBestObj > bestFound then
4: objectiveCut← (z > restrictedBestObj)
5: addGlobalCut(objectiveCut)
6: bestFound← restrictedBestObj
7: yCut← Eq. (3.4.1)
8: addGlobalCut(yCut)
3.4.2. Inner subtrees
When the approximation CC–FLP1 is used, a subtree is associated with y∗ of the main
tree. One then solves subproblem CC–FLP1(y∗), to which one appends a set of constraints
whose role is to discard feasible nodes, as achieved in the main B&B tree by means of
constraints (3.4.1). Precisely, for all j ∈ J1, k = 0, . . . , cmax, we introduce binary variables
c˜jk and consider the following unary representation of cj.
cj =
cmax∑
k=0
k · c˜jk j ∈ J1 (3.4.2)
cmax∑
k=0
c˜jk = 1 j ∈ J1 (3.4.3)
c˜jk ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1; k = 0, . . . , cmax. (3.4.4)
On the other hand, if CC–FLP2 is solved, no additional constraints are required since
Eq. (3.3.57)–(3.3.59) are already part of the formulation.
At each integer node, the true objective is computed by solving the lower level assignment
problem, for instance using the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. If an improved solution is uncovered,
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the incumbent is saved externally, and the lower bound on the objective is updated through
the addition of a global cut. Next, we reject the current integer solution by adding the global
cut
cmax∑
k=0
∑
j∈J1,
c˜∗
jk
=0
c˜jk +
cmax∑
k=0
∑
j∈J1,
c˜∗
jk
=1
(1− c˜jk) ≥ 1, (3.4.5)
thus guaranteeing the consistency of the branching and pruning rules. Eqs. (3.4.2)–(3.4.4),
together with Eq. (3.4.5), ensure that the current vector c will not reappear later in the
tree. These operations have been implemented in the Lazy Constraint Callback described by
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Lazy Constraint Callback in the inner B&B
1: c˜∗ ← current c˜; c∗ ← current c
2: currentObj ← Frank-Wolfe(c∗)
3: if currentObj > bestFound then
4: objectiveCut← (z > currentObj)
5: bestFound← currentObj
6: addGlobalCut(objectiveCut)
7: cCut← Eq. (3.4.5)
8: addGlobalCut(cCut)
In other words, the unary representation of c is necessary to impose the no-good con-
straints (3.4.5), which would be otherwise hard to write for general integer variables.
3.4.3. Improving the upper bound
At the fractional nodes of an inner B&B subtree, the location variables are fixed, while
some cj variables are fractional. Depending on the node, the lower and upper bounds on the
integer variables might have been improved by the branching decisions taken so far. Let cUBj
denote the upper bound on variable cj, at a given fractional node in the subtree. Then we
have the following result.
Proposition 3.4.1. At a fractional node, let us set cj ← cUBj , for all j ∈ J1. Then, the
objective value associated with this solution is a valid upper bound on the true objective, in
the subtree rooted at that node.
100
Proof. Since cUBj exceeds any value that cj may achieve in the subtree rooted at the current
node, it follows from Proposition 3.3.1 that
w(λ, cUBj ) ≤ w(λ, cj) ∀j ∈ J1. (3.4.6)
Since the competitors’ service rate remains unchanged, the conclusion is a direct consequence
of Proposition 3.3.3. 
In most cases, fixing the number of server variables may be infeasible, due to the budget
constraint. Let cTOTAL = B − |J∗1 | · fc be the leader’s available budget at the current node,
to be distributed among facilities. At a a fractional node, it is very likely that
∑
j∈J1
cUBj >
cTOTAL, due to a number of factors. One empirically expects that, deep into the enumeration
tree, bounds are tight and yield feasible solutions.
Improved upper bounds have been implemented in a User Cut Callback that is invoked at
every fractional node. Within the callback, we retrieve the upper bounds on variables cj and
set the current solution to those bounds. If condition (3.4.7) below holds, we compute the
objective value associated with this solution, by evaluating the associated equilibrium flows,
i.e., by solving PL. If this operation improves the bound provided by CPLEX, we append it
to the model in the form of a local user cut as described in Algorithm 4.
When computed close to the root of the tree, bounds tend to be loose, and the probability
of improving over the CPLEX bound is small. On the other hand, when computed deep
into the tree, the tightness of the bounds improve, but only a small portion of the tree is
pruned. In our implementation, the improvement procedure has been activated whenever
the inequality
∑
j∈J∗
1
cUBj ≤ cTOTAL + q · |J∗1 | (3.4.7)
held. In (3.4.7), q plays the role of a flexibility or frequency parameter, to be tuned oﬄine.
When q =∞ the upper bound is computed at all fractional nodes, while if q = 0, it is only
computed at the leaves of the tree.
3.4.4. Computing a lower bound
The performance of the exact method can be improved by computing a good lower bound
at the root of the B&B tree. The underlying idea is to linearize the queueing terms at the
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Algorithm 4 User Cut Constraint Callback in the restricted B&B
1: cUB ← vector of upper bounds with respect to c
2: if Eq. (3.4.7) then
3: currentObj ← Frank-Wolfe(cUB)
4: CPLEXUB ← upper bound provided by CPLEX
5: if CPLEXUB> currentObj then
6: ubCut← (z ≤ currentObj)
7: addLocalCut(ubCut)
leader’s facilities, without the introduction of binary variables. More specifically, in the
sampling scheme described in Section 3.3.3, let us introduce triangles based on consecutive
samples, as detailed in [D’Ambrosio et al., 2010]. The upper triangles are defined by the
points (λ˜k,n, k), (λ˜k+1,n, k + 1) and (λ˜k+1,n+1, k + 1), while the lower triangles are defined by
(λ˜k,n, k), (λ˜k,n+1, k) and (λ˜k+1,n+1, k+1), n = 1, . . . , Nl, k = 1, . . . , cmax−1. The coefficient of
the plane equations associated with the lower and upper triangles are, for every 1 ≤ n ≤ Nl
and 1 ≤ k ≤ cmax − 1
ukn1 = λ˜
k+1,n − λ˜k,n ukn1 = λ˜k+1,n − λ˜k+1,n+1
ukn2 = 1 u
kn
2 = 0
ukn3 = w
k+1,n − wk,n ukn3 = wk+1,n − wk+1,n+1
vkn1 = λ˜
k,n+1 − λ˜k,n vkn1 = λ˜k,n+1 − λ˜k+1,n+1
vkn2 = 0 v
kn
2 = −1
vkn3 = w
k,n+1 − wk,n vkn3 = wk,n+1 − wk+1,n+1
akn = ukn2 · vkn3 − u3kn · vkn2 akn = ukn2 · vkn3 − u3kn · vkn2
bkn = ukn3 · vkn1 − u1kn · vkn3 b
kn
= ukn3 · vkn1 − u1kn · vkn3
ckn = ukn1 · vkn2 − u2kn · vkn1 ckn = ukn1 · vkn2 − u2kn · vkn1
dkn =−
(
aknλ˜k,n+bknk+cknwkn
)
d
kn
=−
(
aknλ˜k+1,n+1+b
kn
(k+1)+cknwk+1,n+1
)
.
(3.4.8)
The plane equations defined by the lower and upper triangles are
aknλj + b
kncj + c
knwj + d
kn = 0 , and aknλj + b
kn
cj + cb
kn
wj + d
kn
= 0 .
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Next, we convexify wj’s by setting them to the maximum of their respective linear approxi-
mations, namely
wj ≈ max
k=1,...,cmax−1
n=1,...N−l
{
max
(
−a
kn
ckn
λj − b
kn
ckn
cj − d
kn
ckn
, −a
kn
ckn
λj − b
kn
ckn
cj − d
kn
ckn
)}
. (3.4.9)
From the leader’s point of view, the lower the waiting time, the more customers will be
attracted to her facilities. This allows to replace Eq. (3.4.9) by the inequalities
wj ≥ −a
kn
ckn
λj − b
kn
ckn
cj − d
kn
ckn
k = 1, . . . , cmax − 1, n = 1, . . . , N − l
wj ≥ −a
kn
ckn
λj − b
kn
ckn
cj − d
kn
ckn
k = 1, . . . , cmax − 1, n = 1, . . . , N − l .
(3.4.10)
We can now write CC–FLP as the following MILP
CC–FLPH: max
y,c,x,γ
z =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xij
s.t. constraints (3.3.5)–(3.3.9), (3.3.12), (3.3.15), (3.3.16), (3.3.20)–(3.3.23),
(3.3.37)–(3.3.44), (3.4.2)–(3.4.4), (3.4.8), (3.4.10).
Note that, for the competitor it would be ill-advised to write a linearization similar to
(3.4.9) – (3.4.10), since increasing w at competitor’s facilities would actually increase the
objective value (of the leader). At optimality, the waiting time at competitor facilities would
be set to very high values, in an attempt to maximize the objective, and no competitor
inequality would be active, yielding a very poor approximation. Additionally, we maintain
the presence of binary variables for the competitor, which are limited in number and hence
do not increase significantly the difficulty of the model. Of course, the heuristic scheme
can be used both for computing a standalone approximate solution for CC–FLP and as
warm start for its exact solution. The approximate model is then solved by the nested B&B
strategy.
We close this section by mentioning that the improved ‘on-the-fly’ upper bounds are not
implemented in the heuristic, as they significantly slow down the exploration process.
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3.5. Experimental setup and results
The MILP formulations were solved by IBM CPLEX Optimizer version 12.6. All tests
were performed on a computer equipped with 96 GB of RAM, and two 6-core Intel(R)
Xeon(R) X5675 processors running at 3.07GHz. To assess the performance of our algorithm,
we could not compare with alternative methods from literature, which are nonexistent, as
discussed in Section 3.3.1. The model of [Marianov et al., 2008] involves facility location
within a user-choice environment, but the decision variables are limited to the locations, while
a heuristic is designed for its solution. This lack of alternatives prompted us to compute
an optimal solution through exhaustive search, iterating through all possible combinations
of number of servers that satisfy the budget constraint. A feasible flow is then computed
to yield a feasible solution to the bilevel program. Some solutions are discarded without
computing the flow, for the following reason. At any open facility, the arrival rate needs to
be lower that the service level. Thus, if the total number of servers times the service rate
is lower than the incumbent, the current solution cannot yield a better objective value, and
we have no incentive to compute the lower-level optimum.
Our experiments involve networks of varying sizes, and travel times ranging from 0 to
5000. In order to generate challenging instances, the combination of budget, fixed and
variable costs was selected such as to ensure the existence of feasible solutions involving a
number of open facilities roughly equal to half the total number, and where the number of
servers could reach 20 on small tests, and 40 or more on larger tests. Note that, at optimality
less than half facilities are typically open, and service levels do not reach their upper limits.
In all our tests we used 5 λ-samples for both the leader and the competitor.
An initial set of experiments was intended to probe the efficiency of linearizations CC–
FLP1 and CC–FLP2, respectively, for various values of parameter q. We show only the most
successful results, namely q = 15 for the single level linearization, and q = 25 for the bilevel
linearization. At the end of this section we provide a deeper analysis of the impact of this
parameter on the overall performance of our algorithm.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 display the results for 15 and 20-node networks, respectively, which
are compared for reference with the full enumeration scheme. The exact methods were tested
with and without a warm start (columns ‘w/o warm start’ and ‘warm start’, respectively).
The warm start is provided by the best solution found by heuristic model CC–FLPH within
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a time limit. In the case of 15-node networks, the warm start improves significantly the
running time. It is not needed, however for the 20-node networks tested, as the methods
perform well without it.
single level linearization (q = 15) bilevel linearization (q = 25)
w/o warm start warm start w/o warm start warm start
test # total opt. total opt. total opt. total opt. enumeration
1 3199 577 6002 3615 87791 58457 81183 50708 170825
2 51242 44696 17237 11485 209778 168134 86522 23866 190268
3 110719 100898 38231 31913 619715 494483 1295419 1208952 1873586
4 47678 40360 11536 2423 132524 866 132761 32420 194206
5 26830 21353 14422 5552 670075 482895 227470 64780 624795
6 42051 39583 5500 2975 148006 112378 161920 126093 1419919
7 11985 11778 1268 600 2106842 2106820 73981 71867 11460
8 6840 5674 3738 3300 21935 15422 18854 15872 7098
9 10694 8798 6324 3118 147756 98541 78980 21630 300081
10 12424 10320 8474 6215 217631 202242 49474 28254 767436
Average 29951 28404 11273 7120 436205 374024 220656 164444 555967
Table 3.1. CPU times (seconds) on 15-node networks; ‘opt.’ refers to the CPU required to
find an optimal solution.
Those initial results confirm the stability and performance of the algorithm when adopting
the single level linearization scheme. This might be due to the use of McCormick envelopes.
Under both schemes, the algorithm outperforms by two orders of magnitude the enumeration-
based method. The single level linearization outperforms clearly the bilevel (McCormick)
linearization on most 15 and 20-node instances.
We ran the same set of experiments on 25-node networks, and report the results in
Table 3.3. All tests were warm started with the heuristic since, without it, the instances
were intractable, with CPLEX running out of memory quickly. The enumeration scheme
failed on all tests after running more than 15 weeks. The single level linearization performs
faster than the bilevel counterpart on the fraction of tests that can be solved. Actually, the
algorithm has to stop for lack of memory on more than half of the instances, which shows
the limitation of our exact method. In that respect, the bilevel scheme looks slightly more
robust, being able to solve 8 instances, versus 6 in the single level case. We note, however,
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single level linearization bilevel linearization
q = 15 q = 25
test # total opt. total opt. enumeration
1 1358 1327 1705 1687 27660
2 36 8 234 209 5892
3 550 90 1504 821 8233
4 667 211 2880 2816 149672
5 307 66 3833 3553 26183
6 338 34 1644 1495 27212
7 1301 416 2265 1673 165337
8 495 406 2438 2401 42301
9 383 265 9823 9766 9571
10 2149 1614 2555 2102 280145
11 1024 958 4789 4718 19249
12 3404 2513 4573 2913 191448
13 305 184 1654 1579 10321
14 332 105 1372 1256 20674
15 383 222 1343 1189 242524
16 1450 313 5401 4090 168118
17 2203 307 4042 3429 309729
18 2149 1132 4018 3609 727332
19 427 137 1633 1002 9731
20 1462 392 2592 1947 191918
Average 1036 535 3015 2608 131663
Table 3.2. CPU times (seconds) on 20-node networks; ‘opt.’ refers to the CPU required
to find an optimal solution. The methods were not warm started.
that the budget allows for up to 12 facilities to be open, and that the number of servers can
vary between 1 and 55, which makes for a very challenging class of problems.
The aim of the second set of experiments is to assess the accuracy of the linearization of
CC–FLP1, as shown in Table 3.5. In this process, the MILP is solved using B&B, without
using callbacks. Once CPLEX has reached and proved optimality, Frank-Wolfe’s algorithm
is used to retrieve its corresponding true objective value (column ‘objective’) and compare
it with the approximated objective value (‘approximated’) and with the actual optimum
106
single level linearization bilevel linearization
q = 15 q = 25
test # total opt. total opt.
1 37.4 6.0 53.8 35.7
2 – – – –
3 – – – –
4 – – – –
5 – – – –
6 – – – –
7 – – 613.8 17.9
8 – – – –
9 – – – –
10 51.3 6.5 550.5 12.5
11 – – – –
12 47.2 14.1 – –
13 – – 563.8 31.1
14 60.1 6.4 – –
15 – – 78.0 29.1
16 – – 176.0 102.0
17 21.7 0.6 125.7 35.2
18 16.2 3.3 535.7 453.2
19 – – – –
20 – – – –
Average 39.9 6.15 337.2 89.6
Table 3.3. CPU times (hours) on 25-node networks; ‘opt.’ refers to the CPU required to
find an optimal solution.
(column ‘optimal’) computed by our exact algorithm. We observe that, on average, the
objective value of the solution found falls within 3.6% of the optimum. Additionally solving
only the MILP yields 89.17% of the optimal locations, which suggests that the approximation
can be used as a good heuristic on its own, as well. The behaviour of the approximation on
the 15-node networks (see Table 3.4) is similar, capturing on average 94.4% of the optimum,
but finding only 68.3% of the optimal facilities.
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MILP
test # MILP obj. true obj. CPU (s) optimum deviation (%)
1 213.57 192.29 1707 204.88 6.2
2 200.24 187.19 66915 193.02 3.1
3 151.82 138.89 158976 147.87 6.1
4 223.58 201.84 2668 212.97 5.2
5 191.29 174.53 91936 182.48 4.4
6 184.76 174.48 11288 180.61 3.4
7 230.41 210.43 27107 218.27 3.6
8 240.06 210.79 5481 220.54 4.4
9 191.69 158.74 4855 185.01 14.2
10 194.07 176.40 5911 186.02 5.2
Average 202.15 182.56 37684 193.17 5.5
Table 3.4. Comparison of the best solution found when solving only the approximation,
versus the optimal solution, for 15-node networks.
In the third set of experiments, we demonstrate why it is advantageous to use the nested
B&B tree structure described in Section 3.4. First we used a single B&B solving for all
variables, with only the no-good cuts within the associated callback, and without computing
the on-the-fly upper bound. In this case the problem became quickly intractable, even for
small instances. For example, on the 9-node networks that we have tested, a single tree
takes more than 3 hours and still does not prove optimality. In comparison, the nested tree
structure takes less than 7 minutes. One reason for this is the preprocessing at the root
nodes of the subtrees. In order to investigate this further, we have measured the objective
value of every leaf of the main tree ( ‘Original node’ in Figure 3.1), which is an upper bound
for the subtree rooted at this node, since the main tree is solving a relaxed problem. We
then generated the respective inner subtree and we retrieved the bounds both after presolve
and after solving the root node. If the subtree was found infeasible at the root node, the
bound is shown as 0. Our measurements were taken on ten 9-node instances, for a total of
2129 explored subtrees, out of which 328 were cut off or found infeasible at the root node.
As shown in Figure 3.1, we observe a significant improvement in the upper bound, after
presolve and solving the root node.
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MILP
test # MILP obj. true obj. CPU (s) optimum deviation (%)
1 287.80 270.30 150 273.55 1.2
2 330.46 312.57 38 323.56 3.4
3 287.86 256.04 102 269.00 4.9
4 296.43 264.94 333 291.95 9.2
5 293.42 277.26 89 287.57 3.6
6 274.25 252.97 146 264.37 4.3
7 268.33 257.52 58 259.14 0.6
8 273.35 258.01 48 270.19 4.6
9 293.83 262.12 68 290.98 9.9
10 248.21 237.36 106 248.21 4.3
11 269.47 249.53 40 261.39 4.6
12 252.33 242.09 71 244.63 1.1
13 291.50 280.73 47 284.58 1.3
14 282.79 264.19 77 271.94 2.9
15 262.29 259.89 237 261.64 0.7
16 242.04 225.69 130 242.04 6.7
17 253.63 252.74 103 253.63 0.3
18 221.47 205.36 583 216.55 5.1
19 289.47 273.95 376 283.10 3.2
20 245.59 245.59 125 245.59 0.0
Average 273.23 257.44 146 267.18 3.6
Table 3.5. Comparison of the best solution found when solving only the approximation,
versus the optimal solution, for 20-node networks.
The following measures were also computed:
— average improvement in UB after presolve: 7.26%
— average improvement in UB after root node: 10.28%
— average LP columns reduction: 52.56
— average LP rows reduction: 47.88
— average MIP columns reduction: 156.32
— average MIP rows reduction: 16.99.
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of the upper bounds throughout the execution of the algorithm.
‘Original node’ is as computed at integer nodes in the main tree. ‘After presolve’ and ‘After
Root Node’ show the upper bound computed after the presolve and after solving the root
node of the inner subtrees, respectively.
Our measurements demonstrate that by creating nested trees, rather than using a single tree,
we make full use of the heuristics, cuts, rows and columns reductions, and other computations
that CPLEX performs during presolve and at the root nodes. The problem becomes thus
more tractable, even without the computation of the on-the-fly upper bounds.
It is important to note that the order in which the nodes are explored differ between
the nested tree and single tree approach, which could impact the efficiency of the algorithm.
When using nested trees, no new nodes in the main tree will be processed until the current
subtree is solved. This particular behaviour cannot be easily achieved in a single tree, even
if we prioritize branching on the location variables.
The fourth experiment was designed to assess the impact of the on-the-fly upper bounds
on the overall performance of the algorithm. Since, without the strengthening of the UB,
even small instances are intractable, we have limited our analysis to 9-node instances, using
the single-level linearization. Figure 3.2 illustrates the typical evolution of the upper bounds
and the best objective function, throughout the execution of our methods. Notice that the
upper bound in the main tree does not improve fast, while the bounds on the subtrees vary
significantly from one subtree to the other.
We have measured the average execution time (’CPU’), the number of integer solution
explored (’# of sols’), and the number of integer nodes pruned (’# of cuts’), for ten 9-node
instances, as shown in Table 3.6. We notice that, as q increases, the average CPU has a
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Figure 3.2. Typical evolution of the upper bounds and best objective during the execution
of our algorithm.
w/o q q=3 q=12 q=20 q=30 q=50
CPU (s) 306.7 87.4 55.4 69.7 72.2 90.3
# of sols 11049 773 512 512 512 512
# of cuts 89741 100017 100278 100278 100278 100278
Table 3.6. Performance of the single-level linearization for different values of q, for 9-node
networks.
convex-like behaviour (decreasing, levelling, increasing), which is to be expected. As q in-
creases, the on-the-fly upper bound is computed at more nodes, and higher in the subtrees.
Therefore, at first, the number of integer solutions visited decreases, as more cuts are com-
puted and more nodes are pruned. However, for large values of q, the bound is computed
often (it is a costly operation), and does not improve on the bound provided by CPLEX.
Thus, the CPU increases, while the number of nodes pruned stalls. It is therefore ill-advised
to set q to a large value. In our tests, values between 10 and 15 were most successful for the
single level linearization, and around 25 for the bilevel linearization.
3.6. Conclusion
The MPEC framework allows the modelling of situations that are highly relevant in
practice. However, the resulting mathematical program highly challenging combinatorial
and nonlinear features, which explains the frequent recourse to heuristic (meta-heuristics,
math-heuristics) for its solution, and the paucity of exact methods. Nevertheless, we expect
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that generic algorithms that exploit MILP approximations of single-level reformulations, as
well as a clever management of the B&B tree, deserve some consideration. We hope that the
present work, which may be viewed as a step in that direction, will trigger further research
in global approaches to bilevel programs involving a lower level variational inequality.
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Chapter 4
Joint location and pricing within a user-optimized
environment
In the third article we analyze a model that captures the key features of facility location
and pricing, in a congestion-sensitive user choice environment. More precisely, we consider
a problem faced by a service firm that is making revenue-maximizing location and pricing
decisions in a competitive market.
In real-life situations, customers are sensitive not only to locations, but to service level
as well as to prices. While low prices may attract more customers, they may also induce
large waiting times at facilities, which may, ultimately deter customers. Alternatively, a
smaller number of clients buying higher priced items might yield a high profit. In such an
environment, the firm must take into account the user-optimized behaviour.
Three types of pricing strategies are usually considered literature [Hanjoul et al., 1990]:
— mill pricing: prices can vary between facilities;
— uniform pricing: all facilities charge the same price;
— discriminative pricing: customers can be charged different prices at the same facility.
From a modelling standpoint, we extend the models considered in the first two articles,
by incorporating mill pricing, which is one of the most challenging form. Akin to the first
article, facilities are modelled as infinite M/M/1 queues, and the decision variable is µ the
service rate, however, balking is disregarded.
At the upper level, the firm maximizes its revenue, whilst at the lower level, we have users
equilibrium problem. Clients minimize their personal utility, which incorporates pricing and
queueing
u˜ij = ti,j + αwj + βpj
where ti,j stands for the travel time, wj represents the waiting time at facilities, and pj is
the price charged per service. This situation fits the context of a Stackelberg game, and is
best described using the bilevel programming framework or, more generally, a mathematical
program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
Concepts from network pricing and CC–FLP are merged into a single model, which
makes the problem much more challenging by the presence of facility location and service
level decision variables, bivariate queueing delays, as well as highly nonlinear nonconvex
equilibrium constraints. Our algorithm borrows ideas from both the bilevel pricing and
location literature. We adapt a reformulation technique introduced in [Julsain, 1999] for
coping with pricing of the arcs of a packet-switched communication network. The non-linear
objective function of the resulting program is linearized via a technique applied in our first
paper [Dan and Marcotte, 2017], which yields a tractable mixed integer linear program
(MILP).
Author contributions
— The general research ideas were developed jointly with my supervisors, Patrice Mar-
cotte and Andrea Lodi.
— The research (including proofs, code, experiments, etc.) was carried out by me.
— The article was written by me, and it was revised and corrected by Patrice Marcotte
and Andrea Lodi.
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ABSTRACT
In a facility service setting, whenever the disutility of customers accessing a facility is im-
pacted by queueing or congestion effects, the resulting equilibrium cannot be ignored by a
firm that strives to maximize revenue within a competitive environment. We model this sit-
uation as a nonlinear bilevel program that involves both discrete and continuous variables,
and for which we propose an efficient algorithm based on an approximation that can be
solved for its global optimum.
Keywords: pricing, location pricing, bilevel programming, mixed integer pro-
gramming, equilibrium, queueing, nonconvex
4.1. Introduction
In a competitive market, service levels and pricing, along with facility locations, are
critical decisions that a service provider faces, in order to capture demand and maximize
profit. In this context, an important trait of a user-choice market is congestion, which
has been often overlooked in the pricing literature, where one routinely assumes that users
patronize the closest facility, disregarding the congestion that may arise at facilities in the
form of queues. However, in real-life situations, customers are sensitive to service level
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as well as to prices. Actually, low prices that attract customers to a facility may in turn
induce large waiting times that will deter customers and shift them to the competition.
Alternatively, the smaller number of clients buying high-priced items might be offset by the
better experience associated with lower waiting times. In such an environment, the firm
that makes location and pricing decisions must take into account not only the price and
location attributes of its competitors, but also the user-optimized behaviour of its potential
customers, who patronize the facility that maximizes their individual utility. This situation
fits the framework of a Stackelberg game, and is best formulated as a bilevel program or,
more generally, a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). At the upper
level, the firm makes revenue-maximizing location and pricing decisions, taking into account
the user equilibrium resulting from those decisions.
The resulting MPEC, which involves highly nonlinear queueing terms, as well as contin-
uous (user flows) and discrete (location decision) variables, looks formidable. The aim of
this paper is to show that it is yet amenable to a strategy that involves approximation by a
tractable mixed integer linear program. The paper’s contributions are four-fold:
— The integration of location, service rates and prices as decision variables within a
user-choice process based on service level, queueing and pricing considerations.
— The integration of congestion and competition in the context of mill pricing, i.e.,
prices that can vary between facilities.
— The explicit modelling of the queueing process that takes place at the facilities.
— The design of an efficient heuristic algorithm based on mixed discrete-continuous linear
approximations and reformulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.1.1, we provide an
overview of the existing facility location and pricing literature. Section 4.2 is devoted to the
model, while, in Section 4.3, we describe the algorithmic framework. Numerical experiments
and a discussion of our results are reported in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5, we draw
conclusions and mention possible extensions of the current work.
4.1.1. Literature Review
In this section, we outline works that are relevant to ours, either from the modelling
(facility location, pricing, user equilibrium) or computational (bilevel programming, MPECs)
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points of view. For a more complete overview on facility location and pricing, one may refer
to [Eiselt et al., 1993].
Although the facility location problem (FLP) has a rich history, most works disregard
user behaviour related to congestion and competition, i.e., similar users are assigned to a
single path leading to the facility they patronize. While some models incorporate congestion
in the form of capacity limits, more elaborate ones capture congestion through nonlinear
functions that can be derived from queueing theory.
With respect to congestion, an early model can be found in [Desrochers et al., 1995],
who studies a centralized facility location problem where travel time increases with traffic,
and users are assigned in a way that minimizes the total delay and costs. Towards the end,
the authors mention a bilevel user-choice version of their model, but do not provide a solution
algorithm. Within the same centralized framework, [Fischetti et al., 2016] propose a Ben-
ders decomposition method for a capacitated FLP. Similarly, [Marianov, 2003] formulates a
model for locating facilities in a centralized system subject to congestion, and where demand
is elastic with respect to travel time and queue length. Users are assigned to centers that
maximize total demand. In [Castillo et al., 2009], users are assigned to facilities so as to
minimize the sum of the number of waiting customers and the total opening and service costs.
Similar to [Marianov, 2003], [Berman and Drezner, 2006], [Aboolian et al., 2008],
and [Aboolian et al., 2012] consider models characterized by elastic demand, subject to
constraints on the waiting time at facilities. Moreover, in [Zhang et al., 2010a] a model
maximizing the participation rate is considered, in a preventive healthcare setting, when
demand is elastic and users choose the facilities to patronize based on the waiting and travel
time. Note that neither of the above papers consider competition or pricing.
With respect to competitive congested facility location problems (CC–FLP), we mention
the work of [Marianov et al., 2008], who were the first to address congestion within a com-
petitive user-choice environment. Similarly, [Sun et al., 2008] consider a generic bilevel
facility location model, in which the upper level selects locations with the aim of minimizing
the sum of total cost and a congestion function, while the lower level (users) minimizes a
nonlinear cost. Both papers employ heuristics for solving their model. A more recent devel-
opment is that of [Dan and Marcotte, 2017], who solve the competitive congested FLP
using matheuristics and approximation algorithms. The present work can be considered a
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pricing extension of [Dan and Marcotte, 2017]. Moreover, [Ljubić and Moreno, 2018]
address a market share-maximization competitive FLP, where captured customer demand
is represented by a multinomial logit model. The authors solve this problem using two
branch-and-cut techniques, namely outer approximation cuts and submodular cuts.
The pricing literature is vast. Actually, many authors have addressed joint loca-
tion and pricing problems, the common practice being to operate in a hierarchical man-
ner: locations are specified first, and then price competition is defined according to the
Bertrand model [Pérez et al., 2004, Panin et al., 2014]. This approach can be justi-
fied by the fact that location decisions are frequently made for the long term, while prices
may fluctuate in the short term. However, determining the pricing strategy after the lo-
cations have been set limits the price choices and can yield sub-optimal locations, as ar-
gued in [Hwang and Mai, 1990, Cheung and Wang, 1995, Aboolian et al., 2008].
A joint decision is more suited in some practical applications, and can provide valuable
insights into whether or not entry into a market is profitable.
To the best of our knowledge, the first paper to consider simultaneous decisions on
location, price and capacity is [Dobson and Stavrulaki, 2007], who investigate a mo-
nopolistic market where a firm sells a product to customers located on the Hotelling
line [Hotelling, 1929]. In his PhD thesis, [Tong, 2011] considers two profit maximiz-
ing models in a network, single-facility and multi-facility, respectively. Competition is not
present, and demand is elastic with respect to travel distance, waiting time and price.
The author analyzes both a centralized and a user-choice system. Within the same frame-
work, [Abouee-Mehrizi et al., 2011] consider a model in which demand is elastic with
respect to price only, and clients spread among facilities based on proximity, according to
a multinomial Logit random utility model. Congestion, which arises at facilities, is char-
acterized by queueing equations, and customers might balk upon arrival. Furthermore,
[Pahlavani and Saidi-Mehrabad, 2011] address a pricing problem within a user-choice
competitive network. Locations are fixed, and users select the facility to patronize based on
price and proximity. Also, they might balk and veer, upon observation of the queue length.
The authors propose two metaheuristics for solving their model. More recent contributions
are given by [Hajipour et al., 2016] and [Tavakkoli-Moghaddam et al., 2017], who in-
vestigate multi-objective models for the centralized facility location problem with congestion
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and pricing policies. Demand is elastic with respect to price and distance, while profit and
congestion (waiting time, and idle probability) are decision variables. An extensive review
of the literature concerning competition in queueing systems is provided in [Hassin, 2016].
From the algorithmic point of view, our approach borrows ideas from the bilevel pricing
literature, which was initiated by [Labbé et al., 1998] and extended along several direc-
tions to include population heterogeneity, congestion or design, as exemplified in the papers
by [Meng et al., 2012] or [Brotcorne et al., 2008], to name only two representative pub-
lications. We will in particular adapt a linearization technique introduced in [Julsain, 1999]
for coping with pricing of the arcs of a packet-switched communication network.
4.2. Model formulation
The problem under consideration involves a firm that enters a market that is already
served by competitors that can accommodate the total demand. At the upper level of
the hierarchical model, a firm must make decisions pertaining to location, prices and qual-
ity of service, anticipating that users will reach an equilibrium where individual utilities
are maximized. Note that, when it comes to pricing, three strategies are typically consid-
ered [Hanjoul et al., 1990]:
— mill pricing: prices can vary between facilities;
— uniform pricing: all facilities charge the same price;
— discriminative pricing: customers patronizing the same facility can be charged differ-
ent prices.
In the present work, we consider mill pricing, which is actually the most challenging from
the computational point of view.
At the lower level, customers purchase an item (this could be a service as well) at the fa-
cility where their disutility, expressed as the weighted sum of (constant) travel time, queueing
delay, and price, is minimized. For the sake of simplicity, facilities are modelled as M/M/1
queues, endowed with only one server. Nevertheless, any M/M/s queues can be considered,
provided that the number of server s is fixed, and the decision variable is the service rate µ.
The assignment of users to facilities thus follows Wardrop’s user equilibrium principle, i.e.,
disutility is minimized with respect to current flows.
We now introduce the parameters and variables of the model.
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sets
I: set of demand nodes;
J : set of candidate facility locations (leader and competitor);
J1: set of leader’s candidate sites;
J∗1 ⊆ J1: set of leader’s open facilities;
Jc: set of competition’s facilities;
J∗ ⊆ J : set of open facilities (leader and competitor).
parameters
di: demand originating from node i ∈ I;
tij: travel time between nodes i ∈ I and j ∈ J ;
α: coefficient of the waiting time in the disutility formula;
β: coefficient of the price in the disutility formula;
fc: fixed cost associated with opening a new facility;
vc : cost per unit of service.
decision variables
yj: binary variable set to 1 if a facility is open at site j, and to 0 otherwise;
µj: service rate at a facility j ∈ J ; typically 0 if the facility is closed;
pj: price at an open facility j ∈ J .
additional variables
xij: arrival rate at facility j ∈ J originating from demand node i ∈ I;
λj =
∑
i∈I xij: arrival rate at node j ∈ J ;
wj: mean queueing time at facility j.
At an open facility j, the mean waiting time in the system, wj, is a bivariate function
depending on both the arrival rate and the service rate, namely
wj(λj, µj) =
1
µj − λj . (4.2.1)
In the above, the waiting time wj is only defined for open facilities, i.e., those for which µj
is positive. However, one can generalize Eq. (4.2.1) to all facilities, open or not, through
multiplication by µj − λj:
wjµj − wjλj = yj . (4.2.2)
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Indeed, when facility j is closed, yj = µj = λj = 0, and wj can assume any value. On the
other hand, Eqs. (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) are equivalent when yj = 1. Nevertheless, for simplicity
and without loss of generality, we keep the original form (4.2.1) in the model, and will specify
in Section 4.3.3 how we deal with null service rates.
At the lower level, let γi denote the minimum disutility for users originating from node
i. The Wardrop conditions are expressed as the set of logical constraints
tij + αw(λj, µj) + βpj

 = γi, if xij > 0≥ γi, if xij = 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J .
In other words, the utility of the paths having positive flow must be lower or equal than the
utility of paths carrying no flow. These conditions can alternatively be formulated as the
complementarity system
tij + αw(λj, µj) + βpj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
xij · (tij + αw(λj, µj) + βpj − γi) = 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
xij ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J .
Our model is as follows:
P: (Leader:)
max
y,µ,x,p,γ
z =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijpj −
∑
j∈J1
(fc · yj + vc · µj) (4.2.3)
s.t. µj ≤M1 · yj j ∈ J1 (4.2.4)
yj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1 (4.2.5)
µj ≥ 0 j ∈ J1 (4.2.6)
(Users:)
tij + αw(λj, µj) + βpj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J (4.2.7)
xij · (tij + αw(λj, µj) + βpj − γi) = 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J (4.2.8)
wj =
1
µj − λj j ∈ J (4.2.9)
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λj =
∑
i∈I
xij j ∈ J (4.2.10)
∑
j∈J
xij = di i ∈ I (4.2.11)
λj ≤ µj j ∈ J (4.2.12)
xij ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J . (4.2.13)
The decision variables are the vectors y (locations) and µ (number of servers), while
the user assignment x is the solution of an equilibrium problem that can be reduced to
a convex optimization problem. The leader’s objective in Eq. (4.2.3) is to maximize the
difference between the total profit and the opening and service costs. Constraints (4.2.4)
ensure that the service rate is strictly positive only at open facilities. When y = 1, it also
helps strengthening the formulation by computing a tight value for M1 such that µ values
yielding solely negative profit are eliminated.
Constraints (4.2.7), (4.2.8) and (4.2.13) characterize the user equilibrium problem, where
γi is the optimal disutility that users originating from node i are willing to incur. Typ-
ically, the equilibrium equations should only be enforced for open facilities. However, in
our case, they are automatically satisfied for closed facilities, for the following reason: if a
facility j closed, the service rate µj, and implicitly λj and xij, will be null, which implies
that Eq. (4.2.8) is satisfied. Additionally, in our model, pj can take any value for a closed
facility (although this is sub-optimal from an economic standpoint), as its contribution to
the objective value is canceled by the null terms xij. It follows that Eq. (4.2.7) is also satis-
fied. Finally, constraints (4.2.11) ensures that the total number of users originating from a
demand point amounts to the demand associated to this node, and Eq. (4.2.12) guarantees
that the arrival rate does not exceed the service rate at facility j.
For the sake of illustration, let us consider the example corresponding to the graph and
data of Figure 4.1, where nodes 1 and 2 are endowed with a demand of 35 and 30, respectively.
The competitor’s facility situated at node C operates at a service rate of 70.5, and charges
a price of 12. The fixed and variable costs are set at 50 and 1, respectively, and parameters
α = 20, β = 10. In this example, the leader opens facilities at both available sites. The
profit is shown as a function of the prices charged at the two facilities, so the service rates
have been fixed at 37.3 for A and 32.5 for B.
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Figure 4.1. Example of a 2-demand node network, 2 location candidate sites.
The associated profit curve is illustrated in Figure 4.2. While it lacks the discontinuities
associated with the basic network pricing problem (see [Labbé et al., 1998]), due to the
smoothing effect of the nonlinear queueing terms, it is still highly nonlinear and nonconvex.
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Figure 4.2. Profit associated with open facilities A and B, for the network displayed in
Figure 4.1
Observation 1. It is trivial to show that the waiting time wj is jointly convex in µj and λj,
for all µj > 0, λj < µj.
123
4.3. A mixed-integer linear approximation
The general idea that underlies the algorithmic approach is to replace the original problem
by a more manageable mixed-integer linear program (MILP), that we can further solve using
an off-the-shelf software. This idea is not entirely novel, as it has been exploited before with
different variants. For instance, in [Dan and Marcotte, 2017], the lower-level problem is
linearized using tangent planes, before the optimality conditions are written. This yields
a model containing bilinear and other nonlinear terms, which are further linearized, for
instance, by using the triangle method of [D’Ambrosio et al., 2010]. Our approach is
related to that of [Julsain, 1999], where univariate congestion functions are linearized in
the context of a network pricing problem. In our case, concepts from network pricing and
CC–FLP are merged into a single model, which makes the problem much more challenging
by the presence of facility location and service level decision variables, as well as bivariate
queueing delays.
The main steps of our resolution method are:
— Replace the bilinear terms in the objective with functions derived from the equilibrium
constraints.
— Perform linear approximations of the complementarity constraints and the remaining
nonlinear terms through the introduction of binary variables and ‘big-M’ constants.
— Use off-the-shelf MILP technology to solve the resulting MILP, or a carefully-designed
sequence of MILPs.
4.3.1. Reformulation of the objective function
The key issue is to eliminate the bilinear terms xijpj, j ∈ J1, in the objective, through
substitution and other algebraic manipulations of the model’s constraints. From Eq. (4.2.8)
we have
xijpj = − 1
β
(tijxij + αxijwj − xijγi) , j ∈ J1, (4.3.1)
whose summation over i ∈ I and j ∈ J1 leads to
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijpj = − 1
β
(∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
tijxij + α
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijwj −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijγi
)
, j ∈ J1. (4.3.2)
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The RHS of Eq. (4.3.2) now contains linear and nonlinear terms. We can simplify some
of the most ‘complicating’ ones, namely the bilinear xijγi, as follows.
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijγi =
∑
i∈I
(∑
j∈J
xijγi −
∑
j∈Jc
xijγi
)
, (4.3.3)
and since J = J1 ∪ Jc and J1 ∩ Jc = ∅,∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijγi =
∑
i∈I
diγi −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Jc
xijγi. (4.3.4)
For the bilinear terms xijγi in the RHS of Eq. (4.3.4), we write the following equations,
derived from Eq. (4.2.8).
xijγi = tijxij + αxijwj + βxijpj, i ∈ I, j ∈ Jc (4.3.5)
or, equivalently, ∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Jc
xijγi =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Jc
(tijxij + αxijwj + βxijpj) . (4.3.6)
Recall that the price is fixed at competitors’ facilities (i.e., j ∈ Jc), so xijpj is not a
bilinear term when j ∈ Jc. Then, the only nonlinear terms in the RHS of Eq. (4.3.6) are
xijwj. Putting together Eqs. (4.3.2), (4.3.4) and (4.3.6) yields:
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J1
xijpj = − 1
β
(∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
tijxij + α
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I xij
µj −
∑
i∈I xij
−
∑
i∈I
diγi + β
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Jc
pjxij
)
and, since λj =
∑
i∈I xij, the objective function can be written as
z = − 1
β
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
tijxij − α
β
∑
j∈J
λj
µj − λj +
∑
i∈I
di
β
γi −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Jc
pjxij −
∑
j∈J1
(fc · yj + vc · µj) .
(4.3.7)
All terms in Eq. (4.3.7) are linear, with the exception of λj/(µj − λj). Additionally, these
terms are undefined for µj = 0. We overcome these issues during the linearization process,
as mentioned in Section 4.3.3. We now discuss some of their properties.
Proposition 4.3.1. Each term
α
β
λj
µj − λj is
— convex in λj, and convex in µj
— neither convex, nor concave jointly in λj and µj (see Figure 4.1).
— pseudolinear jointly in λj and µj.
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Proof. The first statement is obvious. The proof of the second rests on the fact that the
Hessian of the function f(x, y) = x/(y − x) is indefinite. As for the pseudolinearity claim,
let us consider pseudoconcavity first. The gradient of f is
∇f(x, y) =
(
y
(y − x)2 ,
−x
(y − x)2
)
Let a = (xa, ya) and b = (xb, yb), such that ∇f(a) · (b− a) ≥ 0. We have that
∇f(a) · (b− a) =
(
ya
(ya − xa)2 ,
−xa
(ya − xa)2
)
· (xb − xa, yb − ya) = yaxb − xayb
(ya − xa)2 (4.3.8)
and
yaxb − xayb
(ya − xa)2 ≥ 0⇒ yaxb − xayb ≥ 0 . (4.3.9)
We now proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that f(b) < f(a). Then, xb/(yb − xb) <
xa/(ya − xa). This means that xbya − xayb < 0 and xbya − xayb ≥ 0 by Eq. (4.3.9), a
contradiction. This implies that
∇f(a) · (b− a) ≥ 0⇒ f(a) ≤ f(b), (4.3.10)
as required.
Using the same arguments, we can prove the pseudoconvexity of −f , and the pseudolin-
earity of (α/β)(λj)/(µj − λj) follows.

Figure 4.1. Function x/(y − x). Although neither convex nor concave, it is pseudolinear
(pseudoconvex, and pseudoconcave). The non-convexity is more accentuated in the vicinity
of the origin.
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4.3.2. Bounds on w, p and µ
Special attention is paid to tight bounds on the variables, since these will improve the
numerical efficiency of the resolution algorithm. Based on the parameters of the network,
we can derive upper and lower bounds for the waiting time at facilities, the prices set by the
emerging firm, and the service rate profitable for the leader. It is obvious that, in order to
make nonnegative profit, the minimum price that the leader can set must exceed the variable
cost vc associated with the service rate
pmin = vc.
Let (x′, λ′, w′) be the solution of the lower level problem under a competing monopoly. Then,
the maximum utility that users are willing to incur in order to access an item or a service is
umax = max
i∈I,j∈Jc
{
ti,j + αw
′
j + βpj
}
.
The equilibrium constraints guarantee that the above equation is satisfied even when the new
firm enters the market. Then, for all couples (i, j) that have positive flows, the associated
utility cannot exceed umax
ti,j + αwj + βpj ≤ umax,
and the bounds on p and w follow directly
wj ≤ (umax − βpmin)/α , pj ≤ umax/β
wmax = (umax − βpmin)/α , and pmax = umax/β.
(4.3.11)
The service rate at any given facility is limited by the service cost, the maximum price,
fixed cost, and total demand. The maximum possible profit of the firm is obtained when all
the demand is attracted, the maximum price is charged, and only one facility is open (fixed
cost is minimal). Since the profit (objective function) must be nonnegative, we must have
that
pmax
∑
i∈I
di − fc − µmaxvc ≥ 0,
and the upper bound on µ follows directly:
µmax =
pmax
vc
∑
i∈I
di − fc
vc
.
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4.3.3. Linear approximation
This section is devoted to a detailed description of the techniques that allow to transform
the original problem into a mixed integer linear program.
Sampling. We performed piecewise linear interpolations of the nonlinear functions involved
in our model, namely λj/(µj − λj) and 1/(µj − λj). These functions are bivariate for the
leader (µ is a decision variable), and univariate for the competitor.
For the leader, we consider Nµ + 1 equidistant sampling points on the x axis, within the
interval [0, µmax]: {µ˜n}, n ∈ {1, . . . , Nµ} such that µ˜i < µ˜j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ Nµ. Next, for
each sample µ˜n we define λnmax = µ˜
n − 1/wmax, and we sample each interval [0, λnmax] using
Nλ points {λ˜nk}, k ∈ {1, . . . , Nλ}, such that λ˜ni < λ˜nj for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ Nλ. A similar
sampling is performed for every facility of the competitor, where the sampling interval for λ
is [0, µj], ∀j ∈ Jc.
Special attention is paid to the type of sampling we use for λ. The sampling can be
equidistant either ‘horizontally’ or ‘vertically’. In the ‘horizontal’ case, for a given µ˜n the
difference between two consecutive values, λ˜ni − λ˜ni+1, remains constant. In contrast, in
the vertical case, the samples are computed such that, for a given µ˜n, and for any two
consecutive λ samples, λ˜ni and λ˜ni+1, the difference between their respective waiting time,
1/(µ˜n − λ˜ni)− 1/(µ˜n − λ˜ni+1), is constant. Both cases are illustrated in Figure 4.2 below.
(a) sampling equidistant on x axis (b) sampling equidistant on y axis
Figure 4.2. Illustration of the impact of sampling type on the approximation.
When using samples that are equidistant on the x axis, the approximation of waiting
times is best on the region where the slope is small. It is important that this function be
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well approximated in this area, as a small change in the waiting time value would cause a
significant change in the x-variable, thus approximate badly the resulting objective function.
On the other hand, a rougher approximation of the congested part would not yield a large
error in the x-values, which justifies performing the sampling equidistant on y axis.
Piecewise linearization. We now detail the linear approximation of the terms
λj
µj − λj in
the reformulated objective function, and
1
µj − λj in constraints (4.2.9). To this end,
we use the sampling described above in a triangle piecewise linearization technique from
[D’Ambrosio et al., 2010]. At a given point (λ˜, µ˜) the function of interest is approximated
by a convex combination of the function values at the vertices of the triangle containing the
point (λ˜, µ˜).
First, we approximate
λj
µj − λj and
1
µj − λj for the leader, using the following sets of
variables:
— lj,n,k and lj,n,k are binary variables denoting the lower and upper triangles, respectively,
used for evaluating the convex combinations for n ∈ {1, . . . , Nµ}, k ∈ {1, . . . , Nλ}, j ∈
J . In a feasible solution these variables equal 1 if the point of interest falls inside their
associated triangle, and 0 otherwise.
— sj,n,k represents the weight of the convex combination associated with the vertices of
the triangle containing the point of interest.
— u and w hold the approximated values of
λj
µj − λj and
1
µj − λj , respectively.
The following constraints allow to linearize
λj
µj − λj and
1
µj − λj in the original model. Since
they are not defined for µj = 0, by convention, we set them to 0, whenever µj = 0. The
motivation is that users cannot patronize a facility offering no service, yielding a null waiting
time at facilities. To accommodate this, the summation starts at n = 2 in constraints (4.3.17)
and (4.3.18), below.
Nµ∑
n=1
Nλ∑
k=1
(
lj,n,k + lj,n,k
)
= 1 j ∈ J1 (4.3.12)
sj,n,k ≤ lj,n−1,k + lj,n−1,k−1 + lj,n,k+ lj,n,k + lj,n−1,k−1 + lj,n,k−1
j ∈ J1;n ∈ {1, . . . , Nµ}; k ∈ {1, . . . , Nλ} (4.3.13)
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Nµ∑
n=1
Nλ∑
k=1
sj,n,k = 1 j ∈ J1 (4.3.14)
λj =
Nµ∑
n=1
Nλ∑
k=1
sj,n,kλ˜
nk j ∈ J1 (4.3.15)
µj =
Nµ∑
n=1
Nλ∑
k=1
sj,n,kµ˜
n j ∈ J1 (4.3.16)
wj =
Nµ∑
n=2
Nλ∑
k=1
1
µ˜n − λ˜nk · sj,n,k j ∈ J1 (4.3.17)
uj =
Nµ∑
n=2
Nλ∑
k=1
λ˜nk
µ˜n − λ˜nk · sj,n,k j ∈ J1 (4.3.18)
lj,n,k, lj,n,k ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1;n ∈ {1, . . . , Nµ}; k ∈ {1, . . . , Nλ} (4.3.19)
0 ≤ sj,n,k ≤ 1 j ∈ J1;n ∈ {1, . . . , Nµ}; k ∈ {1, . . . , Nλ} (4.3.20)
lj,n,0 = 0, lj,n,0 = 0 j ∈ J1;n ∈ {0, . . . , Nµ} (4.3.21)
lj,n,Nλ = 0, lj,n,Nλ = 0 j ∈ J1;n ∈ {0, . . . , Nµ} (4.3.22)
lj,0,k = 0, lj,0k = 0 j ∈ J1; k ∈ {0, . . . , Nλ} (4.3.23)
lj,Nµ,k = 0, lj,Nµ,k = 0 j ∈ J1; k ∈ {0, . . . , Nλ}. (4.3.24)
We perform a similar linearization for the competitor. Recall that, in this case, the service
rate, µj, is constant. We introduce variables, lˆ, sˆ wˆ and uˆ, having similar meaning to their
leader counterparts. Given wmax, we compute λˆ
j
max = µj−1/wmax, and we sample the interval
[0, λˆjmax] using Nc points λˆ
jn, n ∈ {1, . . . , Nc} such that λˆjn < λˆjm for all 1 ≤ n < m ≤ Nc,
and obtain the linearization
Nc∑
n=1
sˆj,n = 1 j ∈ Jc (4.3.25)
λj =
Nc∑
n=1
sˆj,nλˆ
jn j ∈ Jc (4.3.26)
wˆj =
Nc∑
n=1
1
µj − λˆjn
· sˆj,n j ∈ Jc (4.3.27)
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uˆj =
Nc∑
n=1
λˆj,n
µj − λˆjn
· sˆj,n j ∈ Jc (4.3.28)
Nc∑
n=1
lˆj,n = 1 j ∈ Jc (4.3.29)
sˆj,n ≤ lˆj,n + lˆj,n−1 j ∈ Jc; n ∈ {1, . . . , Nc} (4.3.30)
lˆj,n ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ Jc; n ∈ {1, . . . , Nc} (4.3.31)
0 ≤ sˆj,n ≤ 1 j ∈ Jc; n ∈ {1, . . . , Nc} (4.3.32)
lˆj,0 = 0, lˆj,Nc = 0 j ∈ Jc . (4.3.33)
At last, the complementarity constraints Eq. (4.2.8) are linearized through the introduc-
tion of binary variables and big-M constants, as follows:
tij + αwj + βpj − γi ≤M2sij i ∈ I; j ∈ J1 (4.3.34)
tij + αwˆj + βpj − γi ≤M2sij i ∈ I; j ∈ Jc (4.3.35)
xij ≤M3(1− sij) i ∈ I; j ∈ J (4.3.36)
sij ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ I; j ∈ J . (4.3.37)
The values of M2 and M3 must be sufficiently large not to forbid feasible solutions, but
not too large that they slow down the enumeration algorithm, due to a weak continuous
relaxation. Based on the network’s parameters, the following ‘tight’ values for M2 and M3
hold:
M2 = max
i∈I,j∈J
{tij}+ αwmax + βpmax
M3 = max
i∈I
{di} .
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Putting together all linear terms yields the following MILP approximation of P:
PL:
max
y,c,x,γ
z = − 1
β
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
tijxij − α
β
∑
j∈J1
uj − α
β
∑
j∈Jc
uˆj +
∑
i∈I
di
β
γi −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Jc
pjxij −
∑
j∈J1
(fc · yj + vc · µj)
s.t. tij + αw + βpj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J1
tij + αwˆ + βpj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ Jc
xij · (tij + αw(λj, µj) + βpj − γi) = 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
constraints (4.2.4)–(4.2.6), (4.2.10)–(4.2.13), (4.3.12)–(4.3.37) .
(4.3.38)
An interesting feature of this reformulation-linearization is that, since we use the same
set of variables and constraints to approximate two different functions simultaneously, the
number of variables is greatly reduced. This would not be the case if we were to linearize
separately the waiting time and the bilinear terms xijpj present in the original formulation.
Another interesting feature of this reformulation is the pseudo-linearity of the functions
replacing the bilinear terms in the objective. Although we do not exploit this property
directly, we expect the linearization to be well-behaved.
Finally, an alternative algorithmic approach based on the power-based transformation
originally proposed in [Teles et al., 2011] was initially implemented but did not perform
satisfactorily. The main idea is to transform nonlinear polynomial problems into an MILP, by
applying a term-wise disaggregation scheme, notwithstanding, with additional discrete and
continuous variables. Kolodziej et. al incorporate this technique into a global optimization
algorithm for bilinear programs [Kolodziej et al., 2013]. The authors argue that this
technique scales better than the piecewise McCormick envelopes, and is comparable with
global optimization solvers.
For the sake of completeness, and to warn other people tempted by that path, we thought
it is useful to mention it. The interested reader can find it in the appendix of this Ph.D.
thesis [?].
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4.4. Experimental Setup and Results
The algorithm has been tested on randomly generated data. We focused on challenging
instances, in which, at optimality, the number of open facilities represent more than one fifth
of the nodes. Our experiments were conducted for different problem sizes, namely for 10, 15,
20, and 25 nodes, which were generated as follows. The travel time between nodes varied
uniformly between 0 and 600. In order to ensure that problems were difficult enough, the
combinations of fixed and variable costs were chosen such that there exist feasible solutions
yielding nonnegative profit, where more than half of the facilities were open.
All procedures were implemented in Java, and the MILP formulations were solved by IBM
CPLEX Optimizer version 12.6. The tests were performed on a computer equipped with 96
GB of RAM, and two 6-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5675 processors running at 3.07GHz. The
default values of the parameters α and β were set to 20 and 10, respectively, unless specified
otherwise. In all tests, the maximum tree size was set to 30GB. Throughout this section,
the estimated objective refers to the MILP objective value as returned by CPLEX, whereas
the recovered objective is computed as follows. The decision variables are set to the optimal
values found by CPLEX, then the associated objective value is recovered by solving the
(convex) lower level problem for its exact solution, by Frank-Wolfe algorithm.
4.4.1. Solving the MILP with diﬀerent number of samples
An initial set of experiments was intended to assess the performance of the linear approx-
imation method. The algorithm was stopped as soon as the optimality gap dropped below
CPLEX’s default value (10−4), the 86,400 seconds (24 hours) limit was reached, or the tree
size exceeded 30GB. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 report the CPU needed, for various number of
approximating samples. The relative MILP gap is shown in percentage, next to the CPU.
The gap is omitted if the algorithm terminated at optimality (i.e., gap < 10−4).
For 5 and 10 samples, the algorithm needs less than 100 seconds, and on average less than
35 seconds, to reach optimality. The CPU increases abruptly with the number of samples,
which is to be expected. For 15-node networks, all tests finished at optimality when the
number of samples is lower than 60. However, 6 over 10 instances exceeded the alloted time
or memory when using 60 samples. For larger, 20-node networks, the algorithm terminated
at optimality on very few instances, when using more than 30 samples, and ran out of time
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# of samples
test # 5 10 20 30 40 60 (gap%)
1 4 9 25 9,473 1,363 14,205
2 14 20 110 398 3,883 86,409 (10.95)
3 9 26 30 361 19,837 86,404 (9.97)
4 4 32 172 13,814 21,694 34,066
5 6 18 149 11,025 52,951 73,124
6 2 5 54 5,982 18,408 86,402 (1.03)
7 5 15 92 18,006 8,831 86,402 (3.94)
8 3 11 51 3,535 9,160 86,402 (1.86)
9 2 10 88 30,486 24,153 86,402 (8.22)
10 1 9 52 8,010 9,830 1,406
Average 5 14 82 10,109 17,011 64,122 (3.60)
Table 4.1. CPU time (seconds) on 15-node networks, for different number of samples.
on all 25-node network instances. As suggested by Figure 4.1, the good solutions are found
in the early stages of the algorithm, while the remaining steps are used to close the gap and
prove optimality.
0 2 4 6 8
·104
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
CPU (s)
20 nodes
Recovered obj: 30 samples
Estimated obj: 30 samples
Recovered obj: 40 samples
Estimated obj: 40 samples
0 2 4 6 8
·104
2,000
3,000
CPU (s)
25 nodes
Recovered obj: 30 samples
Estimated obj: 30 samples
Recovered obj: 40 samples
Estimated obj: 40 samples
Figure 4.1. Variation of estimated (MILP) and recovered objective value with respect to
time.
The increase in the running time is compensated by an improvement in the approximation
quality, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The difference between the estimated (MILP) optimal
134
# of samples
test # 5 10 20 (gap%) 30 (gap%) 40 (gap%)
1 22 94 1,459 64,348 (0.30) 86,402 (5.17)
2 6 15 1,297 59,626 77,542
3 12 52 86,401 (3.60) 86,403 (0.95) 86,402 (2.04)
4 7 24 1,035 1,853 86,401 (0.24)
5 13 20 86,402 (0.27) 86,402 (6.12) 86,401 (4.76)
6 7 13 782 86,402 (0.13) 52,097 (0.75)
7 6 27 228 30,892 86,401 (1.73)
8 7 20 305 2,462 28,330
9 20 78 86,401 (0.07) 86,401 (0.04) 86,402 (6.71)
10 3 9 146 86,401 (0.56) 18,096
Average 10 35 26,446 (0.39) 59,119 (0.81) 69,447 (2.14)
Table 4.2. CPU time (seconds) on 20-node networks, for different number of samples.
objective value, and the recovered one is decreasing with the increase of the number of
samples, suggesting a solid improvement in the quality of the approximation.
0 20 40 60
2,000
2,200
2,400
Number of samples
15 nodes
Recovered obj
Estimated obj
20 40
4,000
4,500
5,000
Number of samples
20 nodes
Recovered obj
Estimated obj
20 40
3,000
3,500
Number of samples
25 nodes
Recovered obj
Estimated obj
Figure 4.2. Evolution of the MILP objective value (’Estimated’) and the true objective
value (’Recovered’), as the number of samples increases.
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# of samples
test # 5 10 20 (gap%) 30 (gap%) 40 (gap%)
1 3 5 143 86,402 (0.59) 22,702 (0.48)
2 9 23 259 5,891 (2.25) 86,403 (3.97)
3 2 11 233 78,143 (0.50) 37,895 (1.15)
4 8 32 86,401 (0.73) 25,010 (0.84) 16,177 (2.51)
5 8 24 86,413 (0.76) 86,401 (4.18) 86,403 (5.14)
6 4 12 58,331 68,406 (2.43) 86,403 (2.27)
7 3 24 86,402 (2.40) 15,545 (3.08) 7,864 (3.88)
8 5 30 9,650 86,405 (3.12) 71,371 (2.50)
9 2 16 170 6,633 (0.69) 68,635 (0.54)
10 3 17 9,127 (0.36) 86,402 (1.57) 8,789 (4.10)
Average 4 19 33,713 (0.43) 54,524 (1.93) 49,264 (2.65)
Table 4.3. CPU time (seconds) on 25-node networks, for different number of samples.
4.4.2. A math-heuristic approach
After careful inspection of the solutions, we have noticed that the number of facilities
opened at optimality does not vary significantly with the number of samples, nor with the
alloted execution time (on average around 5 – 7 are opened for the 20 and 25-node instances).
This suggests that quasi-optimal locations are found on the early stages of the algorithm, or
for coarse approximations.
Next, we assessed the quality of these opened facilities, restricting the problem to the
determination of price and service levels, which remains a difficult nonlinear bilevel problem.
We now solve the linearized problem PL using the following algorithm whose main steps are:
I. Solve PL for a small number of samples, and a limited time.
II. Retrieve the locations associated with the incumbent.
III. Solve PL, where locations are fixed from step II, using a more fine-grained sampling,
for a limited time.
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IV. Retrieve the associated solution (µ and p) and compute the lower-level equilibrium
required to obtain the true objective. This last operation can be achieved by solv-
ing a convex program. To this purpose, we implemented the classical Franc-Wolfe
algorithm.
This matheuristc version of our algorithmic has been tested on instances involving 5, 10
and 30 samples, and a time limit of 30 minutes, at step I, and 40 samples and a time limit
of 1 hour in total, for all three steps. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the comparison between the
values obtained in this way, and the objective values yielded by the original algorithm for
40 and 50-samples approximations, with running time limited to 1 hours, and a 50-sample
approximation running for 24 hours, for 20 and 25-node networks, respectively.
40 samples, 1 hour in total
from 5 from 10 from 30 samples, 40 samples, 50 samples, 50 samples,
test # samples samples 30 min 1 hour 1 hour 24 hours
1 3,454.01 3,454.01 3,454.01 345.14 – 3,455.85
2 4,931.14 4,931.14 4,931.14 4,931.14 4,933.98 4,933.98
3 10,083.30 10,083.30 10,091.46 10,091.46 – 10,145.76
4 4,892.30 4,892.30 4,892.30 4,892.30 4,887.66 4,887.66
5 5,106.06 5,862.84 5,788.60 5,757.25 6,219.17 6,201.88
6 4,200.60 4,200.60 4,200.60 4,200.60 4,227.83 4,227.83
7 4,398.22 4,398.22 4,201.22 4,345.16 4,401.96 4,401.96
8 3,141.79 3,141.79 3,141.79 3,141.79 3,154.11 3,154.11
9 3,318.63 3,318.63 3,318.63 3,291.84 3,325.85 3,354.89
10 – – – – – –
Table 4.4. Objective value comparison on 20-node networks, when 40 samples are used for
linearization, locations are fixed, and the CPU is limited to 1 hour in total (including the
warm start).
For the 20-node networks the best performance corresponds the 10-sample starting point.
On 1 instance it outperformed the 50-sample approximation, and on 8 instances it falls, on
average, within 2.4% of the optimum found by the latter, at a much smaller computational
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cost (1 hour for the 10-sample starting point as opposed to 24 hours for the 50 samples). On
most tests, the deviation is less than 1%, but the average is increased by an outlier (instance
# 5) that has an error of 11%. The 5 and 30-sample starting point yield similar results.
In almost all cases in which the 40 and 50-sample algorithm finds an initial solution in 1
hour, such a solution is as good, or even better than the 40-sample boosted by the 10-sample
locations. However, the boosted version looks more robust.
40 samples, 1 hour in total
from 5 from 10 from 40 samples, 40 samples, 50 samples, 50 samples,
test # samples samples 30 min 1 hour 1 hour 24 hours
1 2,783.93 2,783.93 2,820.28 2,820.28 2,840.15 2,840.15
2 3,653.74 3,751.08 3,775.86 3,775.86 – 3,775.44
3 3,531.34 3,531.34 3,549.39 3,549.39 3,550.34 3,550.34
4 3,477.32 3,477.32 3,482.76 3,482.76 – 3,482.60
5 3,793.96 3,841.20 3,849.36 3,849.36 3,793.38 3,849.02
6 3,211.12 3,211.12 3,223.18 3,223.18 – –
7 3,401.53 3,441.98 3,450.50 3,450.50 3,427.26 3,452.59
8 2,881.09 2,881.09 2,881.09 2,881.07 – 2,883.04
9 4,590.49 4,590.49 4,590.49 4,590.49 4,590.80 4,592.41
10 4,277.79 4,277.79 4,304.77 4,353.92 4,347.62 4,347.62
Table 4.5. Objective value comparison on 25-node networks, when 40 samples are used for
linearization, locations are fixed, and the CPU is limited to 1 hour.
Table 4.5 tells a similar story about the 25-node networks. On almost half of the instances,
the 30-sample starting point outperforms the 50-sample approximation, and on the other
half of instances it falls, on average, within 0.3% of the optimum, and at a much smaller
computational cost (1 hour for the 40-sample starting point as opposed to 24 hours for the
50 samples). When the 40 and 50-samples algorithm finds an initial solution in 1 hour, such
a solution is equally good, or even better than the 40 samples boosted by the 30 samples
locations.
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These results demonstrate that, ‘good’ locations can are found in the initial stages of the
algorithm. From an execution time point of view, it is advantageous to stop the algorithm
early on, retrieve the locations, then solve for optimal service levels and prices, using a
limited number of samples, for a small running time.
4.4.3. Comparison with general-purpose solvers
Finally, we compare our linear approximation algorithm with a general purpose solvers
for mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problems, such as BARON. We have measured
the objective values yielded by BARON, and we compare them with the results of our
reformulation technique run for 1000s.
Next, we attempted to improve the solutions found by our algorithm, using IPOPT, an
open-source software for large-scale nonlinear optimization based on a primal-dual interior
point algorithm [?]. For this experiment, we fixed the locations given by a 30-sample approx-
imation within 1 hour, yielding a fully-continuous restricted problem. We have warm-started
IPOPT with the respective 30-sample price, service levels, and user flows. The results are
shown in Table 4.6.
All BARON and IPOPT tests were run for 1,000 seconds on the NEOS server, on com-
puters equipped with 64 GB of RAM, and processors running at a frequency between 2.2
and 2.8 GHz 1.
Our reformulation technique clearly outperforms BARON on all instances. IPOPT is
capable of improving the initial solution only in three instances while, on the others, the
solution worsens significantly. On one instance, marked with * in the table, the objective
value is negative, despite being warm started with a good (positive) solution, likely indication
of numerical difficulties.
4.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we addressed a highly nonlinear bilevel pricing location model involving
both combinatorial and continuous elements, and proposed for its solution an algorithm
based on reformulation and piecewise linear approximations.
1. A detailed description of the NEOS server computers’ speciﬁcations can be found here https://neos-
guide.org/content/FAQ
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y from 30 samples, 1h,
30 samples (1000s) BARON (1000s) IPOPT (1000s)
1 3,454.28 3,330.10 3,139.12
2 4,932.44 4,444.79 3,625.29
3 9,926.58 9,385.23 6,147.16
4 4,891.93 4,323.95 3,053.51
5 5,336.68 4,446.12 5,195.17
6 4,105.17 3,901.16 3,965.02
7 4,426.14 3,789.63 * -6,419.41
8 3,093.31 2,550.13 2,852.44
9 3,215.63 2,666.95 2,374.10
10 4,053.45 2,689.02 667.08
Table 4.6. Objective value comparison with BARON and IPOPT, on 20-node networks.
Our results are encouraging, but our algorithms have some limitations. For instance,
one of the remaining challenges is to design algorithms that scale well, and can be applied
successfully on large networks.
Future work could integrate other realistic features, such as variable demand. On the
algorithmic side, an interesting development could be a method that exploits the pseudolin-
earity property of the nonlinear terms present in the reformulated objective function.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we addressed a number of bilevel location models involving both combinato-
rial and nonlinear, nonconvex elements. The resulting mathematical programs are extremely
challenging. Our models are characterized by non-linear lower level, non-convex upper level,
and the KKT optimality conditions of the lower-level can not be reformulated into an MILP.
This explains the frequent recourse to heuristic (meta-heuristics, math-heuristics) in the lit-
erature, since the exact and quasi-exact bilevel algorithms typically rest on these conditions.
Metaheuristics could be applied in our case (Tabu search, genetic algorithms, etc.), but
they are not desirable, as the solution space would increase tremendously when modelling
the non-binary variables and they only guarantee local optimality.
We believe that algorithms that exploit MILP approximations deserve some considera-
tion, and we have explored this idea in our papers. Our models are flexible and can accom-
modate numerous real-life applications, while the proposed algorithms remain applicable.
While our results are encouraging, our methods have their limitations. The main issue
is that our algorithms are intractable for large networks, due to the highly combinatorial
nature of the problems, so further research is needed in this sense.
On the modelling side, future work could integrate a number of features such as elastic
demand or the possibility of either increasing or decreasing the service rates of existing
facilities. When balking is present, users might decide veer (patronize a second facility)
instead of leaving the system. More realistic models where the competition reacts could also
be considered. Of course, the presence of these features would add more difficulty to an
already challenging problem.
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Chapter A
A power-based linearization technique
In this section we detail a linearization technique for program (P) in Chapter 4, based
on the power-based transformation originally proposed in [Teles et al., 2011]. The main
idea is to transform nonlinear polynomial problems into an MILP , by applying a term-wise
disaggregation scheme, notwithstanding, with additional discrete and continuous variables.
Kolodziej et. al incorporate this technique into a global optimization algorithm for bilinear
programs ([Kolodziej et al., 2013]). The authors argue that this technique scales better
than the piecewise McCormick envelopes, and is comparable with global optimization solvers.
On our problem, this mixed-integer linearization technique became quickly intractable
even for smaller, 10-node networks, perhaps as a consequence of the large number of addi-
tional binary variables. However, we describe it in detail for scientific purposes.
Linearization of wj for the leader.
We sample the interval (0, µmax] using P points µ
p, p ∈ {1, . . . , P}. Then, for each
sample µp we generate m samples of λ over (0, µp). Let λp,m and µp be the samples hence
obtained. We linearize wj(λ, µ) using tangent plane at points (λ
p,m, µp) for p ∈ {1, . . . , P},
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such that λp,m ≤ µp. Based on the gradient
∇wj(λ, µ) =
(
1/(µ− λ)2,−1/(µ− λ)2) , (A.0.1)
we write the first-order Taylor approximations of wj(λ, µ):
f p,m(λ, µ) = w(λp,m, µp) +∇wj(λp,m, µp)

 λ− λp,m
µ− µp


=
1
(µp − λp,m)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ap,m
·λ+ −1
(µp − λp,m)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
bp,m
·µ+ 2
(µp − λp,m)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
cp,m
.
Next, we write a piecewise linear approximation of wj by setting it to the maximum of its
linear approximations:
wj(λj, µj) ≈ max
p∈{1,...,P}
m∈{1,...,M}
{f p,m(λj, µj)} (A.0.2)
Eq. (A.0.2) can be replaced with
wj(λj, µj) ≥ max
p=1,...,P,
m=1,...,M
{f p,m(λj, µj)} (A.0.3)
Intuitively, since the leader is in control of variables λj (provided they satisfy the equilibrium
constraints), for a given value of µj and λj, it is in her best interest to set wj as small as
possible. From another angle, for a given value of wj, the leader will fix λ as high as possible,
in order to maximize her profit. This is not the case when the leader can attract the entire
demand, even for values of wj higher than the under approximation.
Linearization of wj for the competitor. For the competitor we perform a piecewise linear
approximation via binary variables. For each j ∈ Jc we sample the interval (0, µj) using R
points. Let λj,r be the aforementioned samples. We linearize wj(λ, µj) using line equations
between consecutive pair of samples, and we have:
R∑
r=1
sˆjr = 1 j ∈ Jc (A.0.4)
λj =
R∑
r=1
sˆjrλˆ
jr j ∈ Jc (A.0.5)
wˆj ≤
R∑
r=1
sˆjrw(λˆ
jr, µj) j ∈ Jc (A.0.6)
R∑
r=1
lˆjr = 1 j ∈ Jc (A.0.7)
sˆjr ≤ lˆjr + lˆjr−1 j ∈ Jc; r ∈ {1, . . . , R} (A.0.8)
lˆjr ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ R; r ∈ {1, . . . , R} (A.0.9)
0 ≤ sˆjr ≤ 1 j ∈ Jc; r ∈ {1, . . . , R} (A.0.10)
A-ii
lˆj,0 = 0, lˆj,R = 0 j ∈ Jc . (A.0.11)
Linearization of bilinear terms λj · pj. We linearize λjpj using the parametric disaggregated
method where we represent pj to a certain level of precision π (e.g. π = −3 then pj is precise
to three decimal places). Let pMAX be the maximum value the price can have (it can be
easily computed), and let λMAX =
∑
i∈I di, i.e. the total demand rate in the network. We
define Π = log10(pMAX) and the set of equations characterizing terms uj = λjpj is:
uj =
Π∑
l=pi
9∑
k=0
10l · k · λˆj,k,l j ∈ J1 (A.0.12)
pj =
Π∑
l=pi
9∑
k=0
10l · k · zj,k,l j ∈ J1 (A.0.13)
λˆj,k,l ≤ λMAX · zj,k,l j ∈ J1; k ∈ {0, . . . , 9}; l ∈ {π, . . .Π} (A.0.14)
λˆj,k,l ≥ 0 j ∈ J1; k ∈ {0, . . . , 9}; l ∈ {π, . . .Π} (A.0.15)
λj =
9∑
k=0
λˆj,k,l j ∈ J1; l ∈ {π, . . .Π} (A.0.16)
9∑
k=0
zj,k,l = 1 j ∈ J1; l ∈ {π, . . .Π} (A.0.17)
zj,k,l ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1; k ∈ {0, . . . , 9}; l ∈ {π, . . .Π} . (A.0.18)
Linearization of complementarity constraints. We linearize Eq. (??) through the introduction
of binary variables and big-M constants, as follows:
tij + αwj + βpj − γi ≤Msij i ∈ I; j ∈ J (A.0.19)
xij ≤M(1− sij) i ∈ I; j ∈ J (A.0.20)
sij ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ I; j ∈ J . (A.0.21)
The value ofM must be sufficiently large, but not too large that it slows down the algorithm.
We can compute a tight value for theM constant, based on the maximum waiting and travel
time in the network.
Finally, we write (P) as the following MILP:
A-iii
PL: (Leader:)
max
y,µ,x,p,γ
z =
∑
j∈J1
uj −
∑
j∈J1
(fc · yj + vc · µj)
s.t. µj ≤M1 · yj j ∈ J1
yj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J1
µj ≥ 0 j ∈ J1
tij + αwj + βpj − γi ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
λj =
∑
i∈I
xij j ∈ J
∑
j∈J
xij = di i ∈ I
λj ≤ µj j ∈ J
xij ≥ 0 i ∈ I; j ∈ J
constraints (A.0.3) – (A.0.21) .
A-iv
